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Since its introduction into switching service in 1924, to passenger
service in 1934, and to freight service in 1941, the diesel-electric
locomotive has become the dominant form of power on the railroads of
the United States in each of these services. The superiority of the
diesel over the reciprocating steam locomotive in economy and effi-
ciency of operation, through its lower fuel and maintenance costs, its
higher availability, its ability to accelerate rapidly, to draw heavier
loads, to travel longer distances without requiring servicing or re-
fueling, have all recommended its adoption to the carriers.
However, the same factors which led to the adoption of the diesel-
electric led also to its being feared as a potential cause of labor
displacement by the railway employees and their labor organizations.
The historic trend in the industry toward the employment of fewer men
per unit of transportation service furnished caused the railroad workers
to view the innovation with suspicion and alarm.
The content of the jobs of many of the crafts employed by the
carriers has been reduced or drastically altered. This is particularly
true for the firemen, the engineers, the electricians and the machinists.
The employment opportunities for some of the crafts have been reduced
because their skills and services are not required on the diesel loco-
motive. The boilermakers have been affected greatly in this way with
the blacksmiths and machinists suffering also, although to a lesser
degree. The employment opportunities for electrical workers has in-
creased because of the greater quantity of electrical equipment on the
diesel-electric.
Both the Brotherhood of Locomotive Tngineers and the Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen-have sought to require the employment
of an additional member of their craft in the engine rooms of multiple
unit diesels. Each of the organizations has twice carried its demands
before an Emergency Board, in 1943 and in 1949. Each time the Boards
have rejected the union demands. The normal crew of q diesel consists
of an engineer and a fireman, the latter with inspection and patrol
duties in the engine room.
Despite the fears of the two Brotherhoods that the new motive power
would lead to the employment of fewer firemen and engineers, no note-
worthy displacement can be detected in the employment statistics. In
part, this has been the result of a unique system of payment whereunder
train and engine service employees are paid either by time or by mileage,
whichever results in the higher payment.
It is altogether possible that complete dieselization may
result in some degree of labor displacement in the future. To
date, however, such displacement is largely limited to certain
of the shop crafts. The advantages offered by the diesel to the
railway industry, and through it to the economy as a whole, can
not but help to benefit the country and the economy in the long
run. The price for this benefit in terms of technological dis-
placement of workers promises to be. so low that the country
cannot afford not to pay it.
Thesis Supervisor: Douglass V. Brown.
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I. INTRODUC TION
A. The Problem.
The diesel-electric locomotive represents one of the most
significant developments in the transportation industry since the
development of the airplane. It has effected a profound change in
the railroad operating methods, maintenance methods, and managerial
methods. It has displaced the steam locomotive entirely on many
oarriers, is in the process of replacing the older form of motive
power on others, and has left untouched not a single major carrier in
the country. Even the few which have not purchased diesels have had
to adjust their steam operating methods to meet the challenge of
the new power.
Just as the diesel has posed problems and wrought changes for
railway management, so has it presented the railroad workers with a
new set of problems. The "diesel problem" has loomed large on the
scene of American railway labor in recent years and has been a matter
of concern to the labor organizations dealing with the railroadsa.
The skills of many workers have no place in diesel operation and
maintenance. Craft patterns which evolved to cope with and work on
the steam locomotive have, in many instances, lost their significance.
Jurisdictional arrangements among the various labor groups and between
workera and employers hiave become blurred and coriuse' with the
chans-~~ nature of the 'crk to b- done.
Railway labor has reacted to the innovation in a manner fam-
iliar to any student of labor. Firemen and engineers have feared
displacement through dieselization and have attempted to secure the
enploympib of additional mmbers of their crafts as the price for
aoceptance of the innovation. Certain of the shop crafts, seeing
their skills and oustomary duties atrophy as dieselization spread,
have attempted to expand their jurisdiotional lines to encompass the
new work- offered by the diesels
Carriers, in the effort to obtain the maximum advantage from
the economies of the new power, have resisted the attempts of the
labor organizations to impose additional labor costs on the diesels.
The "diesel problem" has resulted in controversy between carriers and
workers. This controversy has affected the public interest through
the medium of strikes and threats of strikes in the industry* On
three occasions an Enwrgeaoy Labor Board has been appointed by the
President of the United States to enquire into the facts of the
segment of the problem as seen by the firemen and engineers. The
other crafts have not gone to these extremes, but have engaged in
various movements aimed at a solution of the problem acceptable to
theme Despite all of these efforts, the "diesel problem" is by no
means a settled ore. It and its ramifications will continue to be
of great importance on the labor relations scene in the railway industry.
It is the purpose of this inquiry to examine the nature of the
diesel-electric locomotive in terms of the characteristics which have
led to its adoption by the carriers, in terms of its effects upon var-
ious sectors of railway labor, and in terms of the attempts at solut-
ion of the "diesel problemo" Since it is the threat of a form of
tecohnological displaoement to which most of the labor organisations
have reacted, an attempt mnst be made to appraise the effects of the
David P. Morgan, "How Many Diesels, How Seon?" ins Trains and
Travel, Vol. 12, No. 6, April, 1952, p. 52.
diesel upon the employment of the various orafts concerned. This can
properly be done only in the light of history and the past relation-
ships between employment in the industry and the various faotors which
have acted upon it* Only in so far as the diesel either creates or
intensifies already existing problems, only to the extent that it alters
already existing patterns, can it properly be blamed for displacement.
Be Characteristics of the Diesel-Electrio Locomotive.
1. lhat it is and how it works.
The diesel-electric locomotive essentially consists of an internal
combustion diesel engine driving an electrio generator which supplies our-
rent to electric motors connected to the driving wheels of the locomebtie.
The propehiing mechanism of this type motive power is electrical.
Electrio traction &ocounts for most of the operating oharacter-
istics which render this type power superior in mwny respeets to the
recipreeoating steam locomotive* Although these oharacteristics are in-
herent in electric traction, the huge capital investment necessary for
power stations, transmission lines, ete. has prevented a more general use
of eleetri• loeemotives. The increasing use of the diesel has resulted,
in part, from its ability to develop its own electrio power without the
extensive fixed plant formerly required for eleetric traction, while
retaining the mobility of steam power.
The power developed in the motors connected to the wheels of the
diesel depends upon the amount of current flowing through the motors.
The close control possible in electrio oircuits over the current flow
enables the enginean to regulate closely the amount of torque or rotary
power reaching the driving wheels. Since the electrical ourrent flows
without interruption from the generator, this power flow is continuous.
The reciprocating steam locomotive obtains its power
from the expansion of steam in a horizontal cylinder. The
reciprocating motion is converted to rotary motion by means
of a crank. The surge of power comes with each individual
admission of steam into the cylinder, two for each revolution
of the driving wheel. The power delivered to the wheel is inter-
mittent rather than continuous.
The close control over power and the continuous flow of
power make it possible for the diesel-electric to achieve ad-
hesion between the driving wheels and the rail far greater than
that permitted by the power characteristics of the steam loco-
motive. The wheels of a diesel are much less likely to slip
at starting than is the case with the reciprocating power. It
has been demonstrated that a coefficient of adhesion as high as
thirty-three per cent is possible for the diesel compared to a
maximum of twenty-five per cent for steam.1 This means that one-
third of the weight of the diesel locomotive is translatable into
forward motion, compared with one-fourth for steam.
These three factors make the diesel electric locomotive far
superior to the steam variety in the ability to start heavy loads
moving over the rail and to keep loads moving at low speeds. This
characteristic is particularly important in switching service and
1. L. K. Sillcox, Head-End Horsepower (Syracuse University, 1949),
p. li.
2. For a full development of the adhesion characteristics and
comparative deficiencies of steam power, see: R. P. Johnson,
The Steam Locomotive (New York: Simmons-Boardman, 1942, pp.
126 ff.
accounts in part for the rapid spread of diesel-electric power in
that area.
Freight service also requires the starting of heavy loads and
the exercise of great power at low speeds. This maximum tractive
effort (the ability measured in pounds, to move a load) requires the
passage of large amounts of current through the traction motors. While
maximum current can be utilized for short periods of time, continuous
large current flow damages the traction motors through overheating
them. Therefore, in practice, while great tractive effort is se-
cured for starting and for emergency short-time conditions without
damage to the motors, the work the diesel will be called upon to do
must be studied carefully. Coasting, stopping, or layovers must be
arranged so that the total amount of current passing through the
motors in any one hour will not be excessive.
In contrast, the steam locomotive can exercise its full power
over unlimited time, but its full power is not realized at low
speeds. Fundamentally, the steam locomotive has a rising power char-
acteristic as speed increases. This is because the number of engine
power strokes varies directly with the speed-- limited in the higher
speed ranges by the capacity of the boiler to deliver steam to the
cylinders. The diesel, however, has an almost constant horsepower
output which results in a decreasing tractive force as speed in-
creases. To obtain equal drawbar pull at higher speeds, a higher
horsepower rating is necessary for a diesel-electric locomotive than
for steam. However, any disadvantage suffered at high speeds by the
diesel-electric can be overcome in part by suitable gear ratios de-
signed for the assigned service. This does result in slightly less
flexibility on the part of the individual diesel-electric unit as
compared to the steam locomotives but the flexibility gained through
the ability to operate in multiple units more than compensates. This
objection has been held to be minor when compared with the advantages
of diesel-electric power.
2. Advantages of the diesel-electric locomotive.
Despite any operating advantages the new form of motive power
might have held, it had to prove itself to the carriers on the basis
of cost* The superiority of the diesel in this area arises from its
thermal efficiency advantages, and its maintenance requirements.
The comparatively high thermal efficiency of the diesel-eleo-
tric locomotive in comparison with steam motive power is responsible
for much of its relative economy. The energy pofentialin a given
quantity of fuel is realized to a ruch greater extent in the diesel-
electric locomotive thah in any form of existing competing motive
power.
The use of superheated steam with single expansion character-
izes the average steam locomotive in use today. As is shown in Table
I, this delivers approximately seven per cent thermal efficiency, as
compared with about thirty per cent for the diesel-electric locomotive.
The last great challenge to the diesel-electric locomotive by the
designers of reciprocating steam motive power was in high pressure
steam. Even in this, however, the thermal efficiency managed to reach
only about ten per cent*
TABLE I
THERMAL EFFICIENCY AT WHEEL
VARIOUS TYPES OF RAILWAY MOTIVE POWER*
Type of Motive Power Per CentEfficiency
at Wheel
Saturated steam, single expansion. 5.0
Superheated steam, single expansion 7.0
Superheated steam, compound expansion 8.0
Condensing Steam Turbine, Electric Transmission 8.5
High Pressure Steam, single expansion 10.0
High Pressure Steam, Condensing 12.0
Gas Turbine, Electric Transmission 16.0
Diesel-electric 30.0
* SOURCE: G. H. Allen, The Railway Locomotive (New York;
Harcourt Brace and Company, 1941), p.176.
The comparatively high thermal efficiency of the diesel-
electric enables it to recover and develop as useful work about
thirty per cent of the total heat in the fuel. This results in sub-
stantial savings in fuel costs compared to other forms of motive
power.
TABLE II
RELATIVE FUEL COSTS FOR VARIOUS SERVICES,
CLASSI'SrFAM RAILWAYS IN THE UNITED STATES,
MARCH, 1949*
Unit and Service Coal Oil Diesel-Steam Steam Electric
Per Locomotive Switching Hour $2.41 $3.05 $0.69
Per 1,000 Gross Ton-Miles, Freight 0.352 0.399 0.165
Per 1,000 Passenger Miles 0.052 0.051 0.029
SOURCE: "Fuel and Power Statistics of Class I Steam Railways",
Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics, Interstate
Commerce Commission. Statement M-230, March, 1949.
A study made by the Bureau of Transport Economics and Statis-
tics of the Interstate Commerce Commission revealed that in the
first six months of 1950, the Class I railroads of the country were
able to carry 2.3 times as many gross ton-miles of freight per dollar
spent on diesel fuel than per dollar spent on coal, 2.2 times per
dollar spent on fuel for oil burning steam engines, and over twice
as many per dollar than for purchased electric current for electric
1
locomotives. Diesel fuel has not increased in price per unit relative
to coal. From 1939 to 1949 the average cost per ton of coal in-
creased 105 per cent. During the same period the price of diesel fuel
rose 103 per cent.2
Fuel costs have been one of the more important savings of the
diesel-electric locomotive, but the economies do not end with fuel.
The .eost of water for a steam locomotive is a considerable item of
expense. The steam locomotive may evaporate more than 70,000 pounds
of water per hour. With the exception of rain water, melted snow,
and condensate, all water supplies are contaiminated with mineral
salts, vegetable matter, or acids. If these impurities are not re-
moved, they will corrode the boiler or deposit scale on the inside of
the boiler tubes. This 5cale acts as a heat insulating material and
may cause heat losses up to 12 per cent.3  The railroads are forced
1 "Monthly Comment on Transportation Statistics," Bureau of Trans-
port Economics and Statistics, Interstate Commerce Commission,
September 14, 1950, p.7.
2Sixt-third Annual ReDort on the Statistics of Railways in the
United States (1949), Interstate Commerce Commission (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1951), Table 71, p.68. (Hereinafter
cited as: Annual Report on the Statistics of Railways.)
R. P. Johnson, 9o. cit., p.109.
9to spend large sums for treatment of the water required by the
boilers of the steam locomotive.
The New York Central operates for the most part through terri-
tory where water is abundant, yet it has calculated that for its
most modern steam locomotives the water cost approximates three
cents per mile. This compares with a per mile cost of approximately
one-half of one cent for diesel power on the same assignments.1
Water costs for steam switching power on the Burlington Lines were
calculated at eleven cents per switching hour; the cost for diesel-
electric operation was an insignificant fraction of one cent.2
The savings in water costs are possible because the water re-
quirements of the diesel are negligible in comparison with steam.
Water is used in the radiators of the diesel engines for cooling and,
in passenger service, for heating the train with steam. It is sel-
dom necessary to add water to the diesel en route as these locomo-
tives can carry several days' supply. This eliminates many of the
service stops which are necessary for the steam locomotive. The
diesel thus can attain a higher average speed over a given distance
or maintain the same average as the steam locomotive although opera-
ting at a lower maximum speed.
High utilization is another of the outstanding advantages of
the diesel-electric locomotive. This strongly recommends the
adoption of this type of motive power to railroad operating
officials. Utilization may be measured on a relative, or on an
P. W. Kiefer, A Practical Evaluation of Railroad Motive Power
(New York: Steam Locomotive Research Institute, 19A7), p. 48.
2 F. G. Gurley, "Diesel Engines in Railway Service,"
FRailway Age, Vol. 100, May 9, 1936, p. 763.
:.. 10.
absolute, basis. In both passenger and freight service, the mileage
per locomotive per year indicates directly the absolute utilization.
The time the locomotive is in use divided by the time the locomotive
could have been used yields a percentage figure valuable as a yard-
stick of relative utilization. By either of these measure, the
diesel-electric has demonstrated a superiority over the older form
of motive power.
In passenger service the diesel has been able to operate as
many as 250,000 miles per locomotive per year, and up to 27,000
miles per month. This is in contrast with 180,000 miles per year
and a monthly mileage of 18,000 to 19,000 miles for steam passenger
locomotives.
The New York Central experimented with diesel power in 1946 and
operated both steam and diesel under identical conditions, so far
as was possible. The results of this study indicated that steam
could produce a potential of 26,226 miles per month; the diesel-
electric, 27,496. In terms of average miles per day, the respec-
tive figures were 862 and 904 miles. In this test only the most
modern steam power was used and the diesels were given no prefer-
ence in assignments.2
In still another instance, the diesel-electric assigned to the
"Capital Limited" of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad had 100 per
cent availability over a period of twelve months. This locomotive
made a 772 miles run between Chicago and Washington for 365 con-
secutive days. The locomotive arrived in the morning and departed
E. E. Chapman, "Steam vs. Diesel-Electric Power". Railway Akge
Vol. 111, July 26, 1941, p. 173.
2
For details of this interesting study see: Kiefer, on. cit.,
passim.
. 1.1
in the same afternoon at each terminal and the longest period during
the entire year in which the locomotive was available for servicing
was six and one-half hours.
Because of this greater availability and higher utilization,
it has been possible for a fleet of diesel-electric locomotivesto
replace a much larger number of steam locomotives. The Maybrook
line of the New Haven replaced 46 steam locomotives with 15 diesel-
electrics and improved schedules and train loads in the process.2
However, diesels cannot escape the law of diminishing returns.
The New York Central dieselized approximately 46 per cent of its
locomotive mileage by early 1952 with]235 diesel units. At this rate
of utilization in theory the system could replace all of its steam
engines with a total diesel fleet of approximately 2,500 units.
Officials of the road hope to convert completely to diesel operation
by 1950 but expect to use at least 4,600 units for full diesel oper-
ation.3  Such variations from theoretical requirements based on
past records arise from the fact that most of the carriers have
assigned the more expensive diesel locomotives first to long dis-
tance runs which permit greater utilization. In the event of com-
plete dieselization, standby power must be kept in order to provide
for peak traffic loads. Optimum utilization of units assigned to
more sporadic services cannot be achieved. Despite this less than
theoretical performance, diesels will be able to replace steam in
a ratio of two to three, or three to four.
"B.& 0.Diesels on the Job 365 Days in a Year", Railwyr Age,
Vol. 108, March 9, 1940, p. 469.
2 "New Haven Changes Maybrook Freight Line to Diesel-Electric",
Railway Age, Vol. 124, June 19, 1948, p. 1197.
3 D. P. Morgan, 2R. cit., p. 53.
The higher initial cost of diesel-electric power relative to
steam and the greater contribution to fixed charges represented
by this higher initial cost are not important in the long run. Both
are more than over-balanced by the utilization advantages. The high
degree of availability of the diesel locomotive permits the armor-
tization of this type power over a shorter time period than is
possible with less utilized locomotives. This is sufficient to over-
come the disadvantage of higher first cost.
Mr. J. M. Symes, Vice-President in Charge of Operations of the
Pennsylvania Railroad, one of the last of the major carriers to
adopt diesel power, justified the abandonment of steam in terms of
the marginal efficiency of capital in fixed and initial cost terms:
Rights up to and through World War II we were leaning
toward the further development of the steam locomotive
and the extended use of electrification. The economy
of the diesel had not sufficiently proven itself to us.
During 1939 we could have acquired the most modern
heavy duty steam locomotive at a cost of approximately
$150,000. We could have extended our electrification
west from Harrisburg to Altoona, including the required
electric locomotives, for approximately 47 million dol-
lars. A 6,000 horsepower diesel locomotive at that
time cost something like $550,000 . The price of coal
was but $2 a ton, and by reason of its abundant
supply on our railroad the hauls to consuming point
were not excessive.
To place the higher initial cost of diesels against the
lower initial cost of steam locomotives or the 47
million dollar electrification project on the Middle
Division between Harrisburg and Altoona at that time
would have shown but a doubtful 5 per cent or 6 per cent
annual 'saving.
What happened to change this? The cost of the $150,000
steam engine progressively increased to a $300,000
figure. The 47 million cost of the electrification be-
tween Harrisburg and Altoona progressively increased to
a 105 million dollar figure. The cost of the $550,000
diesel progressively increased to a little over
$600,000. The price of coal increased from $2.00 to
$4.60 a ton. Wage rates increased 47.9 per cent from
1939 to 1946, and to 74.5 per cent as of today 1949 on
the Pennsylvania Railroad. The doubtful 5 or 6 per cent
return on the diesel against the other forms of motive
power at the beginning of the War moved into a definite
return of about 30 per cent at the end of the War, and
inasmuch as a large motive power program was required
on our railroad to take care of obsolescence and increase
operating efficiency, that is when we moved into the
diesel field. 1
It is probable that the experience of the Pennsylvania has been
the rule rather than the exception and this experience offered ample
reason for the adoption of the diesel-electric in preference to
competing forms of motive power.
There are other less obvious advantages inherent in the use of
the diesel internal combustion enginer with electric traction. These
include several effects upon the maintenance of track and structures.
The absence of unbalanced rotating parts in the diesel locomotive
removes the dynamic augment or rail pound which results from a
necessary imbalance on reciprocating steam locomotive driving wheels.
The unbalanced weights on steam drivers contribute to a centrifugal
force which tends to lift the wheel off the rail during one phase
of the rotation cycle and cauaes it to bear more heavily on the
on the rail in the downward phase of rotation. This pounding, which
contributes greatly to track and structure stresses, is abaent in
the diesel.
Transcript of Proceedings of the Emergency Board in so-called
"Engineers' Diesel Case", Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
vs. Designated Railroads, 1949, Vol. 14, p.2360.
(Hereinafter cited as: Transcript, Engineers' Diesel Case.)
:14
The diesel does have a disadvantage in this connection which is
not generally shared with the steam locomotive as high wheel loading
in proportion to wheel diameter is characteristic of diesel locomo-
tive design. It is altogether possible that the problem of high
wheel loading may replace dynamic augment as an important factor in
the determination of rail life. Wear and tear on track and struc-
tures by locomotives is directly reflected in maintenance costs.
The fouling of track ballast by the continuous rain of cinders
and ashes from the fireboxes of coal-burning locomotives has been a
problem in track maintenance. Fouling of ballast can lead to
improper drainage of surface water which can result in increased rust-
ing of rail tie-plates and rotting of ties. This potential source
of increased maintenance is not a problem with the diesel locomotive.
A lower center of gravity than is possible with steam power
is characteristic of diesel design and is a factor in track and
structure wear. This is particularly true in high speed operation
where the speed on curves is limited absolutely by the theoretical
overturning speed of the locomotive. The lower center of gravity
permits higher operating speeds in the same service and also con-
tributes to less rail wear on curves.
It is not possible to draw any valid quantitative conclusions
concerning the effects of dieselization on track maintenance costs
because many of the variables are completely independent of the
kind of motive power used. These variables include the increasing
mechanization of track maintenance, the quantity of deferred main-
tenance, the weight and speed of the traffic borne by the rail, the
design and the weight of the rail, etc. It may be said only that the
1amount of maintenance required, provided that wheel loadings do not
1
reach the critical level. The other diesel characteristics bearing
on the track maintenance problem may exert some long-run effects
toward reducing costs.
Diesel locomotives are not completely free from objectionable
combustion gases, but they are vastly cleaner in operation than steam
engines. The absence of coal smoke and fumes is an important con-
sideration even in non-urban operations. Extensive blower installa-
tions have been found necessary in many tunnels to probect the crews
of steam locomotives from the gases produced by the combustion of
coal. As alternatives, electric locomotives have been used in some
tunnel operations as have cab-in-front steam locomotives.
The products of coal combustion form acids which attack structural
members in bridges, underpasses, and other structures. The inhibi-
ting and correction of such corrosion is a considerable item of
expense which is reduced greatly by the use of the diesel locomotive.
For the most part, diesels have been assigned to select and
i difficult runs. On these the new motive power has demonstrated out-
standing economies and advantages. The advantages of diesel-electric
operation are multiplied greatly when it is used to the exclusion
of steam power, and the full economies are realized only after com-
plete dieselization.
1
A non-technical development of this aspect of the diesel is found
in: Chapman, op. cit., p.175-7.
absence of unbalanced rotating parts in the running gear of the loco-
motive will reduce stresses in track and structures and, hence, the
The railroad must maintain complete facilities for repair,
fueling, water supply, cinder-handling, etc., so long as any steam
power is in use over a particular section. The concomitants of
steam operation can be abandoned only when the diesel is the only
motive power in use.
A dieselized railroad can use utility switching locomotives and
combination freight-passenger units. This permits two types of
power to replace aasmany as seven classes of steam locomotives.
Three or four types of diesel power can meet all of the locomotive
needs, even if combination units are not used.
A Committee of the American Association of Railroad Super-
intendents reported in 1949 on the "Benefits from Complete Diesel-
ization of an Entire Division or Subdivision". This report cited a
district with 950 miles of track in which 165 steam locomotives were
replaced by 100 diesel-electric units used in multiples of one, two,
and three. The district was able to abandon its steam locomotive
repair facilities, six boiler-washout plants, eight mechanical
cinder hoists, 44 water stations, 40 water treating plants, and
1
17 coaling stations.
On another railroad studied-by this Committee, twelve diesels
of only two types. replaced twenty-six steam locomotives of five
types. After dieselization, operating costs including fuel,q water,
lubrication, maintenance, wages of maintenance and train-service
employees, maintenance of facilities, and depreciation were
"Superintendents Probe Wide Range of Problems at 53 Convention",
Railway Age, Vol 126, June 25, 1949, p. 1248.
S$969,996 a year. With steam power these costs had been $1,491,468.
A net return of 15.3 per cent on the investment in diesels re-
sulted from these savings.
The reduction in the number of locomotive types in use on any
particular portion of road results in a sharp reduction in the
spare parts inventory which must be carried. The maintenance forces
need not be prepared to replace any one of a hundred different
parts on six or seven different locomotive types.
The advantages of dieselization are cumulative and the implica-
tions for railway labor are the greatest where diesel-electric
locomotives have replaced all of the steam motive power.
~I
I
C. History and Scope of Dieselization
The diesel-electric locomotive is a comparative newcomer to
the railroads of the United States. This form of motive power was
first applied to switching service and was thought suitable only
for this limited use for many years.
In the early 1920's, the American railroads, locomotive-manu-
facturers, and diesel engine builders realized that the steam switch-
ing locomotive was very inefficient and objectionable. The smoke
and noise of a steam locomotive constituted a problem, particularly
in metropolitan areas.
The General Electric Company and the Ingersoll-Rand Company were
the first to approach this problem constructively. Beginning with
the Central Railroad of New Jersey in 1925, this combination supplied
railroads in the New York City area with diesel-electric switching
locomotives. This development, however, did not spread rapidly. At
the end of 1934 only approximately 100 such.locomotives were in use,
but within the next five years over 300 came into service. Between
January 1, 1940, and December 31, 1944, over 1,500 more were pur-
chased. By the end of 1949, over 2,500 more had been added to the
rosters of the carriers. An additional thousand new ones added in
1950 brought the total at the end of that year to 5,687. Diesel
switching power at the end of October, 1951, numbered 6,413, repre-
senting about 51 per cent of the.total switching locomotives in ser-
vice.
Annual Report on the Statistics oC Railways, 1949, p.18.
2 "Motive Power and Car Equipment of Class I Steam Railways",
Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics, Interstate Commerce
Commission. Statement M-240, October, 1951.
The spread of the diesel to passenger service did not occur
until 1934. Early in 1933, the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Rail
Road Company determined to build a small, streamline train which
later became inown as the "Zephyr". A light-weight, internal com-
bustion engine was essential for a train such as the officials had
in mind. General Motors Corporation had developed a new, two-cycle
diesel engine using strong, new metal alloys. Weight per horsepower
was reduced from over 150 pounds to 21 pounds in the new engine.
Mr. Ralph Budd, then president of the Burlington Lines, saw
two of the remarkable new engines on exhibit in the General Motors'
Building at the Century of Progress in Chicago in the summer of 1933.
He was able to visualize "one of them in the Burlington streamline
train which was then being built". After experiencing difficulties
in cooling the engine within the limited confines of a locomotive,
the manufacturers pronounced the engine satisfactory for installa-
tion early in 1934. On April 7, 1934, the train came out, and two
days later on its trial trip attained a speed of 104 miles an hour.
The new train and its diesel-electric power were both very
successful and the lead of the Burlington was followed by several
other roads soon thereafter. Bankrupt roads were among the early
adopters of diesel power. The absence of the necessity to pay bond
interest permitted trustees to invest cash in the newer motive
2power, an action which speeded the recovery of many of the roads.
By the end of 1939, ninety diesel-electric passenger units were
in use. In the next five years about two-hundred were added. With
1Mr. Budd told the interesting story of the Burlington's experiment at
a luncheon in New York City commemorating the fortieth anniversary of
the diesel engine. Reported in: Railway Ag, Voil. 103, Nov. '37,p.636
"Progress Through Diesels", Investors' Reader, Vol. 12, May 11,'49,p4
the end of the war, the rate of adoption increased and 381 were pur-
chased by the carriers in 1947. The trend has continued in recent
years and at the end of October, 1951, 1433 diesel-electric passenger
locomotives were in use--about thirty per cent of all passenger
locomotives.1
The railroads have seen the popular appeal of higher speeds to a
public made conscious of speed by the progress of air transport.
The diesel is most strongly indentified with passenger service in
the eyes of the public. It is the high-speed, "name-train," drawn
by a colorful and streamline diesel which is regarded as the natural
element of this type motive power. By lightening the equipment,
streamlining the exterior surfaces, improving braking methods, etc.,
the carriers have put into operation trains with much faster schedules
than was previously possible.
On a basis of high top speed alone, however, the steam locomo-
tive is certainly the equal of the diesel. But, in any considera-
tion of high-speed operation, the problem of sustained speeds must
carefully be balanced against maximum speed considerations. The re-
duction of delays during stops, of time required to accelerate the
train up to operating speed from a stop or a slow down, or of the
time jeqiuired to brake the train to a stop from a high speed, can
contribute more to maintaining a high average speed over a route
than can a simple increase in maximum speed.
The diesel caaracteristics permit high average speed without
excessive maximum speed. A 3600 horsepower diesel-electric locomotive
"Notive Power and Car Equipment", October, 1951.
can reach a speed of 87 miles per hour in slightly over 13 minutes;
an eauivalent steam locomotive with an identical train consumes
over 17 minutes in accelerating to the same speed.
A similar advantage is held by the diesel in braking. Less
time is required for the diesel powered train to slow down or to
stop. In both steam and diesel powered trains the locomotive weight
is a large portion of the total train weight, but the diesel can be
braked at a level higher than steam power and more consistent with
the braking level of the trailing cars.2
Field tests made with diesel and steam powered trains have
indicated that a ten-car, diesel-powered, light-weight train running
at a speed of 110 miles per hour could be brought to a stop within
3,675 feet. At 90 miles per hour, within 2,550 feet. This is
approximately forty per cent less distance than is required by a
steam powered train.3
An added braking advantage possible with the diesel-electric
is "dynamic braking". This involves using the traction motors as
electric generators while the locomotive is decelerating. The
energy thus produced is transformed into heat by electric resistance
circuits and released to the atmosphere. This method of braking
reduces greatly the air-brake applications necessary to slow or
stop the train and also speeds and improves the braking process.
1
"Motive Power and Car Equipment", October, 1951.
2- H.M.Jacklin, Testimony in: Transcript of Proceedings of the Emer-
gency Board in so-called "Diesel Case"n, Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers and Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen vs.
Designated Railroads, 1943, Vol. 12, p.230. (Hereinafter cited
as: Transcript, Diesel Case.)
3 L.K.Sillcox, Mastering Momentum (New York: Simmons-Boardman, 1941),
pp.79-3. The braking characteristics of the steam locomotive are
discussed at some length in this technical treatment.
L
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The combination of these many advantages made the diesel par-
ticularly attractive for passenger train operation. For several
years, however, railroad officials considered that high-speed
passenger service marked the limit of the diesel's railway applica-
tion.
It was not -until 1941 that the first diesel-electric powered
main-line freight train appeared. Previously, seven diesel locomo-
tives had been assigned to freight service, but the application of
diesel power to freight service in the manner it is used today began
on the Santa Fe February 5, 1941, when a diesel left Argentine,
1
Kansas, with a freight train for Los Angeles.
On this pioneer freight run, no particular attempt was made for
a speed record either by means of unusually high operating Eeeds
or reduced delays on the road and at terminals. The running time
for this trip of 1,761.8 miles was 54 hours, 35-1/2 minutes, an
average running speed of 32.3 miles per hour. The maximum speed
attained during the run was 68 miles per hour. The locomotive de-
monstrated ample reserve capacity to handle heavier trains than the
one used in the test and at substantially higher speeds. The use
of dynamic braking on the locomotive resulted in a reduction in the
number of air brake applications to one-fourth the number ordinarily
necessary. A total of seven steam locomotives would have been re-
quired for the entire trip and not less than 28 stops for water or
fuel. The diesel made the run with only four stops for fuel. 2
"Santa Fe Tests Main-Line Diesel Freight Power", Railway Age,
Vol. 110, pp. 452-8.
2Ibid., p.456-7.
Operating officials regarded this trip as highly successful.
The economies and advantages of diesel-electric power in freight
service were conclusively demonstrated. During 1941, 47 freight
units were placed in service on the railways and the last field
had been won by the diesel.
The production limitations imposed by the War inhibited the
adoption of this new power to a high degree, but 845 were placed
in service by the end of 1944. The end of the War marked the start
of a rapid trend toward diesel freight power and at the end of
October, 1951, the 4730 diesel locomotives assigned to freight ser-
vice accounted for 25 per cent of the freight locomotives in use.
Only 14 of the Class I railroads of the country operating loco-
motives in 1950 did not use some diesel power and three of these
placed orders for diesels in the course of 1951. Most of the.non-
diesel roads -are:small, relatively unimportant carriers. With the
single exception of the Norfolk and Western Railway, none of these
are over 1,000 miles in length. The Norfolk and Western, virtually
the last major citadel of steam, began construction of six freight
steam locomotives and fifteen steam switching locomotives in 1951.
This was the only steam construction for an American carrier during
the entire year.2 The road is primarily a coal hauling railroad
with abundant coal supplies on line.
"Motive Power and Car Equipment", October, 1951
2 "Motive Power Orders in 19511, Rail, Vol. 132,
January 14, 1952, p.204.
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The increase in importance of the diesel at the expense of
other forms of motive power is shown in the following table.
TABLE III
LOCOMOTIVES ORDERED, 1939-1951*
Year Steam Diesel Electric Total
1951 22 4,071 14 4,107
1950 15 4,473 28# 4,516
1949 13 1,782 10 1,805
1948 54 2,661 2 2,717
1947 79 2,149 1 2,229
1946 55 989 8 1,052
.1945 148 691 6 845
1944 74 68o 3 757
.1943 413 635 0 1,048
1942 363 894 12 1,269
1941 302 1,104 38 1,444
1940 207 492 13 712
.1939 119 249 32 400
1951, 1950, 1949 and 1948 diesel orders are calculated
in units; preirous years statistics were kept in loco-
motives, which may include one or more units.
Includes 10 gas turbine electrics.
*SOURCE: Railway ZAe, Vol. 132, January 14, 1952, p.202.
It should be noted that despite the rapid strides of dieseliza-
tion, there were 22,348 steam locomotives left on the Class I
railroads of the country as of November 1, 1951. The largest number
of installations of diesel-electric locomotives, and a comparable
number of steam retirements, came in the period 1947 to 1951. Even
if the rate of replacement were to continue at the 1951 rate, many
years would elapse before all of the steam power disappears. It is
a matter of conjecture whether or not this ever will actually take
place.
TABLE IV
COMPARATIVE OWNERSHIP OF MOTIVE POYWER*
STEAM LOCOMOTIVES
Type
Passenger
Freight
Passenger or
Freight
Switching
Type
Passenger
Freight
Passenger or
Freight
Switching
1941
6,727
24,378
1,245
7,110
39,460
1950
3,867
16,387
1,095
4,225
25,575
1951
3,269
14,352
1,030
3,697
22,348
1941-1951
Change
- 3,458
-10,026
- 215
- 3,413
-17,112
DIESEL-ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVES
1941-1951
1941 1950 1951 Change
168 996 1,049 881
34 2,503 3,585 3,551
2 325 509 507
982 5,580 6,786 5,804
1,186 9.374 11,292 10,743
1950-1951
Change
- 598
-2,035
- 65
- 528
-3,227
1950-1951
Change
83
1,082
184
1,206
2,555
SOURCE: Railway Age, Vol. 132, January 14, 1952, p.203.
It would appear that the diesel-electric is the locomotive of
the immediate future. Longer range developments in the area of coal
or gas turbines show a high degree of promise, but these locomo-
tives bear more similarity to the diesel than to reciprocating
steam.
The comingto fruition of any motive power developments now on
the horizon will not materially change the nature of the problems
posed by the diesel-electric locomotive for the carriers and for
the employees and their labor organizations.
I
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II. TRENDS AND RELATIONSHIPS IN E PLOYMENT
To appraise the effects of the diesel-electric locomotive upon
railway employment it is necessary to examine past trends and
relationships in the industry. In 1949 there were roughly only
two hundred thousand more workers employed in railroading than
there had been in 1900. This eighteen per cent increase in employ-
ment was accompanied by a mileage rise of only sixteentper; cent traffic
units (twice passenger miles plus freight ton miles) increased 167
per cent. It is obvious that many factors have been operating
to increase the productivity of the railroad employee in terms of
the goods and people he transports.
From Table V it can be seen that the peak of railway employment
was reached in 1920 when over two millions were at work on the rail-
roads of the country. That year was also a peak traffic year and
volume reached a level higher than any other year up to 1926. It
should be noted that the latter year, although two per cent higher
in traffic than 1920, had a labor force twelve and one-half per cent
smaller. In traffic units per worker terms, the 1920 worker
accounted for 244,912 traffic units, while the 1926 worker had
284,791.
The traffic volume of 1926 remained a peak until 1941 when the
demands of the war sent traffic upward, a rise which continued
unbroken through 1944. Traffic units per worker also rose with the
advent of the heavy war traffic, but reached a maximium of 658,896 in
1943, a year before the traffic peak.
I
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TABLE V
RAILWAY EMPLOYMENT AND TRAFFIC*
Traffic Units per Traffic Units per
Year Workers Units Worker Year Workers Units Worker
000 000 -
1900 1,018 173,673 170,602 1925 1,786 489,752 274,217
1901 1,071 181,785 169,733 1926 1,822 518,790 284,791
1902 1,189 196,669 165,407 1927 1,776 499,610 281,311
1903 1,313 215,053 163,787 1928 1,692 499,523 295,226
1904 1,296 218,368 168,493 1929 1,694 512,519 302,549
1905 1,382 234,063 169,365 1930 1,517 439,567 289,767
1906 1,521 266,212 175,024 1931 1,283 354,939 276,647
1907 1,672 292,039 174,664 1932 1,052 259,303 255,991
1908 1,436 276,498 192,582 1933 991 283,387 285,960
1909 1,503 277,021 184,312 1934 1,027 306,430 298,373
1910 1,699 319,693 188,165 1935 1,014 320,657 316,229
1911 1,670 320,188 191,729 1936 1,086- 386,102 355,526
1912 1,716 330.,345 192,508 1937 1,137 412,205 362,537
1913 1,815 371,076 204,449 1938 958 335,180 349,874
1914 1,710 359,351 210,146 1939 1,007 380,801 378,153
1915 1,548 342,085 220,985 1940 1,046 423,001 404,398
1916 1,701 430,613 253,152 1941 1,159 536,388 462,802
1917 1,786 478,463 267,896 1942 1,291 748,486 579,772
1918 1,892 495,202 261,734 1943 1,375 905,982 658,896
1919 1,960 460,837 235,120 1944 1,434 931,912 649,868
1920 2,076 508,439 244,912 1945 1,439 867,800 603,057
1921 1,705 384,945 225,774 1946 1,378 724,451 525,726
1922 1,670 414,810 248,389 1947 1,371 749,822 546,916
1923 1,902 492,844 259,118 1948 1,345 723,552 537,956
1924 1,795 464,683 258,876 1949 1,209 699,377 495,762
*SOURCE: Annual Report on the Statistics of Railways (1949),
p. 159, Table 155.
The very nature of the railroad industry may be held responsi-
ble for the ability of the rails to absorb widely fluctuating
traffic loads with comparatively little variation in employment.
The industry is characterized by decreasing costs arising from the
fact that constant costs represent a large item of expense. It has
been estimated that about two-thirds of railroad expenses are con-
1
stant and one-third variable. This is to say that costs very about
one-third as much as business.
The constancy of railroad costs mirrors the high degree to which
fixed capital contributes to the transportation process. The very
nature of a railroad tends toward excess facilities. The plant must
expand by large units; any capacity means great capacity. A track
is required if only one train is to be operated, yet the track is
2
capable of accomodating perhaps sixty trains.
Similarly, the labor force has a high degree of "constancy".
One train crew can operate a train of one-hundred cars as easily
as it can a train of fifty cars. A switching yard can operate at
capacity with the addition of relatively few men above its require-
ments to do any switching at all. A passenger train can be operated
as easily and with as few men when filled to capacity as when half
empty. As a result, the railroads can assume relatively heavy
traffic loads with little variation in fixed capital or in labor.
While the course of railway employment has followed traffic,
generally, the changes in the number of workers in most instances
has been less than proportionate to changes in the volume of traffic.
1 Truman C. Bigham, Transportation Principles and Problems (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1947), p. 1 0 0 .
2Ibid., p. 101.
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This was particularly true during the years of the Second World
War. From 1939 to 1944, traffic units increased 59.2 per cent,
but employment rose only 29.8 per cent. From 1944 to 1949, traffic
contracted 35.7 per cent while employment fell only 15.8 per cent.1
As might be expected, all of the variation in work to do is
not met by changing the size of the labor force. Some of the
change is met by increasing or decreasing the number of hours
worked by employees. On the average a man puts in more time per
month as traffic increases and less and less time as traffic de-
clines. The number of man-hours worked rises and falls more
rapidly than the number of workers. The number of hourly employees
on the Class I, line-haul railways decreased 12.7 per cent from
1947 to 1949, but the man-hours paid for fell 17.3 per cent over
2
the same period. This -holds true over even a shorter run period.
From January of 1948 to January, 1949, traffic fell 9.8 per cent,
the number of hourly employees fell only 5.2 per cent, but there was
an 8.5 per cent drop in the total time paid hourly employees.3
The performances discussed above refer to all employees on the
railroads. Many of these were engaged in making improvements in
railroad property and not to current operations. Thor Hultgren
has found that the percentage of wages charged to capital account be-
ca-me larger in every traffic expansion, and smaller in every con-
4
traction from 1921 to 1938. From this the inference may be drawn
1Annual Report on the Statistics of Railways (1949) Table 155, p.159.
2 Annual Report on the Statistics of Railways (1947-1949), Table 155.
3
"Freight Train Performance of Class I Steam Railways", "Passenger
Train Performance of Class I Steam Railways", and "Wage Statistics
of Class I Steam Railways", Bureau of Transport Economics and Sta-
tistics, Interstate Commerce Commission. January, 1949.
4 Thor Hultgren, Am. Transportation in Prosperity and Depression (N.Y:
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1948), Chap. 7, p. 182-3.
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that time spent in construction and similar activity grew more
rapidly in expansion and decreased more rapidly in contraction than
did total man-hours or total labor force. Hence, the labor charge-
able to operation must have risen and declined less rapidly than
total time worked or total labor force, and traffic handled per
man or per man-hour of operating labor must have increased and de-
creased by larger percentages than is indicated by the overall data.
Again, these phenomena are inherent in the nature of the industry.
Deferred maintenance and repairs can be charged when income is low
and made up when traffic and income are high.
Cyclical aspects and relationships aside, a marked trend to-
ward more traffic per employee may be noted over the half century.
The high levels of the war period cannot be expected to be main-
tained, but, barring a return of traffic to depression levels, it
may safely be assumed that this measure of worker productivity will
remain well above previous levels.
Many factors have been responsible for the greater output per
worker. Certainly one of the factors has been the decline in the
number of railroads. In 1900 there were 1,224 operating steam
railroads in the United States; in 1949 there were only 481. This
decline has been continuous since 1911 and reflects consolidation
to a much greater extent than it does abandonment. The bulk of
this decrease in operating entities has been at the expense of the
shorter roads as the decrease in the number of companies operating
over 1,000 miles of road has been only from the 1912 peak of 58 to
1
the 1949 total of 42.
1 Annual Report on the Statistics of Railways, (1949), Table 155,
p.155.
The smaller, and probably less efficient, operating companies
have been eliminated and the consolidations have served to reduce
labor requirements. The Transportation Act of 1920 both facili-
tated and urged such consolidations and coordinations of services
and facilities. The Interstate Commerce Commission followed the
policy outlined in the Act and the carriers themselves took action
toward that end. Many small-scale coordinations and consolidations
of station facilities and the like were undertaken by the railroads
as a method of retrenchment during the early 1930's.
The full force of this movement on the part of the roads was
not felt by railway labor immediately. In 1930, the Senate of the
United States passed a bill vesting in the Interstate Commerce
Commission the power to include in any order it might enter approv-
ing consolidations such terms and conditions necessary to protect
employees against injury resulting from the consolidations. The
Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933, which established
a Federal Coordinator of Transportation who was empowered to re-
quire action to avoid unnecessary duplication of services and
facilities, also protected employees. Section 7b of that Act pro-
vided that the number of employees in the service of any carrier
should not, by reason of any action taken under the statute, be re-
duced below the number on the payrolls at the time of enactment,
nor should any employee be deprived of employment or placed in a
worse position with respect to his compensation by such action.
1 73rd Congress, 1st Session, Chap. 91, 48 U.S.Statutes-at-Large,
Part I, p. 211 ff.
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This protection given labor served largely to nullify the sav-
ings to be expected from coordinations and only a few relatively
minor changes were made under the Act. The Coordinator Section
of the Emergency Act expired in 1935. The labor organizations
immediately began negotiations with the carriers to extend the job
protection provisions by a collective agreement. The negotiations
resulted, in May of 1936, in the Washington Job Protection Agreement
between virtually all of the Class I carriers and all of the railway
labor organizations.
The Washington Agreement provided that whenever a coordination
or consolidation of facilities or services was affected between two
or more carriers, all employees who were displaced should receive a
displacement allowance based on length of service. This allowance
was payable monthly at the rate of sixty per cent of the average
monthly compensation of the employee at the time of displacement. In
the case of employees of fifteen or more years service, the allowance
was to continue for five years. The duration of payment was scaled
downward for shorter service men. Employees who were downgraded as
a& resalt of consolidation or coordination were to be paid not less
than their old rate for a period of five years. Similar protection
features were written into the Transportation Act of 1940.
The protection features of the Washington Agreement and of the
1940 Act prevent any severe, immediate displacement of employees
by consolidations and coordinations. The Interstate Commerce
Commission is empowered, as well, to include in abandonment orders
conditions for the purpose of protecting displacedemployees.2
1 Wages and Labor Relations in the Railroad Industry. 1900-191
(Privately printed by the Executive Committee of the Bureau of Infor-
mation of the Eastern Railways), pp.95-6.
2 Tbid., p.97.
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In the long run, however, there can be no doubt that the tendency
toward fewer companies has led to fewer employees.
Other legislative factors also served to temper the winds of
displacement. Many states have enacted what are known as "Full Crew
Laws". These laws specify a minimum number of employees for each
train--within certain limits. An example of such legislation in the
New York law, enacted in 1921,. which required minimum crews for all
trains operating outside of yard limits on railways more than fifty
miles in length. In each case, the crew, by law, had to consist of
one engineer, one fireman, and as many conductors and brakemen as
will provide a minimum crew of five for freight trains of twenty-five
cars or less, and six men for trains of over twenty-five cars. The
Nevada law requires four men on a passenger train of two cars or
1less and five men on a train with three cars or more. These laws
are typical of the requirements of the twenty states which have had,
at one time or another, such laws on their statute books. Inevitably,
many of the provisions of such laws have come to be included in
collective bargaining agreements. This effectively prevents the
carriers from taking full advantage of any circumstances or develop-
ments which would permit the reduction of crews in train and engine
service.
Technological advance has been responsible for much of the de-
cline in employment and increase in productivity. The increasing
mechanization of maintenance vwork, the installation of modern
switching yards, the use of more powerful motive power, etc., have
all combined with other changes in operation, signaling, and clerical
Julius H. Parmelee, The Modern Railway (New York: Longmans, Green
and Co., 1940), pp. 432-3.
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methods to reduce the quantity of labor required for a given amount
of traffic. There is no necessity to examine these in detail here,
but, as the diesel-electric locomotive represents a continuation of
the trend toward more powerful motive power, the past trends in
motive power should be examined in this connection.
The amount of freight behind an engine typically becomes larger
as traffic expands and smaller as traffic contracts. In spite of
this cyclical variation there has been a fairly consistent upward
trend in the size of train-loads from the early 1890's to the present.
This great cumulative increase was made possible by the adoption of
progressively more powerful locomotives. Until shortly before 1900
the increase in power was obtained by the installation of larger and
larger locomotives. Then designers turned their attention to the
construction of locomotives with larger fireboxes. Until that time,
the width of fireboxes had been restricted by the width of the engine
frame or the distance between the high driving wheels. This restric-
tion was avoided by the addition of a trailing truck of small dia-
meter wheels behind the driving wheels. A wider firebox could be
placed over this trailing truck. This growth in the size of fire-
boxes, however, created the problem of keeping the larger fire
supplied with fuel. In an effort to solve this problem as well as
to produce more power with the same size firebox, automatic, mech-
anical stokers were introduced beginning in 1903, A stoker' could
supply coal faster than a fireman could. By 1925 the mechanical
2
stoker was in common use.
1 Hultgren, op. cit., p.97.
R. P. Johnson, op. cit., p. 84.
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The superheater was adopted. This increases the heat content
and reduces the water content of the steam, reducing the quantity
of coal which must be burned to obtain an equivalent amount of power.
The superheater first appeared about 1910, and resulted in an in-
1
crease in the tractive effort of locomotives.
Another design advance which increasedthe power obtained per ton
of coal fired and resulted in more powerful locomotives was the feed-
water heater. This device pre-heated the water before it was
introduced into the boiler of the steam locomotive and, hence, reduced
the time necessary for that water to produce steam. The feedwater
heater appeared about 1918.2
The use of the locomotive booster, an auxiliary engine used
only in starting or at low speeds, also began about 1918. However,
by 1934, only slightly over eight per cent of the steam locomotives
in the country were equipped with boosters.
The use of higher steam pressures in the boilers of locomotives,
made possible through the use of alloy steel in their construction,
began about 1928.4  Higher pressures resulted in more powerful
locomotives; a reduction in the number of locomotives required to
handle a given weight of traffic followed.
Trains usually .are drawn by a single locomotive, but double-
heading is not uncommon with weaker motive power, particularly in
hilly territory. The use of helper locomotives or of second loco-
motives on heavier trains is reflected in the ratio between locomotive
1 Ibid., p. 49
2Ibid., p. 123
3Annual Report on the Statistics of Railways (1934), Statement No.8-A,
p. S-13.
'Rultgren, op. cit., p. 98.
miles in trains and train miles. Between January 1, 1920 and
December 31, 1939 this ratio was never higher than 1.08 in any month
1
or lower than 1.05. This would indicate that the increasing power
of locomotives accompanied and was responsible for the rise in train
weight.
TABLE VI
AVEPJGE TRACTIVE EFFORT OF ALL LOCOMOTIVES*
Year Effort Year Effort Year Effort Year Effort Year Effort
LBS LBS LBS LBS LBS
1903 21,781 1913 30,258 1923 39,177 1933 46,916 1943 52,L51
1904 22,804 1914 31,006 1924 39,891 1934 47,712 1944 52,822
1905 23,666 1915 31,501 1925 40,666 1935 48,367 1945 53,217
1906 24,741 1916 32,840 1926 41,866 1936 48,972 1946 53,735
1907 25,781 1917 33,932 1927 42,798 1937 49,412 1947 54,506
1908 26,356 1918 34,995 1928 43,838 1938 49,803 1948 55,170
1909 26,601' 1919 35,789 - 1929 44,801 1939 50,395 1949 56,333
1910 27,282 1920 36,365 1930 45,225 1940 50,905
1911 38,291 1921 36,935 1931 45,764 1941 51,217
1912 29,049 1922 37,441 1932 46,299 1942 51,811
SOURCE: Annual Report on the Statistics of Railways (1949) p.155,
Table 155.
The steady rise in the tractive effort of steam locomotives
indicated in Table VI led to the ability to handle trains of
greater weight with a single locomotive. This has necessitated fewer
trains for an equivalent quantity of traffic. As a result, train
miles run per employee have not increased although traffic units per
employee have risen (Table V).
The more powerful motive power of recent years permitted the
carriers to handle the huge traffic of the war years with compara-
tively little increase inttain miles. The peak traffic year of 1944
Ibid., p. 97.
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TABLE VII
RAILWAY EMPLOYMENT AND TRAIN MILES*
Total Miles Total Miles
Train per Train per
Year Workers Miles Worker Year Workers Miles Worker
000 000
1900 1,018 856,014 841 1925 1,786 1,217,800 682
1901 1,071 877,115 819 1926 1,822 1,240,761 681
1902 1,189 905,324 761 1927 1,776 1,210,777 686
1903 1,313 951,454 724 1928 1,692 1,193,449 705
1904 1,296 975,556 753 1929 1,694 1,200,239 709
1905 1,382 1,006,251 728 1930 1,517 1,101,727 726
1906 1,521 1,073,044 706 1931 1,283 967,679 754
1907 1,672 1,139,324 681 1932 1,052 827,789 787
1908 1,436 1,093,164 761 1933 991 792,801 800
1909 1,503 1,074,866 715 1934 1,027 822,529 801
1910 1,699 1,184,466 697 1935 1,014 831,709 820
1911 1,670 1,199,425 718 1936 1,086 905,340 834
1912 1,716 1,198,199 698 1937 1,137 933,019 821
1913 1,815 1,236,902 682 1938 958 829,535 866
1914 1,710 1,213,084 709 1939 1,007 856,153 850
1915 1,548 1,132,452 732 1940 1,046 886,537 848
1916 1,701 1,227,745 722 1941 1,159 981,579 847
1917 1,786 1,239,740 694 1942 1,291 1,107,248 858
1918 1,892 1,172,757 620 1943 1,375 1,177,246 856
1919 1,960 1,113,646 568 1944 1,434 1,187,698 828
1920 2.076 1,194,333 575 1945 1,439 1,145,785 796
1921 1,705 1,088,059 638 1946 1,378 1,050,300 762
1922 1,670 1,098,405 658 1947 1,371 1,042,604 761
1923 1,902 1,238,918 651 1948 1,345 1,004,819 747
1924 1,795 1,203,527 671 1949 1,209 888,620 735
SOURCE: Annual Report on the
pp. 158-9.
Statistics of Railways (1949), Table 155,
had slightly less than twice as many traffic units as did 1924
(931,912,000,000 vs. 464,683,000,000) but 1944 required fewer train
miles to transport the much larger traffic load. This was not a re-
flection of shorter hauls, as both the average passenger journey and
the average freight haul were longer in 1944 than in 1924. The
performance must be ascribed to heavier loads per train. The capacity
of the average freight car had increased from 44.8 tons to 50.8 tons
over this period, and the tractive effort of the average locomotive
had increased from 39,891 pounds to 52,822 pounds.1
The decrease in the number of trains required to transport a
given quantity of traffic was particularly important in its effect
upon the employment and productivity of train and engine service
employees. The workers in this group, which includes conductors,
baggagemen, brakemen, engineers, and firemen, are directly affected
by any reduction in the number of trains operated. Heavier trains
reduce the employment opportunities for this group.
The work of train and engine service employees may be apportioned
between freight and passenger traffic to a degree impossible with
most other employees. The mileage of I"mixed" trains, containing
both freight and passenger cars, is a very small percentage of total
mileage and may be disregarded.
The increases in efficiency noted in connection with all employ-
ees are particularly striking when train and engine service workers
alone are considered. In 1921 one hour of freight crew labor paid
for was required for about 850 tons-miles of freight. In 1937
about 1,450 ton-miles resulted from the payment for one hour, and in
1949 the figure had increased to about 1,780. Historically, this
productivity has tended to vary directly with traffic to a certain
extent. It has increased perceptibly in most expansions of traffic
and even in some contractions---though to a lesser degree."
1Annual Report on the Statistics of Railways (1949), Table 155, p.155.
Hultgren, op. cit., p.192, and Annual Report on the Statistics of
Railways (1949), Table 69, Table 44, p. 39.
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Some roads have taken advantage of the more powerful motive
power by running all through freight trains on an "extra" or non-
scheduled basis. Cars are accumulated until the weight limitations
of the locomotive for that particular run are reached and then a
train of maximum weight is dispatched. In the past, when freight
trains were made up and sent out at more regular intervals, the em-
ployment of freight train crews was a function of time to a greater
extent and of available traffic to a lesser extent than after the
advent of more powerful locomotives.
Insofar as the diesel-electric locomotive represents a more
powerful form of motive power, it will facilitate the increase in
productivity of freight train and engine employees. This question
will be examined in detail in a following chapter.
There has been no persistent upward trend in productivity in
passenger service. The technological factors which were operating
in freight service were opposed in passenger service by a downward
trend in passenger traffic. There has been, however, an increase
in productivity in every expansion of passenger traffic and a de-
1
crease in every contraction. Productivity per hour paid train
and engine employees in passenger service followed this pattern dur-
ing the huge wartime expansion in traffic, however the decline in
productivity accompanying the post-war traffic decrease has been to
levels above the pre-war period.
The necessity to operate scheduled passenger trains regardless
of the level of traffic prevents the carriers from taking full ad-
vantage of motive power developments in passenger ser-vice. As a
1ultgren, op. cit., p. 194.
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result, the productivity of passenger train and engine service work-
ers has not kept pace either with freight developments or with motive
power advances.
It is recognized in business and industry generally that over-
time work increases and decreases more rapidly than other work. In
the railway industry there has been a general relation between the
cycles in traffic and the ratio of overtime hours to total hours.
This ratio for all hourly employees fell in all the contractions
from 1921 to 1941 and rose in all periods of traffic expansion but
1
there has been no discernable trend.
The system of payment for train and engine service employees is
peculiar to the railroad industry. Road passenger and road freight
train and engine workers receive pay for either mileage or hours,
whichever is the greater. In through passenger service, employees
are paid on the basis of a day's pay for a run of 100 miles or less.
Twenty miles per hour is used as the base for determining the hours
of work for a day's pay so that five hours is allowed for the com-
pletion of 100 miles. Payment is made for mileage in excess of 100
miles, even when it is completed within the five hours allotted. If
a passenger service employee makes his assigned run in less than the
theoretical time allowed at 20 miles per hour, he is paid according
to the mileage. If it should take him longer than the theoretical
time, he is paid according to the hours -- on a pro rata overtime basis.
It is possible for these employees to receive overtime either for
service beyond five hours or beyond 100 miles. However, only service
over the time limit is paid for at time and one-half rates. A trip
1Ibid., p. 194.
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of 125 miles made in four hours would result in payment for one and
one-quarter days. A trip taking six hours would be paid at the rate
1
of six and one-half hours.
In addition, some wage contracts provide that the employee
must receive specified minimum aggregate earnings in the month. In
road freight service a similar system is used, but the allowances
are computed on the basis of twelve and one-half miles per hour,
with overtime and punitive overtime paid for runs of over 100 miles
2
or eight hours.
This system of computing earnings results in train and engine
service employees being paid for hours not worked. The dual basis
of payment does not penalize train and engine workers fully for in-
creases in speed because their payment is a function of distance, as
well as of time. However, increases in speed do result in a reduction
of punitive overtime payments. The trend in the ratio of overtime
hours to total hours worked for train and engine service employees
has been down, despite the fact that no such trend is visible for
all hourly employees. In freight service the decline from 1923 to
1932 was virtually continuous and quite severe, with overtime about
16 per cent of total man-hours worked in the earlier year and about
six per cent in the latter. The increase in traffic in the middle
thirties and during the war years sent this ratio upward again. In
December 1949 in freight service overtime represented about 12.7 per
cent of total hours worked and about nine per cent of total hours
paid for.
1Julius H. Parmelee, The Modern Railway (New York: Longmans, Green
and Co., 1940), p.460.
2It is interesting to note in this connection that in the year 1949
train-miles per train-hour in passenger service averaged 37.0 miles
and in freight service, 16.9 miles.
I
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The picture in passenger service has been similar. As speed
has increased, overtime payments have decreased. The decline has
been almost continuous in the ratio between overtime and time worked
or time paid for. Expansions in passenger traffic have served only
to reduce the rate of decline. In December of 1949, overtime was 7.6
per cent of total time worked and about 4.4 per cent of total time
paid for.
The system of payment also results in time paid for but not
worked. The changes in the ratio between overtime and time worked
or time paid for are overcome to a certain extent by counter move-
ments in time paid for but not worked. As traffic increases, time
paid for but not worked tends to decrease. Actually, the ratio be-
tween hours paid for but not worked and total hours paid for has
been rising historically. However, periods of traffic expansion
have slowed this rate of increase. In periods of traffic decline, the
ratio has risen at a faster rate than in periods of traffic increase.
This is true for all hourly employees as well as for train and
engine employees alone.
Man hours paid for but not worked as a percentage of total hours
paid for rose throughout the 1920's and thirties for all hourly em-
ployees. The war time traffic expansions slowed the rate of increase
considerably. From 1934 to 1949 the ratio increased an average of
.24 per cent a year, from 5.6 in 1934 to 9.6 in 1949. The train
and engine service workers saw no such advance. The payment methods
account for a much higher level for this ratio.for train and engine
employees, but traffic expansions have served to slow the growth.
In 1934, man-hours paid for but not worked represented 22.4 per cent
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of total hours paid for. By 1939, this had fallen to 20.1 per cent.
in 1944, the ratio was again 20.1 per cent, but by 1949 it had risen
to 23.7 per cent.
This phenomenon is, in large measure, the result of increases
in train speed. Some trips that formerly required ten hours can now
be made in eight hours, some seven hour runs now require only six
hours. Higher speeds reduce the percentage of overtime in some
circumstances and increase the percentage of time paid for but not
worked in other circumstances, and for much the same reasons. A
time reduction from ten hours to eight reduces the amount of over-
time. A reduction from seven hours to six hours increases time
paid for but not worked.
The percentage relationship between hours paid for but not
worked and total hours paid for has been little affected by varia-
tions in traffic in passenger Service. Again, the compulsion to
serve, to operate passenger trains, even in the fact of declining
traffic, has entered in. The elimination of many passenger train
stops because of traffic declines and a desire to speed up schedules
has resulted in faster runs over longer distances. This has con-
tributed to increasing time paid for but not worked. The rise in
the ratio of this time to total time paid for has been virtually
continuous in passenger service.
Employees directly engaged in transportation do not constitute
the majority of railway employees. Only about thirty-six per cent
of the hourly paid workers are in transportation service and only
twenty-three per cent of the total are in train and engine service.
1Hultgren, op. cit., p.202.
44
Twenty-eight per cent are charged to the maintenance of equipment
and stores, twenty-one per cent to the maintenance of way and
structures, and fifteen per cent to professional, clerical, and general
pursuits.
About half of the railway workers are employed in maintenance
work with most of these concerned with equipment and stores.
Generally speaking, maintenance is deferred in periods of traffic con-
traction. Cars in bad order are permitted to accumulate, repairs on
locomotives not in use or not required are not performed. Hultgren
I
has found that the number of unserviceable freight cars has in-
creased in almost all periods of traffic contraction. This is to say
that the amount of equipment rendered unserviceable exceeded the num-
ber retired or repaired. Equipment was not repaired as fast as it
became unusable.
It may be assumed that in periods of traffic contraction the
number of cars falling into disrepair decreases as the amount of use
decreases. Hence, repairs could be reduced to a certain extent with-
out any accumulation of bad order cars. Since the number of un-
serviceable cars has increased in times of decreasing traffic, it
follows that maintenance of equipment has been reduced proportionate-
ly more than traffic fell. The reverse is true in periods of traffic
expansion as the number of unserviceable cars falls proportionately
more than traffic increases.
A variety of factors enter into managerial decisions in this
area. The desire to reduce expenses as revenue declines, the fear
that the next expansion of traffic may not be great enough to require
1Ibid., pp. 169-75, passim.
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all of the equipment on hand, the realization that bad order equip-
ment can be repaired quickly so as to provide for rises in traffic
all play a part in the decision to defer maintenance.
Similar reasoning -,applies to the maintenance of way and
structures. It is obvious that an unserviceable section of track
must be repaired if any trains are to operate over it. However, the
general condition of the roadbed, ties, ballast, and structures can
be allowed to deteriorate within the limits of safety. That the limits
permitted for safe and efficient operation are not broad is indicated
historically by the fact that maintenance work tended to decline rela-
tively to traffic in expansion, and to increase relatively to
traffic in contractions.
In terms of maintenance man-hours paid for per traffic unit,
the trend has been down. This does not necessarily reflect any de-
cline in maintenance work over time but rather an increase in the
mechanization of such work. Some technological advances have tended
to reduce the deterioration of equipment and plant and others have
enabled maintenance forces to make repairs in less time. Better
rails, ties, and bardware have reduced the necessity for track main-
tenance. The growing use of power machines for cleaning and placing
ballast, tamping ties, driving spikes, etc., has speeded maintenance
work and reduced the labor requirements.
In summary, historically productivity in the railway industry
has increased. Traffic units per worker have risen overall. Em-
ployment has borne a definite relationship to the volume of traffic,
but changes in employment have been less than proportionate to
changes in the volume of traffic. Hours paid for have varied more
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widely than the number of workers and changes in hours provide most
of the response to changes in traffic volume.
More powerful locomotives have reduced the number of trains
and train miles necessary to haul a given volume of traffic. This
has resulted in fewer employees for a given traffic load and has ac-
counted in large part for increases in productivity.
Greater speed has reduced the number of hours of work necessary
to move a given volume of traffic. The unique payment system on the
railroads for train and engine employees has resulted in a decline in
overtime payments but in an increase in time paid for but not worked
as train speeds have risen.
Consolidations and some improvements in efficiency of operation
have not been permitted to exercise their full effects upon railway
workers. Job protection has been given by law and by collective
agreements.
The impact of the diesel-electric locomotive upon these trends
and relationships will be examined in later chapters. From the fore-
going, however, it is obvious that railway labor has been in the
grip of technological changes which have significantly altered the
employment opportunities for railway labor. Many of these changes
have been in the area of improved motive power. To the extent that
the diesel is merely a continuation of the trend toward improved
motive power, it does not mark any sharp break between the new
and the old nor a new problem in technological displacement.
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III. ENGINE SERVICE EIFLOYEES
A. The Job.
Since the early days of railroading the engine crew of a rail-
way locomotive has consisted of an engineer, responsible for the
operation of the locomotive, and a fireman who, under the jurisdiction
of the engineer, has been responsible for the production of power.
When the fireman has not been so engaged, he has assisted the
engineer in the observance and calling of signals.
In steam locomotives of any description the duties of the fire-
man in producing power have been well defined. He has thrown in the
wood, or shoveled in the coal, or operated the mechanical stoker or
oil pump in oil burning steam power. In the diesel, this function
has disappeared. The fuel is burned in the cylinder of the diesel
engine. It is supplied to the cylinder by continuously operating
pumps drawing from a fuel tank. Control of the flow of fuel is in
the hands of the engineer, regulated by the throttle which he controls.
The operating duties of the fireman, those concerned with actual
train operation, have not changed. He is still charged with observing
and calling signals and otherwise assisting the engineer in the opera-
tion of the train.
The function of the engineer has changed little with the advent of
the diesel-electric locomotive. He governs the power that is produced
by the locomotive and utilizes that power to propel the train over the
road. It is immaterial whether that power be produced by a fireman's
throwing coal into a firebox, by a fireman's admitting oil through a
valve, by dynamos at a central power station, or by combustion within
the cylinders of a diesel motor.
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In addition to his functions concerned with power, the engineer
is concerned with train operation. He must observe the track ahead,
grade crossings, signals, train orders, time card regulations, and
general train movements. Historically, he has also been responsible
for the general supervision of the fireman and for road repairs to
j
The means by which the engineer exercises control over power
and train movements have changed somewhat with the diesel. The
controls on the new locomotive consist of the conventional air brake
valves, sander equipment, whistle cord and bell ringer-- all familiar
from steam locomotive practice. In addition two levers are employed
to control the movement of the engine. One of these is the throttle,
easily manipulated, which controls the speed of the diesel engine.
The second control is electrical and has substantially the same
functions as the controller on a street car. This governs forward
and backup movements, having series, parallel, and shunt electrical
contact positions to be used at different speeds and under varying
power requirements. In freight service, usually an additional
control over dynamic braking is provided.
The controls are arranged so that all of the engines in the
locomotive and all of the individual units which may be coupled
together function as one locomotive controlled from the engineer's
position.
On road locomotives the engineer's position is provided with a
safety feature, either a foot pedal or part of the brake valve
which must be kept in a certain position by a positive action of
the engineer. In theevent that the operator should become
sil  anl.pultlte , ~ch tr ls t  s ee  f t  i l enC~ine,
  tr l is l t i l   st ti lly t  
f ti   t  tr ll    , i   
a  txl  ove ents, i  i , r ll l,  t t
t ct sitio s t  e se  at iff t s s  r r i
po er r ir ents, In fr ig t s r i , ll  a  iLddftional
tr l r i  r i  is r f ,
 tr l   rrang   t t l  t  i  in t
loco otive and all f the in i i al its hich ay e c le
t t r f tion s e lo oti  tr ll  from t  i er's
sitio ,
n road loco otives ·t~e gin er's sitio  is pp~vided p;ith a
s f ty f t r , ith r a f t 3 r rt f t  r ls  l
hich ust be e t in a rtz.i  ,Dosition bSr a Fositive tio  of
t~e i eer, In t egvent t t t  r t r l  
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incapacitated while the locomotive is in motion, the release of
pressure on the safety control would cause the motors to be brought
down to idling speed and the brakes to be applied automatically.
This is commonly known as a "dead man control".
Numerous gauges and signals relating to the condition and
operation of the locomotive are on a panel in front of the engineer.
He relies upon these for information about the performance of the
locomotive under his charge.
The functions of the engineer are so many and his importance
so great that the actual 
performance of his job has not 
been
threatened by the diesel-electric. In the early days of the use of
internal combustion motors on the rails, members of the shop crafts
were used as operators. The settlement of the jurisdictional dis-I we---- e------------------
putes which arose out of this practice was in favor of the engineers
and the operation of motive power by members of that craft has not
since been seriously challenged. The jurisdiction of the engineers
is well established. Whenever a locomotive is operated for the pur-
f vin t ai 
that o eration 
is erformed b 
a 
r
puose or mo grr a vl~r) n, n pyr u~l pu y~rlu~ g~ nr .IE~·
The security of the rfireman in the new situation is less well
established anid has been created only by the a~ction of his labor
organiz~ation. It waes not the intention of" many of the carriers to
lm~ fir th kc l~rfr ·r~n inad di s l cmoivrces The~ dieserl
emp oy a reman on e ar y o e e o o . -
electric evolved out of the earlier applications of internal com-
bustion motors to the rail-car field. Rail-cars were not held to be
locomotives for purposes of crew assignment, even under the national
agreements with the labor organizations representing the firemen
and engineers. The main point of distinction was that a portion
i
50
of the rail-car was devoted to revenue traffic; the car itself
might or might not draw other cars but was not regarded as a
locomotive. Much of the attraction of the rail-cars for the
carriers lay in the fact that they could be and were operated by
one man.
The railroads regarded the early diesels as rail-cars and
assumed that they would be operated with only one man on the locomo-
tive. This was one of the selling points of the diesel builders.
R. M. Dilworth, Chief Engineer of the Electro-Motive Division of
General Motors Corporation, the leading diesel builder, has testi-
fied that his organization had begun as manufacturers of rail motor
cars sold as a substitute for the small, branch line steam trains.
The older steam power in use on such runs was very inefficient and
could be replaced with profit even by the gaoline burning rail
motor car. One of the savings was in manpower. Mr. Dilworth has
said, "They could operate a motor car with one man in the engine
room, and if the branch line depended on motor cars and there was no
steam, we could shut down the coal docks and water stations and
generally reduce the cost of operation of the branch line."
The earliest road diesels were sold to service a new type,
extremely fast, light weight train. Some of the carriers attempted
to operate without a fireman and some did not. Since the stream-
line trains began operation on the Unicn Pacific and Burlington
Lines, it was inevitable that the questions of jurisdiction should
first arise there.
1Transcript of Proceedings in so-called "Diesel Case", Vol. 22, p.2338.
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A fireman was assigned to the streamlined Union Pacific trains
at the instance and request of the engineers. His duties and
responsibilities were determined and agreed upon by a joint confer-
ence of representatives of both the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen
with the Union Pacific Railroad. It was asked that the firemen re-
ceive special mechanical training so that he could be in charge of
the engineroom. The agreement provided:
Helpers will be taken from the ranks of firemen
and it will be their duty to give necessary
attention to the motor generating equipment, air
conditioning, heating, lighting and other
appurtenances throughout the train while enroute.
This agreement was signed on November 17, 1933, and assigned to
firemen mechanical duties in the engine rooms of streamline trains.
About a year later the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
made a demand for a second engineer on this new type power. The
Brotherhood maintained that the second engineer was required to han-
dle and manipulate the operating controls of the locomotive. It
was held to be unreasonable to expect one man to sit for several
hours in a seat he could not vacate. The safety of the train, it
was claimed, required that a second engineer be available in order
to substitute for the engineer when the occasion required. This de-
mand was rejected by the Union Pacific
1The agreement is described in detail in: Brief of the Carriers,
Transcript of Proceedings, Engineers' Diesel Case, p. 1166.
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At about this same time the firemen were attempting to secure
an agreement from the Burlington to provide for the assignment
of a fireman to the Pioneer Zephyr trains, the name given to the
earliest Burlington diesel trains. The firemen were successful only
after a strike threat. It was not until December 9, 1935, that an
agreement with the firemen was reached. Until that time the Burling-
ton had operated its Zephyrs for slightly over a year with only one
man in the locomotive cab. At least five streamlined trains were in
service, all of which were being successfully operated by one
engineers and without a fireman.
The December 9, 1935, agreement provided that a man be taken
from the ranks of the firemen to serve on the diesel trains. Para-
1
graph two of this agreement was as follows:
(2) That such Firemen (Helpers) shall have
duties as follows: inspection of and attention
to motor, generator, heating, lighting, and
air-conditioning equipment during their trip
and shall be subject in all respects not incon-
sistent with the foregoing to all rules and
working conditions as set out in the existing
schedule.
The engineers raised no objection to this and the firemen began
an attempt to secure jurisdiction from the New England roads.
Negotiations were entered into with the New York, New Haven, and
Hartford, the Boston and Maine, and the Maine Central Railroads for
the assignment of firemen to diesel yard and road locomotives then
operated in New England with only one man in the cab.
Ibid., p. 1167.
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The negotiations with the New England roads were successful
and in June 1936 agreements were concluded with the New England
carriers which provided for a fireman in the cab of diesel-electric
locomotives. These agreements set forth the duties of the fireman
(helper) in much the same terms as had the Western agreements, with
regard to the inspection and attention to the motor, generator,
heating, light and air conditioning equipment during the trip, and
also specified "such other duties. as may be reasonably and usually
performed by firemen (helpers) on diesel electric engines or
diesel electric streamline trains."
The New England agreements marked the end of joint action on
the part of the firemen and engineers. Near the end of 1936 the two
organizations began a contest to secure additional employees on the
diesel-electric locomotives. The firemen started a national movement
to secure a fireman (helper) on diesel locomotives about the end of
October 1936. This was a movement for a single fireman in the cab
of all diesel locomotives. This movement culminated in the so-called
"National Diesel-Electric Agreement" between the B. L. F. and E. and
most of the American railroads and which dealt with the assignment
of firemen (helpers) on locomotives other than steam. This was
signed on February 28, 1937, and became effective on March 15, 1937.
The agreement provided that after the effective date a fireman
(helper), taken from the ranks of the firemen, should be employed
on diesel-electric, oil-electric, gas-electric, other internal com-
bustion, or steam-electric locomotives on stream lined or main line
through passenger trains. The term "main line through passenger
trains" was defined so as to include only trains which made few or no
11
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stops. In addition, a fireman was to be employed on any "diesel-
electric, oil-electric, gas-electric, other internal combustion,
1
steam-electric, of more than 90,000 pounds weight on drivers."
The agreement further provided that steam rates of pay should apply
to firemen employed under the agreement. Roads using both coal and
oil burning steam locomotives were to pay the slightly higher coal
rate; roads using only oil burning steam locomotives were to pay
the oil rate; and roads using only coal burning steam locomotives
were to pay the coal rate. A fireman was to be used on all switch-
2
ing engines weighing over 90,000 pounds.
1Section III of the agreement made specific exceptions to the general
rule and is here quoted:
"The term 'locomotives', as used ...does not include any of the
following: (a) Electric car service, operated in single or
multiple units. This service is definitely excluded from the
terms oftthe agreement. (b) Gasoline, Diesel-electric, gas-
electric, oil-electric, or other rail motor cars, which are
self-propelled units (sometimes handling additional cars) but
distinguished from locomotives in having facilities for revenue
lading or passengers in the motor car; except that new rail
motor cars installed after the effective date of this agreement
which weigh more than 90,000 pounds on drivers shall be considered
'locomotives" .... If the power plants of existing rail motor
cars be made more powerful by alteration, renewal, replacement,
or any other method, to the extent than more trailing units can
be pulled than could have been pulled with the power plants which
were in the rail motor cars on the effective date hereof, such
motor cars, if then weighing more than 90,000 pounds on drivers
shall be considered 'locomotives', as provided.... (c) Self-
propelled machines used in maintenance of way, maintenance of
equipment, stores department, and construction work.... This
will not prejudice local handling on individual railroads where
disputes arise as to whether or not the character of work per-
formed by these devices constitutes road or yard engine
service."
2
"Memorandum of Agreement", in: General Wage and Rule Agreements,
Decisions, Awards, and Orders, 1907-1941 (Cleveland: Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 1949), pp. 571-2.
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The National Diesel-Electric Agreement determined the pattern
of subsequent diesel-employment. The carriers estimated that this
agreement resulted in the assignment of approximately two hundred
and thirty additional helpers and an increase of $445,000 in payrolls
for the diesel-electric power in use on March 16, 1937.
The introduction into the cab of the diesel of another man
required extensive changes in design. The builders had assumed
one-man operation and that the fewest possible functions required
of the operator resulted in the most satisfactory operation of the
locomotive. Simplicity of control and reduction to a minimum of the
duties of the operator was fundamental in their engineering and held
to be the most economical. Most of the apparatus on the diesel was
designed to be controlled automatically with mechanical and electri-
cal devices.
With one-man operation, control of the locomotive had been
placed entirely in the hands of the engineer. After a fireman
(helper) was required as a part of the crew, the carriers requested
the elimination of a few of the automatic controls and required
that their function be made manual. The builders did this
gradually until, essentially, four functions were the responsibility
of the fireman: (a) Control of the engine radiator shutter which
determines the amount of air admitted for engine cooling purposes.
This must be changed with variations in the temperature of the out-
side air and the labor of the locomotive. (b) Reversing the fuel
strainer at intervals of approximately one hour. (c) Cleaning
the train heating steam generator at intervals. This is normally
Testimony of F. G. Gurley, Vice President of the Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad, in: Transcript of Proceedings in
so-called "Diesel Case", Vol. 19, p. 1798.
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done by depressing a foot pedal. (d) Operating the stack or soot
blower on the heating generator at intervals, which is also done
with a foot pedal. There are no facilities required for train
heat in freight service, and the last two of the functions were
limited to passenger train service only.
These functions were from a locomotive operating point of view.
The fireman retained his train operating duties. In addition many
of the railroads gave other, non-functional duties, to the fireman.
These included making reports, tours of inspection, the recording
of meter readings, etc . In the effort to provide occupation for
the fireman required by the Agreement, some of the carriers went to
odd lengths.
A fireman in diesel service described his duties in some de-
tail to the 1943 National Railway Labor Panel Emergency Board.
Immediately on the train's arrival at Omaha he had to go to the
front of the engine and put up numbers identifying the train. Then
he had to read the orders relating to the movement of the train over
the road. He then had to go to the engine room and check all of the
oil levels in each individual diesel motor. This had to be done
while the motors were idling, a period of short duration as the
train remained there only long enough to refuel and inspect the
train, load the mail and load the passengers.
As the train left Omaha the fireman normally returned to the
engine room and adjusted the ventilators that control the water
temperatures of the various diesel motors. At the same time he
1Testimony of R. M. Dilworth, loc. cit., Vol. 21, p. 2228.
57
would note all of the gauges indicating fuel pressure, oil pressure,
temperature, etc. During this tour he would also note that all
valves were in proper position.
In multiple unit operation this procedure would be repeated in
each of the units. The train heat boiler and the stack for the
boiler had to be attended to about every twenty minutes. A jet
of steam was used to blow the soot out of the boiler stack. Water
would be blown down into the boiler to clean it, an operation which
was performed on the same inspection trip.
In the second unit the air reservoirs had to be blown out to
prevent the accumulation of moisture, the same gauges checked,
and ventilators adjusted. In all, this first patrol would take
from 35 to 40 minutes as the same checks would be made on his way
back to the front of the locomotive. The fireman was expected to
listen for any unusual noises, pounds, or knocks as he passed the
motors. Each stack had to be felt with the hands to see that each
cylinder was firing.
The fireman would then go into the cab to see if the engineer
needed or wanted anything. If not, he returned immediately to the
engine room. Inspection trips after the- first required approxi-
mately twenty minutes.
Concerning his train operating duties, the witness said:
I spend no time watching signals .... We have a few
engineers who will demand us to be in the cab at cer-
tain points, such as through yard limits, where there
are train order boards, but he will tell you.... We
are instructed to stay out of the cab.1
1 Testimony of L. J. Fry, employee of the Union Pacific Railroad,
loc. cit., Vol. 7, pp. 941-51.
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Some of the railroads required the fireman to note and to write
down the various gauge readings and other details of his inspection
tours. Others required the fireman to be in the cab to observe
signal indications in certain territory. Still others placed the
fireman under the orders of the engineer who could direct him to
remain in the cab or to make tours as circumstances dictated.
At about the same time that the firemen had secured the diesel
agreement with the carriers, in the Fall of 1936 and in 1937, the
engineers made their first formal demands for the employment of an
additional engineer on diesel locomotives. These demands were
served upon and denied by six Western railroads. Over the next few
years demands were served for the assignment of assistant engineers
to the engine rooms of diesel locomotives by the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers upon various railroads in the country. By
March, 1941, the engineers had served 52 railroads with formal
notices for the placing of additional engineers on diesel locomotives.
On May 10, 1941, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen served demands on the railroads for the employment of
additional firemen on diesel locomotives. The B. L. E. was now
seeking at least two engineers on most road diesels and the B. L. F.
and E was seeking at least two firemen on most road diesels.
B. The First Diesel Case
The demands of the two organizations were formulated as separate--
not joint-demands. The Emergency Board eventually created to hear
the dispute between the two Brotherhoods and the carriers said in
its report:
Report of Emergency Board Appointed February 20, 1943, (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 49-50.
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Apparently, realizing the untenable character of
their original requests, the brotherhoods made an
effort to reconcile conflicting interests and to
present a joint program with regard to... the
manning of diesels.... Their efforts proved un-
successful, however, and their separate demands
were progressed independently until they reached
this Board.1
In its report the Board further noted that at the opening of
the engineers' case they had modified their request to provide that
only one additional man, to be designated an assistant engineer, be
placed on single- and multiple-unit assemblies up to and including
four units. Subsequently, the fireman, too, modified their request
to provide that only one additional fireman be employed on multiple-
unit diesels up to four units. "Both organizations," said the
Board, "concede that only one additional man is necessary, but each
claims the right to that job. This, of course, precipitates a
sharp juridictional issue."2
The Board decided that the firemen should first present their
case, the engineers should then present their case, and the
carriers should present their case jointly in reply to the brother-
hoods. The hearings of the Board extended from March 1 to April 20,
1943. All parties were given opportunity to present such evidence,
submit such exhibits, and make such arguments as they wished and to
rebut, examine and cross-examine witnesses. Oral arguments were pre-
sented and briefs were filed by the parties. The record constituted
6,814 pages of testimony and argument.3  This hearing represented the
LReport of Emergency Board Appointed February 20, 1943, (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 49-50.
2Ibid., p. 50
31bid., p. 3.
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first real inquiry into the problems raised by the diesel locomo-
tive for the engine service employees.
The engineers based their case for an additional engineer
upon two contentions. (a) Any job in the engineroom of the diesel-
electric belonged to the engineer by custom, tradition and inheri-
tance, and (b) for reasons of safety the fireman should be. at the
side of the engineer at all times the train is in motion.
The brief for the engineers declared, "The engineer has always
been in charge of and has had the responsibility for the engine."
It was held that in the switch to the diesel, the engineer should
normally be permitted to take his rightful place in the engine
room. "The equipment and appurtenances of the diesel locomotive
would naturally come within the charge and responsibility of the
engineer," declared counsel for the engineers. He continued, "The
-evidence before the Board proves conclusively that all the work
described as having been done by a maintainer or a fireman (helper)
is work that should properly be performed by an engineer. " l
The safety contentions were summed up in the brief:
This Board will surely consider what might happen
in the operation of the diesel-electric when the
engineer is robbed part time of the two eyes and
two ears of a fireman. When the fireman is in the
engine room, nothing might happen for a long period
of time. Everything might appear to be secure.
But, there is no telling when mist, smoke or other
causes might make a signal escape the eyes of the
engineer, and then calamity would follow. It is
singular that four major accidents during the last
year happened while the fireman (helper) was in the
engine room, and in each instance, that if the fire-
man had been in the cab, the accident might have
been avoided. It is plain from the testimony that
1 Brief of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, in: Transcript
of Proceedings in so-called "Diesel Case", p. 1947.
Ioperation or the worl•ds fastest powerhouse, the
diesel-electric. Two eyes, ever watchful, obser-
vant and coordimnating with the engineer's,
might save human lives, might prevent calamity,
agony, grief and despair, .ight save millions of
dollors of property value.
So are as the diesel was concerned, the firemen were seeking
two things. The 1937 National Diesel Agreement had excepted diesel
locomotives weighing less than 90,000 pounds from the requirement
of carrying a fireman. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen wanted this restriction on the employment of their mem-
bers removed. The second demand was for the employment of a second
fireman (helper) in multiple unit operation.
The firemen contended that there should be a fireman on any
locomotive operating in normal railroad service, on the road or in
the yard. Said counsel for the B. L. F. and E. :
I do not think that the rather petty method of
avoiding putting a fireman on, by building yard
locomotives a few hundred pounds under 90,000
pounds, weignt on arivers, ougnt to prevail very
long. If a man is needed on 90,000 pounds, he
is needed on 80,500 pounds, and the railroads
agreed to put a fireman on 90,000 pound locomotives.
I do not think that that is really a serious sub-
ject of contention. I can hardly see how it can be
seriously argued that our position is unsound.2
The attorney for the firemen then approached the matter of the
additional man in road service. This was held to be no problem.
The safety argument was advanced along the line that the total
effect of the testimony of the railroads and the facts brought out
lIbid., pp. 1947-8.
2Brief of the Brotherhood of Lacomotive Firemen and Enginemen, in
Transcript of Proceedings in so-called "Diesel Case", p. 1924.
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the horrible accident at Dickerson might have been
avoided if the fireman had been in the cab. No one
knows when disaster approaches, but great safe-
guards could be built against calamity in the
in the case gave ample evidence that a fireman in the cab was
essential. Standard railway practice had long recognized this
need.
It was also clear, argued the firemen, that a man in the engine
room was also essential. Counsel cited orders by carriers that
patrolling must be done continuously by the fireman, that the fire-
man should come up to the cab only when called by the engineer,
that the fireman should come to the cab only at certain points
along the road where signal indications were so critical as to re-
quire two pairs of eyes. He held that these indicated that the
railroads thought it necessary to have a man in the engine room.
Many of the roads used maintainers, taken from the shop
crafts, even on single unit operation. These roads always had
maintainers on diesel operation. This indicated "there is something
back in the engine room that needs to be done, and that it is
necessary to have somebody there, patrolling and inspecting, keep-
ing track of what is going on." 1
A maintainer had been called as a witness and had testified
that only he and his craft were capable of doing the engine room
work. Some maintainers were electricians, some were mechinists.
Said counsel, "If it is a machinist, he has to learn a little
electrical work; and if it is an electrician, he has to learn a
little machinist work; so I judge that a little of both is suffi-
cient, a little machinist's work, and a little electrician's
work, .... * 2
lIbid., p. 1925.
2 Loc. cit.,
I:
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It was pointed out that mechanics cannot make major repairs
while the locomotive is operating on the road. This is not
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maintainers went along to do what an intelligent, capable
mechanic, an instructed man, or a trained man, could do.
Counsel for the firemen then argued that the firemen and
the engineers were well trained and well informed about the
mechanism of locomotives and their operation. They were accustomed
to running repairs which could be made on steam locomotives and
could easily acquire the necessary training to make any running
repairs that can reasonably be made on a diesel locomotive. He
cited instances in which maintainers were used for a portion of a
run and relieved by firemen. Even more compelling an indication of
the competence of the firemen to do the engine room job was the
fact that many of the carriers did not have any maintainers at
all, and wbuld not employ them, but expected the firemen to do the
job. This reduced the problem, argued the fireman, to this:
"To what extent can the fireman double up and do whatever is
necessary in the way of inspection, operation and repair and care
in the engine room, and at the same time do his job in the cab ?"
The carriers challenged the two brotherhoods on all points.
Their principal contention was that the demands for extra men on
the diesels were make-work proposals; there was nothing for the
extra men to do. The demands of the firemen for amendment of the
1937 National Diesel Agreement to eliminate the 90,000 pounds on
drivers line of demarcation was held to be wholly unwarranted and
an attempt to repudiate an agreement fairly made.
2
Counsel for the carriers reviewed the circumstances which had
led up to the diesel agreement, and indicated that the 90,000
pounds weight had been a compromise between the two parties. Even
if there had been no diesels in use at that time weighing less than.
this amount, the fact that the roads had insisted upon some line
of demarcation should have indicated to the union that the carriers
intended to make use of the line in the future. The railroads had
relied upon the agreement and had installed smaller locomotives,
not because of any black hearted intention to thwart the Brother-
hood, but to get the lighter work done at a minimum cost. This was
coupled with a conviction that firemen were not needed on the
lighter locomotives. It was indicated that these locomotives were
used in the type of service which never took them very far from
their terminals, which gave the engineer adequate time to give the
engine all the attention it needed, and which did not require the
services of a second man. The carriers presented statistics indi-
cating that on seven Western railroads in the period 1939 to 1941,
diesel switchers carrying two men had had 24.57 accidents per million
locomotive miles, while the one man diesel switchers had had only
18.23 accidents per million locomotive miles. It was maintained
that there was no hazard involved in the operation of the smaller
locomotives with only one man, that the locomotive could be effi-
ciently operated without this additional man, that the volume of
the transportation service performed by these smaller locomotives
did not warrant the employment of an extra man, and that to change
the 1937 rule would be unfair and unjust. 1
1 Brief on Behalf of the Railroads, in: Transcript of Proceedings
in so-called "Diesel Case", p. 2014.
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The carriers made five main points concerning the use of
additional men on road diesels: (1) The demands for additional
men involved a juridictional dispute between the Brotherhoods.
(2) Diesel locomotives are safely operated with present consist of
engine crews. (3) Diesel locomotives have changed operating and
working conditions on locomotives to such an extent there exists
insufficient work to justify employment of more than two men on
them. (4) Engineers and firemen are not qualified to perform any
assignable additional work. (5) Any assignable additional work
should be performed by an experienced machinist or electrician.
To buttress their first point, the carriers reviewed the
history of diesel manning negotiations and contended that the
engineers had never accepted the need for a fireman on the newer
form of motive power. When a fireman had been placed on Burlington
diesels, the engineers had complained to the carrier that the fire-
man was doing engineerts work. This complaint had never been
dropped. Originally the firemen had aimed merely at getting a
fireman on diesel locomotives, had viewed the diesel agreement as
a victory, and had shown no intention of later asking for two fire-
men. The engineers had wanted jurisdiction over the second man on
the grounds that he was doing engineer's work, but.had shown no
intention of later asking for two engineers. The desire for a
third man on the diesel was a comparatively recent development on
the part of both labor organizations and represented really a juris-
dictional dispute between them.
1Ibid., p. 2017.
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The carriers contended that the diesel as operated was safer
than the steam locomotive. The Brotherhoods had placed their re-
liance upon three accidents on a single railroad, the Baltimore
and Ohio, and it was a matter of pure speculation in all three.
cases whether the fireman could have averted the accidents had he
been in the cab. The counsel for the carriers pointed out that
the Interstate Commerce Commission, after investigating the
accidents, had made no recommendation that aifireman should be in
the cab at all times. The commission is charged with safety in rail-
road operations and had not said that one-man operation was unsafe.
The full vision afforded the engineer was offered by the
roads as the main reason for the safety record of the diesel.
'The position of the cab in the front of the locomotive permits
the engineers a complete view of the track and signals ahead.
It was contended that the fireman had a great deal of time
to spend in the cab. While requirements varied widely from road
to road, studies made in actual running time, showed that firemen
in all diesel passenger service spent an average of only 27.29 per
cent of their time in patrolling. In freight serivce, the engineer
had the benefit also of the presence of the head brakeman in the
cab. This employee called signals just as did the fireman. Should
the engineer require the presence of the fireman in the cab, he
could summon the fireman by means of a bell which could be heard
in the engine room.
The carriers also stressed the safety feature of the deadman
contrdl It was regarded as highly improbable that the engineer%
should die on duty so suddenly that he would have no warning and
no ability to take steps to stop his train. It was held equally
improbable that in a sudden death, the engineer's body would fall
on the safety pedal. It was pointed out that the fireman in the
engine lom has a check on the engineer by the grade crossing warn-
ing whistle blown by the engineer. The fireman could not help but
notice the failure of the crossing whistle to be sounded as it
makes an unpleasant and harsh sound in the engine room. This would
indicate that something was wrong and the fireman would visit the
cab to investigate.
The roads also pointed out that the hazards of the diesel en-
gine crew were less than those of steam crews. In all classes of
accidents in the East during the years 1936 to 1941 there was not
a single engineer or fireman death in diesel service, compared to
fifty-five in steam. The steam death rate was .059 per million
locomotive miles. The injury rate for diesel service was .468 as
against a rate of 1.142 in steam.
Concerning the changed operating and working conditions on the
diesel, the carriers attempted to refute the union contentions
that diesel work was more strenuous. The roads maintained that the
speed of diesel operation was no greater than in steam because of
the diesel's ability to operate at higher average speeds with a
lower maximum speed. Evidence was also given that both engineers
and firemen applied for diesel work when they were physically in-
capable of performing steam service work. Sixteen separate cases on
ten different railroads were cited in which firemen were assigned to
diesel work because they were unable to perform firemen duties on
steam locomotives. These assignments had been made at the request
of the employee, sometimes through the Brotherhood, and in some
instances on the advice of doctors.
Testimony offered indicated that employee preference for
diesel jobs was great. Some workers would lay off rather than
take a steam run and often waited for the scheduling of a diesel run.
Any claim that the diesel work wkas more strenuous than steam
was denied by the carriers. It was shown that men did not have to
give up diesel work for steam in old age. Diesel enginemen did not
retire as early as steam enginemen and they tended to cling to the
diesel in' advanced years. Three engineers in diesel service on the
Burlington were over seventy years of age. Not a single steam
locomotive engineer had failed to retire at age seventy. On seven
Western railroads, in combined road and yard service, 27.36 per.
cent of all the retiring steam engineers retired before age 65.
Of diesel engineers retiring, 19.64 per cent retired before 65.
From January, 1936, through June, 1941, death from natural causes
before retirement came to steam engineers who had an average age
2.76 years less than for diesel engineers. Diesel firemen
1
attained an average age of 5.15 years more than steam firemen.
The carriers held that firemen (helpers) and engineers were
wholly unqualified for anything except the routine patrolling
and checking done by the firemen and that the addition of one or
more unqualified men would not further safe or efficient operation.
It was maintained that neither railroad engineers nor firemen
were qualified by training or experience to do the electrical and
1Ibid., pp. 2028-9.
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mechanical work required. This work had to be done by maintainers
and, in many instances, even if an additional fireman or engineer
were to be assigned to the engine room, the services of a maintainer
would still be required.
The engine room work was regarded by the carriers as logically
neither fireman's nor engineer's work. Arguing that if the fire-
man's traditional place is in the cab, than all the more is the
engineer's traditional place in the cab at the throttle and the
controls. The engineer had always had to remain in his seat in
the cab while his train was in motion. In the days of universal
hand firing, the fireman often had to leave the cab to push the coal
forward in the tender. Even on stoker-fired locomotives, the fire-
man has to leave his seat to perform many of his duties. The
fireman (helper) as a person who leaves the cab had been recognized
for years-- since electric locomotives were placed in service, and
more particularly by the National Diesel Agreement. The assistant
engineer, declared the carriers, was an unheard of person whose
creation never had been nor was not then necessary.
The argument continued to the effect that the railroads'
traditional and managerial right to have locomotives operated by
only two men should be upheld. The carriers felt that they were
the best judges of what crew was required. If they thought a main-
tainer or engine room employee would contribute to safe and
efficient operation in a particular instance, they should have the
right to select whatever craft they thought appropriate. The rail-
roads, by virtue of history and the satisfactory experience of two-
man operation of the diesel, should have the right to have the
2
firemen who were on the trains under the terms of the National
Diesel Agreement do more than just sit in the cab. Counsel for the
carriers stated:
Therer being no sound reason either from safety
considerations or for the proper functioning
of the diesel locomotive to have more men on
the diesel, there is all the more reason why
the traditional and managerial rights of the
railroads should be respected.1
Finally the carriers took issue with the fears of the Brother-
hoods that the diesel represented a technological innovation which
would reduce the employment of their members. Mr. J. P. Shields,
then Assistant Grand Chief Engineer, had testified that the B. L. E.
demand for an assistant engineer was aimed in part at protecting
against the loss of employment by Brotherhood members. He had indi-
cated that the Engineers regarded the new type of power as an
introduction which, in the absence of provision for assistant
2
engineers, could reduce employment opportunities for engineers.
The firemen had also indicated that they feated that this technolo-
gical advance in railroad operation would displace manpower.
Carriers' counsel said:
In considering the question of employment, the condi-
tion of two individual crafts out of a great many can-
not alone be controlling. ...The problem cannot be
solved simply by keeping or adding men on the pay-
roll. This would be obviously unsound for it
would shoulder on the particular industry more than
its fair share of social obligations. Worse yet,
it would disregard the fact that the technological
advance has created employment elsewhere. In the
manufacture of diesels, for example, there has been
extended employment of electricians and workers in
other crafts who had no employment in the making
of steam locomotives. The evidence clearly shows
the diesel has tended to create jobs rather than 3
destroy employment for both engineers and firemen.
llbid., p. 2032. 2 -Testimony, in: Transcript of Proceedings in
so-called "Diesel Case", Vol. 14, pp. 488 - 9.
Brief on Behalf of the Railroads, loc. cit., p. 2033.
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It was further indicated that one of the impelling reasons for
the adoption of the diesel had been to enable the railroads to com-
pete for traffic which was going to buses, autos, trucks and airplanes.
The improved transportation service brought about by the diesel had
greatly bettered the competitive position of the railroads. The
worry of the employees that the diesel would create unemployment was
held to be defeatist. ."This will more than likely develop if the
diesel is loaded down with extra men and thus robbed of economy of
operation, one of the very things that gives it stature in the competi-
tive picture." 1
The carriers cited the fact that many of the new passenger
trains drawn by diesels had not replaced steam drawn trains but were
new trains that did not before exist. Even in cases where diesel
power had replaced steam power, both the engineers and the firemen
received more compensation per trip in diesel service than in steam,
they worked less hours, and their hourly rate was higher.
It was argued that the burden which would be imposed by either
or both of the manning demands of the labor organizations would be
unreasonable and weaken the competitive position of the railroads.
Diesel operation would not be able to survive if it had to bear the
burden of additional men to meet possible unemployment problems.2
The Emergency Board concluded that on multiple-unit Diesel,
high-speed, main-line through passenger trains, safety of operation
demanded, whenever the train was in motion, the presence of the
fireman(helper) in the cab. If compliance with this finding was to
lIbid., pp. 2033-4
2Ibid., p. 2035.
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require the services of an extra man in the engine room to perform
the work customarily done by firemen, the Board concluded that such
an extra man should be added.
The Board felt, however, that in multiple-unit, diesel-electric,
freight road service the situation was different. The locomotive
normally operated at a slower rate of speed, it hauled no
passengers, and the head brakeman was in the cab and called signals
when the fireman was absent. No additional man was required.
The evidence did not indicate to the Board that an extra man
was needed on yard engines nor on single-unit, local freight and
passenger locomotives, as requested by the engineers. Those loco-
motives operated at slow speeds and under comparatively simple
traffic conditions, with numerous stops, which afforded the regular
firemen sufficient opportunity to make inspections of the engine
room.
Having concluded that under certain circumstances an extra
man might be required in the operation of a diesel, the Board then
had to decide whether he should be taken from the ranks of the fire-
men or of the engineers. The Board weighed the contentions of the
two Brotherhoods as to the proper assignment of such duties and
concluded that when an additional operating man was used he should
be taken from the ranks of the fireman. (The Chairman disagreed
with this conclusion and believed that the extra man should be
an assistant engineer.)l
1Report of Dergency Board Appointed February 20, 1943, p. 54.
Rfeport of Emergency~ Board Appointed Februaryr 20, 1943, p. 54.
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The Board supported this finding with this reasoning:
The Board believes that this decision is in keeping
with the traditional demarcation between the duties
of the engineer and those of the fireman. Since the
early days of railroading the engine crew has con-
sisted of an engineer, responsible for the operation
of the locomotive, and a fireman who, under the juris-
diction of the engineer, has been responsible for
the production of power. When not so engaged, he hasi td h &A.U i &-" Ai h bl
of signals. When ini the past a third man has been
required, as in the hand firing of large steam
locomotives, a second or assistant fireman has been
used.1
This traditional demarcation had been buttressed by the
National Diesel Agreement of 1937 and by operating rules subse-
quent to that time. The fireman had divided his time between the
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and assisting the engineer in the calling and observing of signals.
"If the duties are too extensive to permit the safe operation of
high-speed passenger trains and a second helper is required, he
should logically come from the ranks of the firemen."2 This
arrangement maintained the traditional relationship between the
engineer and the firemen. The engineer remained in command of the
operation of the locomotive and the fireman continued under his
jurisdiction and general supervision.
On the other manpower proposal, that of the firemen that a
member of their craft be required on all locomotives regardless of
size or type of power, the Board found for the carriers. The
90,000 pounds weight on drivers limitation was held to have been a
compromise. It was to be assumed that after such a settlement had
1 Loc. cit.
2Ibid., p. 55.
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been reached, the carriers were free to install as many locomotives
of the lesser weight as their operations appeared to them to
justify. The Board found no violation of the agreement in this
1
development.
The Brotherhoods thus received through the Emergency Board
proceedings very little. The Engineers were denied in their re-
quest for an assistant engineer in the engine room, and were denied
jurisdiction over the engine room employees. The Firemen were to
be bound by the 1937 agreement 90,000 pounds weight on drivers
limitation, but did receive a finding that the fireman should re-
main in the cab at all times when the train was in motion in main-
line passenger service. Although denied a second fireman in the
engine room, any additional man used by the carriers "to perform
duties customarily performed by firemen (helpers)" were to be
selected from the ranks of the firemen. This last was to apply
to passenger service and to freight service, but the fireman was
to continue to make his patrols and inspections in freight service.
It was left to the discretion of the carriers as to whether an
additional man was to be employed. In the event that one would be
used to perform duties customarily performed by firemen, he was
to be a second fireman.
Both the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen refused to accept the
findings and recommendations of the first diesel Board. Prolonged
negotiations between these unions and the railroads followed. The
disputes were settled only by a series of regional agreements
Ibid., pp. 55-6.
j
known as the Diesel Settlement Agreements of 1943 and 1944. The
first of these was with carriers of the Eastern region and Section 3
of this agreement, signed August 13, 1943, provided:
On multiple-unit diesel-electric locomotives in high-
speed, streamlined, or main line through passenger
trains, a fireman (helper) shall be in the cab at
all times when the train is in motion. If compliance
with the foregoing requires the service of an addition-
al fireman (helper) on such trains to perform the work
customarily done by firemen (helpers), he shall be
taken from the seniority ranks of the firemen, in
which event the working conditions and rates of pay
of each fireman shall be those which are specified
in the firemen's schedule. The rates of pay shall be
determined by the weight on drivers of the combined
units.
(Note-- The term "main line through passenger trains"
includes only trains which make few or no stops).
For the sole purpose of designating the ranks from
which the employee shall be drawn and for no other
purpose, it is further understood that on multiple-
unit diesel-electric locomotives operated in other
classes of service, should there be added a man to
perform the work customarily performed by firemen
(helpers) such man shall also be taken from the
seniority ranks of the firemen and his working con-
ditions and rates of pay shall be those which are
specified in the Firemen's schedule. The rates of
pay shall be determined by the weight on drivers of
the combined units.1
The weight on drivers limitations of the 1937 agreement were
reaffirmed and no gain accrued to the firemen as a result of the
new agreement.
The terms of the Firemen's Eastern Diesel Agreement were made
the basis of a similar agreement with the Western carriers on
November 27, 1943, and with the carriers of the Southeastern region
dated May 11, 1944.
1 bid., p. 32.Ibid., p. 32.
7of contract in settlement of all pending diesel issues. This step
was taken in November, 1943. Negotiations continued and a con-
tract was formally executed between the representatives of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the Western Carriers'
Conference Committee on January 25, 1944.
Much of the new agreement was concerned with changes in the
rates of pay governing steam, electric and diesel-electric locomo-
tives. However, several sections dealt specifically with the
diesel issue. Section Three of the Memorandum of Agreement read:
In the application of this agreement it is under-
stood that the existing duties and responsibilities
of engineers will not be assigned to others. It
is further understood that a second engineer is
not required in multiple-unit service where the
engineer operates the locomotive from one cab
with one set of controls.1
The Brotherhood thus surrended its demand for an assistant
engineer in multiple-unit operation, and received an assurance
that the "existing duties and responsibilities of engineers"
would not be assigned to any other craft. This last provision
was to become a critical consideration in numerous disputes be-
tween the Brotherhood and the railroads.
I
Ibid., p. 32.
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The Engineers expressed their dissatisfaction with the Board's
findings by filing with the Western Carriers' Conference Committee,
"A Memorandum of Exceptions Taken by the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers to the Recommendations of the Board", and a proposed form
Section Six declared, "This agreement is in full settlement
of the second party's proposals and the questions covering by
Mediation Case A-978, and shall continue in effect, subject to
change under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act as amended."1
Case A-978 had been the Engineers' proposal acted upon by the 1943
2
Emergency Board. There was also attached to the Engineers'
Western Diesel Settlement Agreement the following memorandum:
This will confirm our understanding that any
pending claims for the employment of a second
engineer in multiple-unit diesel-electric
service, except those covering conditions where
employees other than engineers were handling
the operating controls of any of the units,
are hereby withdrawn.3
This served to underline the fact that the Brotherhood had
abandoned its efforts to obtain the assignment of an assistant
engineer.
Substantially the same agreement was made with a committee
representing the Eastern Carriers on December 20, 1944, and with
the Southeastern Region carriers on April 3, 1945. The peace
achieved under these agreements was relatively short lived.
f
The Engineers soon took the position that, although responsi-
ble for the safe and efficient operation of the many engine
applicances in the engine room, the operating engineer was con-
fined to the cab of the locomotive while the train was in motion.
Ibid., p. 33.
2Supra., pp. 58-60
3 Cited in: Brief on Behalf of the Carriers, in: Transcript of
Proceedings in Engineers' Diesel Case, p. 1192.
There was a job to be done in the engine room, particularly on
multiple-unit operation, which required a well trained, highly
skilled locomotive engineer back in the engine room. To the extent
that the job was performed, it was done sometimes by the fireman
(helper)-- whose proper and necessary place was in the locomotive
cab with the engineer--and sometimes by supervisorial employees,
and sometimes by members of the shop forces. This job in the
engine room of the diesels stemmed directly from and partook fully.
of the traditional, historical, carrier imposed responsibilites
and dutiesof the craft of locomotive engineers. Hence, the em-
ployment by the carriers of other persons to perform these duties
in the engine room was in violation of the clause in the diesel
agreements which provided that "the' existing duties and responsi-
bilities of engineers will not be assigned to nthArsn
Acting on these assumptions, the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers served notices between March 12, 1945, and October 8, 1948,
requesting the employment of an additional engineer to supervise
and make road repairs and adjustments in the engine room of all
diesel-electric locomotives, on 63 principal railroad and 53 sub-
sidiaries. Under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, these
notices were processed through initial conferences with all the
carriers concerned and then through mediation--first on an individ-
ual basis with some 17 railroads, and, finally, on a concerted
basis with all the lines concerned. These joint sessions were
held December 15-17, 1948 and January 12-14, 1949, in Chicago.
1to arbitration. The next day, for the first time under the Railway
Labor Act in a nationwide rule case, the Brotherhood agreed to submit
the dispute to arbitration. The carriers rejected arbitration, and
the National Mediation Board announced that mediation was at an end.
The Brotherhood set January 31, 1949, at 6:00 a.m. as a strike
deadline and prepared to withdraw from service on 15 railroads in
~r~t--------------------------------------------L --
the West. Strike votes were processed on other roads. Before the
time set for the'strike, the President of the United States created
an Emergency Board. The strike action was suspended, pending
hearings before that Board.1
C. The Second Diesel Case
The Brotherhood requested the Board to rule on a six point
ro osal which included 
the revived dema 
d f r a s c d 
i e r
whose duties, for the most part, were to be confined to the
engine room. This additional engineer was to be employed on each
multiple-unit diesel of four units or less, and on each single-
unit diesel weighing 200,000 pounds or less. The second engineer
was to be required in road service, and in transfer or belt-line
service. This proposal was subsequently modified to exclude single-
unit diesels provided that the carrier did not require any person
to give attention to the engine room machinery while the locomotive
was in motion. Road service was also defined more specifically
1A more detailed narrative may be found in the opening statement of
Mr. Clifford D. O'Brien, Counsel for the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, in: Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 23-30.
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At the conclusion of the January 14th session, after the car-
riers had categorically rejected the Engineers' proposals and modifica-
tions, the mediators announced that further efforts at conciliation
would be useless. The mediators recommended that the dispute be taken
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subsequent to the original submission: "Road service is intended
to mean that service which is assigned to road engineers as dis-
tinguished from that assigned to yard engineers as provided for
in current agreements." 1
The second point specified that the qualifications of the second
engineer were to be the same as those required of engineers operating
the locomotives and, in addition, of such familiarity with the
engine room machinery as would qualify them to perform the duties
assigned. Next, the union wanted specified that the duties of the
assistant engineer were to be confined to supervision over the
engine room and would consist generally of starting and stopping
the diesel engines, patrolling, inspecting and giving such atten-
tion to adjustment and the operation of the engines, motors, and
engine appliances as would be necessary in operation. He was not
to be required to perform bench work in the units enroute or at
terminals. He would make only such adjustments and light road re-
pairs as would De necessary or practicable in roau operation. Tne
assistant, however, could be used temporarily to relieve the
operating engineer enroute if and when necessary, and if permissible
under operating rules.
The fourth point of the Engineers' demand specified that
additional engineers should be paid at the rate of $12.97 per day
for eight hours or less, while attending such instruction classes
as might be required. in meeting the qualifying requirements. If
the assistant engineer, in the process of training and learning for
lIbid., pp. 30-1.
-L~ L, 1 -I ·ii m~-
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schneaues, pus hins actual expenses wnhile away Zrom nis nhome terminal.
If he were required to make road qualifying trips under instruction,
he was to be paid $12.97 per 100 miles or less.
In an effort to protect the assistant engineers from any
attempt of the carriers to make their lot difficult, the demands
also specified that additional engineers were to go on and be re-
lieved from duty at recognized home or far terminals for engineers.
The final point specified that, except as provided in the de-
mands, additional engineers would be governed by the same rates,
rules and working conditions as applied to the operating engineers
on the same locomotives.1
The Brotherhood held that the 1943 Board decision and subse-
quent agreements based upon it had proved unequal to the realistic
resolution of the issues. Both the 1943 recommendations and the
diesel agreements ensuing from it had left the diesel question
more confused and more complicated. The central issues, as viewed
by the Engineers, involved the problem of adequate running super-
vision, patrol, inspection, and asjustment and repair of the
2
machinery in the diesel engine room.
The Engineers viewed the responsibilities and duties of their
craft as dividing themselves into three major classifications:
First was the top responsibility of the engineer for the successful
lIbid., p. 29-32.
2Ibid., p. 35.
his job in the engine room, were required to attend instruction
classes at points other than the home terminal of his seniority
district, he should be paid the deadhead allowance of the existing
. . .. • .. .. _- _ _2- ~_ J ,I _-
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and safe operation of the locomotive over the road to its terminal.
Second, was the detection and prevention of -trouble, and, in case
of difficulties along the road, such adjustments and repair work
as are practicable and necessary to complete the run into the
terminal. Third, was the careful instruction of and close super-
vision over the fireman (termed "helpers" on other than steam power)
and over his performance of his duties. These responsibilities
and duties, imposed by the carriers, could no longer be discharged
ty the engineer in his new position in the cab of the diesel-
electric locomotive.
The carriers still charged the engineer with responsibility for
the engine in operation (and for the helper's work on that engine)
and enforced the requirements by disciplinary actions including
demerits, suspensions, and discharge. The engineer was held respon-
sible even for acting upon erroneous information concerning the
condition of the engine room machinery relayed to him by the
fireman, the only operating employee available under the th~n exist-
ing practices as a source of this information. Since the engineer
had the responsibility for the engine room, an engineer should
be employed there.
In support of their contentions, the Engineers advanced a
three stage argument: (a) There was a job which had to be done
in the engine room. (b) An additional man was needed to do the
job in the engine room. (c) The additional man should be an
engineer.
Ibid., p. 38.
The Brotherhood-submitted very little new evidence on the
first two points. In defense of their craft rights, however,
the engineers called upon history and tradition. The responsibility
for locomotive machinery en route had always been an important
segment of the content of the craft of locomotive engineers.
A clear-cut demarcation of engineers' work had developed from its
early expression in operating rules, through recognition and spell-
ing out by arbitration boards and governmental agencies. These
duties and responsibilities had been carried over intact from steam
service. The union maintained that the over-all responsibility im-
posed upon engineers had actually been increased on diesels; it was
not limited merely to conditions of the engine which they could know
about personally nor only to those actions of others which they
could personally supervise. This was a serious distension of the
engineer's responsibility. It could not adequately be discharged
by the diesel engineer. That segment of the craft of locomotive
engineers which held him responsible for the locomotive machinery
en route between terminals required him to perform patrol, inspec-
tion, repair and adjustment, as well as to perform supervision
over and to be responsible for the acts of anyone assisting him in
1
his work.
The traditional duty of the locomotive engineer to make road.
repairs was not altered by the fact that others assist him. Indeed,
it was his responsibility to obtain the help of others, if necessary,
1Brief on Behalf of Employees Represented by Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Engineers, in: Transcript of Proceedings in Engineers' Diesel
Case, pp. 1402-1414, passim.
and to supervise them, be they other members of the train crew,
i
track laborers, garage mechanics or members of the shop forces.
The argument of the Engineers continued with the assertion that
any division of the engineer's craft duties and responsibilities
must be with another engineer. Any other division would seriously
violate the established craft lines and creat an intolerable confu-
sion which would complicate rather than solve the diesel question.
The use of shop men, electricians or maintainers to do the work
which has always been the traditional duty and final responsibility
of locomotive engineers would violate the established principle that
shop men do shop work in the shops. The assignment by the carriers
to men of the non-operating crafts of the engine room patrol,
inspection, light repair and adjustment on diesel locomotives en
route was regarded by the engineers as an invasion. The shop men
would certainly oppose any move by the engineers to do bench work,
the major upkeep on the locomotive consisting of the heavy main-
tenance repair work, assembly, and disassembly done in the round-
house and shops. Similarly, the engineers opposed any invasion
of repairs en route by the shop men.
In addition to the threat to craft rights, the presence of a
member of the shop crafts on the locomotive presented a problem in
responsibility. The carriers imposed responsibility for the
condition of the locomotive upon tne engineer. Inevitably, he had
been in doubt as to the functions of these shon men. In the ab-
sence of any operating rules holding him responsible for shop men
Ibid., p. 1409.
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on his engine, was the engineer to exercise the same supervision
over maintainers as he was required to exercise over the fireman
helpers? The engineer was required by rules to see that his
fireman was familiar with his duties, understood the rules, had
sufficient experience, and was adequately instructed in the proper
performance of his work. The maintainer,,: a non-operating
employee, was neither familiar with the operating rules nor included
in their application. He was responsible to no one under any
operating rule and was apparently a free agent in an otherwise
efficient scheme of train operation where responsibility of every
1
train and engine crew member was fixed and definite.
This in itself, claimed the B. L. E., made for inefficient
operation. Should the maintainer have to take an engine off the
line for adjustment or repair, he would not know at what point in
the terrain he could safely cut out part of the power without
affecting the operation of the train. He might interfere with
the engineer's maintenance of a schedule or deprive the engineer
of maximum power at some point on the line where it was required.
The maintainer did not know and was not required to know the topo-
graphy of the road, the upgrades and down-grades or the location
of the scheduled stops.
The engineers also held that the use of supervisorily-titled
employees to dothe work presented no satisfactory solution to the
problems raised by the diesel. Such a practice they felt was both
demoralizing and inefficient. "What is the engineer to consider
1Ibid., p. 1416.
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the extent of his traditional over-all responsibility for the
operation and mechanical condition of his locomotive and the
action of others employed on it, if one of these others is his
immediate boss?" i
Another attempted solution was also denied by the B. L. E.
The use of firemen to handle the engine room repairs, adjust-
ments, patrolling and inspection was regarded by the Brotherhood
as a distinct violation of the craft demarcation between the work
of the two crafts. Historically, the fireman, aside from his job
of firing or production of power --which he does not have on
diesels--has been an assistant to the engineer.
The engineer has a supervisory responsibility over the fireman,
a responsibility almost impossible to fulfill with the fireman out
of the cab and in the engine room. The use of a second fireman to
work in the engine room would place an even larger burden of
responsibility upon the engineer while making it even more difficult
for him to discharge it. When the carriers attemptedto get the
work done by assigning it to the fireman, already assigned important
duties in the cab, they were not only invading craft lines, but also
interfering with the engineer's carrying out of his traditional
responsibility for the entire locomotive. The practice burdened
the locomotive engineer with a supervisory problem he could not
discharge, consistent with,.the important safety requirement which
2
binds him to the operating controls while in motion.
lIbid., p. 1418.
2 Ibid., pp. 1419-22.
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The carriers had made a plea for the right of managerial dis-
cretion, holding that they should be left that degree of flexi-
bility which would enable them to operate their railroads
efficiently, economically and in the public interest. Carrier
counsel had enquired whether an Emergency Board should substitute
its judgment for the judgment of railroad executives charged with
the responsibility of operating the railroad properties. Management
should have the right to determine whether or not an additional
employee was necessary to do the engine room work and what craft
could best be employed at the work.1
The employees characterized this as a "thinly disguised attempt
to fill the engine room job with employees whose rate of pay under-
cut the engineers' hard won pay rates and whose method of payment
defeats the established mileage basis of pay. ... " Since the
engineer was paid on a miles run basis, for the transportation he
produced, he had a distinct and specific interest in getting his
train over the road efficiently and in the shortest time consistent
with speed restrictions and operating conditions. For this the
engineers were paid from 13.1 cents to 14.6 cents per mile in
passenger service and an average of 20.9 cents per mile: in freight
Pay given maintainers per mile ranged from twenty per cent to
fifty per cent of the engineers' rate. These employees were paid
on a monthly basis, had no specific interest in getting the train
1Closing Statement on Behalf of the Carriers, in: Transcript,
Vol. 21, pp. 3647-9.
2Brief on Behalf of Employees, in: Transcript, pp. 1422-3.
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over the road in as short a time as possible, and constituted a
threat to the engineers' rates of pay.1
The brotherhood concluded by indicating that it considered the
locomotive engineer the man best qualified for this job in the
engine room. The degree of mechanical knowledge of the locomotive
machinery, breakdowns, and malfunctions required by the carriers
of their engineers particularly qualified that craft for the
inspection, patrolling, adjustment, and light repair duties. The
B. L. E. further declared that it was and had been fully willing
to cooperate with any carrier program for giving additional training
to or raising the qualifications of diesel engineers.
The carriers disagreed on all counts. They indicated flatly
that there was no need for the services of an additional man on
diesel locomotives. Such a man would render no useful service in
connection with the operation of diesel power, was not required by
safety considerations, and the cost of an additional engineer would
be out of all proportion to the value of his services.
Statistics were presented dealing with diesel operations on
the Burlington Lines indicating that an additional man would have
had an opportunity possibly to prevent an engine failure or shorten
a delay on an average of only once each 750 trips during the years
1947 and 1948. Over that period the wages which would have been
paid an assistant engineer amounted to $4,596.04 for each diesel
delay without regard for whether or not the presence of an assistant
2
could have prevented the delay.
llbid., pp. 1423-4.
2Transcript, p. 2743.
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Carrier testimony pointed out that from November 11, 1934, to
December 16, 1935, the first four diesel trains of the Burlington
were operated by one man, no fireman was employed either in the
cab or in the engine room. During this time, the trains made
1752 trips, not a single passenger or employee was injured, they
reached their final terminals under their own power on 99.7 per cent
of the trips, they ran an average of 26,164 miles (261 days of
engineer pay) per each mechanical delay, and they ran 120,357 miles
per each failure requiring assistance to reach the final terminal.
This performance, argued the .carriers, indicated that so great was
the reliability of the diesel that two men were not required to
operate it--to say nothing of more than two.
With two man operation in 1948, the Burlington's diesels
averaged 28,000 miles for each mechanical delay. The Seaboard
Airline Railroad with passenger diesels in the same year averaged
42,512 miles per failure or delay. In freight service, the
average was.12,986 miles.2  Such trouble-free operation served to
indicate that there was no job in the engine room.
Mr. James M. Symes, vice president in charge of operations of
the Pennsylvania Railroad testified that the Pennsylvanis con-
sidered terminal maintenance to be entirely adequate for efficient
operations:
1Testimony of Mr. Ralph Budd, President, Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad, in: Transcript, pp. 2206-11
2Testimony of Mr. C. H. Sauls, General Manager, Seaboard
Airline Railroad, in: Transcript, p. 2279.
I
Experience has indicated to us that repairs can
be better made at regular maintenance points,
with engines standing still, where we are
equipped with the necessary tools and materials
and have available highly skilled mechanics, than
is possible by 'tinkering' with adjustments and
controls by less experienced help with locomo-
tives moving at high rates of speed.1
Testimony was also offered that very few of the roads used
maintainers. One of the Carriers' Exhibits said in summary:
1) The use of supervisors and other employees
selected from the mechanics class to ride
diesel locomotives, either part or full
time, is decreasing instead of increasing.
2) Where such employees are assigned, they are
for.the purpose of performing shop work;
for which others than mechanics are not
qualified to do this work.
3) The use of Road Foremen and other super-
visors is decreasing instead of increasing,
when we see that there are 6-1/2 times as
many diesel road locomotives as there were in
1943.
4) The work performed by Road Foreman and other
road supervisors is entirely foreign to the
duties and resporsibilities claimed for a
second engineer.
In a less direct portion of their argument the carriers main-
tained that in and by the diesel settlement agreements of 1943 and
1944, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers had contracted away
and waived all rights to demand the assignment of an engineer to
the engine rooms of diesel locomotives. Section IIII .o those a·gree-
ments was at issue: "In the application of this agreement it is
understood that the existing duties and responsibilities of
1Transcript, pp. 2361-2.
2Carriers' Exhibit No. 17. Cited in: Brief on Behalf of the
Carriers, in Transcript, p. 1239.
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engineers will not be assigned to others. It is further under-
stood that a second engineer is not required in multiple-unit
service where the engineer operates the locomotive from one cab with
one set of controls." 1
The Brotherhood had indicated in its testimony that the first
sentence of Section Three was designed to preserve to the
engineer the right to perform in the engine room those duties con-
sistent with his overall responsibility for the locomotive. The
question of diesel engine room supervision, road repairs, and ad-
justments, was said to be dealt with solely by the first sentence.
The second sentence, as interpreted by the Engineers, dealt with
matters separate and apart from, and unconnected with the first
sentence. The second sentence related only to the assignment of
and additional operating engineer; it was not concerned with the
question of engine room supervision, and adjustment and repairs.2
This interpretation was denied by the carriers. They held
that any such construction was in conflict with the representa-
tions made by the B. L. E. at the time the agreements were made
and also with the plain and literal meaning of the language of the
Section. At the time the agreements were made, the "existing"
duties of the engineers included no engine room duties. The fire-
men had taken engine room duties under the findings of the 1943
Emergency Board and subsequent agreements between the Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen and the carriers. The "existing"
1Supra., pp. 74-6.
2Transcript, pp. 484, 5634-72 passim.
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duties and responsibilities of the engineers had not changed.
The carriers held that these "then as now, while the train was
in motion, included only (1) the manipulation of the operating
controls and, (2) general supervision and jurisdiction of the
1
locomotive."
The engineers had never given attention to the machinery
in diesel engine rooms while the train was in motion. The very
nature of their duties in operating locomotives made it impossible
for them to leave the operating controls. Had the Brotherhood
intended to secure an exclusive right to engine room work the
language of Section Three would have been vastly different.
The carriers further indicated that the language of Section Three
had been that of the Brotherhood accepted by the carriers.
Counsel for the carriers declared that two inferences were
possible. Either the language of the first sentence did not
mean at the time the agreements were signed what the Brotherhood
now said that it meant, or the BLE had tricked the carriers into
accepting language which would subject them to then unsuspected
penalties. "In either event the employees should not be allowed
2
to succeed in their contentions."
The Board held for the carriers. The issue, as seen by the
Board, did not relate to all the duties and responsibilities of
tne engineer, but only to the duties and responsibilities of the
craft as respected engine room operation on the diesel-electric
locomotive while the train is enroute.
13rief on Behalf of the Carriers, in: Transcript, p. 1277.
ZIbid.., p. 1280
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Said the Board:
The narrow issue before us is whether or
not preservation of the established craft
rights of engineers supports the B.L.1.
claim for an. additional engineer who shall
be made solely responsible for the engine
room while the train is enroute and who
shall either perform or supervise the
engine room work. Is approval of this pro-
position essential to the preservation of
essential draft rights of engineers? 1
The Board's consideration of the fundamental issue in
the case and of the various basic cuestions raised by the
Brotherhood contentions was on five main bases. First, they
examined the carrier rules, operating practices, and policies
applied in discipline cases in an effort to determine whether
or not the craft rights claimed by the engineers were tradi-
tionally performed by them or required of them by the carriers.
The Board found that the traditional and long established respon-
sibilities could not be said to give the engineers a right
actually to perform or directly to supervise all engine room
work. "This right cannot be sought by analogy with steam opera-
2
tions--the analogy argues against the engineers." After ex-
amining the problem of engineer responsibilities and duties in
some detail the Board concluded:
It must, accordingly, be seen that application
of carrier imposed rules, practices, and policies
does not, and may not, give foundation to the de-
mand here made. Under such rules, practices, and
policies, the B.L.E. cannot properly exercise a
craft claim over engine room work of diesel-electrics
on the ground that such work has traditionally been
performed by them and traditionally expected of them
1~Eort2 of Emergency Board Appointed January 28, 1949, p. 27, in
Transcrtit, pp. 1505-91.
2 bid*., p. 34
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by the carriers 1e all locomotives, including
diesel-elec trics.
Secondly, the Board reviewed the early development of the
diesel ouestion in an attempt to determine whether or not the
engineers uninterruptedly achieved or pursued a claim to the
traditional craft rights, as stated by them, in the operation
of diesel-electric locomotives. The Brotherhood had maintained
that it had consistently, from the very first use of diesel
power, claimed the craft rights it was claiming in the proceeding
before the Board. Historically, the Board found, the duties
claimed by the engineers had been assigned to the fireman--from
the first employment of a fireman (helper) on diesels. The first
demand of the engineers for an additional member of their craft
had been on the grounds that the firemen were not qualified to do
the engine roma work. The carriers had objected to this request
on the grounds that three men, engineer, fireman, and maintainer,
were already employed on diesels. The Brotherhood had then explained
that their request was predicated on the assumption that it was
possible, desirable and entirely practicable to qualify engineers
to assume the duties then being discharged by the electricians.
The claim to this work was not urged as necessary to preserve en-
gineers' traditional duties, but uron the premise that the work was
such that engineers could, in time, cualify to preform it--thus
supplanting the electricians then being used. The Board regarded
it as significant that the electricians were not represented by
any organization at the time this demand for the work being done
11114, P. 38.
I
by them was made. 1  The engineers had not protested the
assignment of engine room duties to the firemen, nor had the
B.L.E. urged the employment of a second engineer on any basis
save safety and efficiency until comparatively recently. In
summary of its findings on this point the Board said:
The implication of the record of early
attempts to deal with the diesel question
scarcely needs comment. It suffices to
say that the work in diesel engine rooms
now claimed by the B.L.E. is not shown
to be traditionally that of engineers,
nor has it been continuously claimed as
such by the organization. 2
The third consideration of the Board was an analysis of
the B.L.L. agreements with the Western, Eastern and Southeastern
Carriers' Conferences in 1943 and 1944 to determine whether or
not the claim of the organization to engine room work was pre-
served or abandoned and intended so to be in those agreements.
The consideration again hinged upon Section Three of the agree-
ments. The contentions of the B.L.. . that that section bad been
one of the means by which they had continued and preserved their
craft rights was reviewed. The Board felt that it had the duty to
make a finding of fact on the question whether that contention
was correct or whether by that section or other provisions of
those B.L.E. agreements with the carriers, the Brotherhood had
voluntarily relinquished by contract any claim to those craft rights
or any claim to have an additional engineer assigned to the engine
room of diesels regardless of a craft-right basis. Whether the
Ibid., p. 41.
2Ibi.., pp. 441--5
1organization had actually intended to relinquish any such
claims by those contracts, even though the contracts might
not have achieved that purpose, became of major importance
in any appraisal of the equity to the unionts demand. The
Emergency Board admitted that it was not an arbitration tribunal
but viewed a finding on the issue to be within its powers and
necessary to its function. It had to try to ascertain what the
parties reasonably or actually intended to accomplish by their
agreement in order to pass judgment upon the equity of the demand.
After an extensive analysis of the problem, the Board concluded
that the B.L.E. had, in Section Three, "contracted away, clearly
intended to contract away, any claim, regardless of the basis of
the claims, for a second or assistant engineer to do work of any
kind whatsoever in the engine room of diesel-electric locomotives
while in motion.'l
The Board then turned to a consideration of the B.L.E. claim
that the employment of an additional engineer in the engine room
had merit, apart from traditional craft rights, upon the grounds
that it would contribute to the safe and efficient operation of
the locomotive. The Board pointed out that no argument had been
made by the engineers that they must do the work themselves in
order to contribute to the end of increased efficiency and safety
of operation. They were quite willing that firemen or others do
the work provided only that an engineer directly supervise the man
who actually performed the labor.
iThe Board considered this problem at length in its Reort from
p. 46 through p. 74. The specific conclusion is found in: Ibid.,
p. 71•
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The alternatives proposed by the Brotherhood were either
the closing of the engine room so as to prevent any attention
en route, or the assignment of an assistant engineer either to
perform such work or to supervise its performance. The discon-
tinuance of any attention to the engine room would scarcely con-
tribute to increased efficiency or safety, in the Board's opinion.
Testimony had indicated that the engineers were not competent to
perform the work, so that their assignment to it would not con-
tribute to either efficiency or safety. This left only the matter
of supervision.
The Board noted that the engineer did supervise the fireman
who did whatever patrolling was done while the train was in motion.
Employment of an additional engineer would only provide direct
supervision under the eye, not of the existing engineer, but of
another engineer. This assistant engineer would carry out his
responsibilities quite independently of the present engineer. The
traditional duty of the operating engineer for general supervision
of the engine from draw bar to draw bar would be completely ended.
In its place, entire divided responsibilities and powers would be
introduced. Said the Board:
Jiust how this divided responsibility would
work to improve the service was never spelled
out for the Board by the engineers. Would
the present fireman be subject to two engineer
bosses while the train is in motion? If so,
which of the two would have the superior auth-
ority over him? What would be the relationship
between the two engineers in meeting problems
affecting both of their exclusive spheres? In-
stead of contributing to efficiency of operation,
such a system as proposed by the engineers would
seem to create confusion and diminish, rather
than increase, efficiency.l
llbid., p. 76.
I
The Board could find "absolutely nothing in the record
on which to base a recommendation that the employment of a
full-time engineer to watch patrol, inspection, adjustment and
light repairing by firemen, or work done by the maintainer, in
the engine room of diesels would increase efficiency of operation
sufficiently to justify his employment,ul No safety considerations
important enough to justify an additional engineer were admitted.
The Regýrt of the Emergency Board, .dated April 11, 1949, thus
denied aqy justification for acceptance oi the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Enginners' claims for the emplayment of an additional
engineer in multiple unit diesel operations. The same personnel,
George W. Taylor (Chairman), Grady Lewis, and George E. Osborne,
also heard, as an Emergency Board appointed February 15, 1949, yet
another "diesel case" brought by the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen.
D. The Third Diesel Case
The so-called nFiremen's Diesel Case" arose out of notices
dated June 30, 1947, served by the B.L.F. and E. upon 160 railroads,
and three notices of the same date served by the WVestern, Eastern,
and Southeastern Carriers on the union. The notices served by the
Brotherhood had for their purpose the alteration of the three existing
regional agreements between the union and the carrier groups entered
into in 1943 and 1944. Six issues were raised by the Firemen, but
only two of these related to the diesel and will be considered here.
On December 22, 1947, request was made by the Brotherhood for
Yon + .'Hp~tnl ~ ik iqqiipq Radnaii of t i -ilgilca+
of a wage-rules movement which was not finally settled until No-
!i. pp. 76-7.
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representatives had been held and no agreement reached. On
January 14, 1949, the national groups met. The carriers suggested
progressing the case into mediation immediately, in order to
expedite the proceeding. The B.L.F. and E. stated its opposition
to any procedure which would result in a repetition of the 1943
situation in which the Firemen case and the Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Engineers case were heard before the one Emergency Board.
The carriers then declined to make any changes in the existing
agreements, and the parties jointly invoked the services of the
National Mediation Board, on January 15, 1949. The Brotherhood
accepted an offer of arbitration, but the carriers declined. On
February 15, 1949, without any strike vote having been taken by
the Brotherhood, the Emergency Board was created.
The issues involving the diesel were: (1) Shall an additional
fireman (helper) be assigned on all diesel-electric locomotives
operated in road service for each four units or less? And (2) Shall
a fireman be assigned to locomotives operating in yard service and
weighing 90,000 pounds 
or less on driverst
Existing agreements provided that the fireman 
should be in
the cab of multiple unit diesel locomotives in high speed stream-
lined, or main line through passenger trains at all times when the
train was in motion. The agreements further provided that if com-
pliance with the above required the service of an additional man
on such trains to perform the work customarily done by firemen, he
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vember 12, 1948, no further action was taken upon the issues
until November 20, 1)48. The Firemen then officially informed
the carriers that conferences between carrier and employee
was to be taken from the seniority ranks of the firemen.
Locomotives weighing under 90,000 pounds on the drivers were
not required to carry a fireman.
The Board noted that the issue raised by the proposal of
the Brotherhood for the employment of an additional fireman
(helper) on all road diesel-electric locomotives was by far the
most important of the issues before it. Not only did this issue
involve a substantial proposed addition to the wage bill of the
industry (the carriers had estimated that the assignment of a
second fireman on road diesels would increase the total annual
wage bill of Class I railroads by more than 40 million dollars1),
but it had an important bearing upon what the relative operating
effectiveness of diesels in comparison with steam and other types
of locomotives would be. Other road locomotives would be operated
with a crew of two. The larger crew on the diesel might provide
more jobs for firemen, but it would also entail an offset of an
increased wage cost against the proved operating advantages-against
the productivity--of diesels and would substantially cut down the
extent of the technological advantages which had been widely attri-
buted to the new type power.
The Board, therefore, considered the critical additional fire-
man issue in some detail. The agreements providing that in high-
speed, main line, multiunit passenger trains the fire man should
be in the cab at all times when the train was in motion had com-
pensating carrier rules. These required that the train would be
ITranscript of Proceedings of the Emergency Board in Firemen's Diesel
Case (Washington: Ward and Paul, 1949) p. 2133.
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roads which employed maintainers, the engine rooms in this
high-speed service were not given patrolling attention while
the train was in action. The fireman 
could inspect the machinery
at the infrequent station stops and do a limited amount of work
then if necessary.
The Brotherhood claimed, however, that this rule had proved
unsatisfactory in practice. In reality, ran the unionts argument,
the fireman was expected to perform engine room work while the
train was in motion and the rule requiring him to watch signals
was accordingly frequently violated in order to maintain schedules.
It was also claimed that unscheduled stops to enable the fireman
to attend to the engine room increased greatly the chance of rear-
end collisions. The Firemen contended that when the fireman had
to remain in the cab, others, in violation of his rights, performed
his "customary work" in the engine room. The only way out, said
the Brotherhood, was to assign an additional fireman to these loco-
I
motives.
The organization also claimed that the existing operating
methods in freight service were equally unsatisfactory. The safety
aspects involved in having someone in addition to the engineer in
the cab were stressed by the Fireman as was their contention that
this person must be a fireman rather than a head brakeman who, on
most roads either because of rule requirements or established prac-
tice, rides in the cab. He is normally available to watch signals.
R ort of Emergency Board Appointed February 15, 1949, p. 20, in
Transcript of Proceedings in Firemen's Diesel Case, pp. 2115-2249.
stopped, if necessary, to enable the fireman to give atten-
tion to engine room machinery en route. Except for those
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during such times as the fireman is absent in the engine room.
The Brotherhood maintained that the regular duties of the head-end
brakeman prevented him from properly performing the lookout fune-
tions of the fireman. In addition, the fireman, rather than the
brakeman is the person test fitted by training and experience to
act as lookout assistant to the engineer. Also, contended the
B.L.F. and E. the brakeman watching signals takes over "customary
duties" of the fireman to which the fireman craft is entitled.
Again the Brotherhood concluded that the only way out was to em-
ploy an additional fireman.
In general the main line of the Brotherhood-st argument on the
safety and efficiency of operations aspects of the situation followed
the same lines as it had in the 1943 proceeding. It ran as follows:
(a) Considerations of safety required the presence of a fireman
in the cab of all road diesels at all times; (b) there was also
essential work in the engine room that must be done by a fireman;
(c) it followed that a second fireman was required to perform the
engine room work; (d) the greater producitivity of the diesels, as
compared to steam, had enabled the carriers to effect substantial
savings through adopting the diesel but only at the expense of
some firemen whose job opportunities had decreased or been elimin-
ated; (e) under these circumstances, firemen displaced as a result
of the introduction of diesel power should be employed in other new
jobs created by the diesel. 1
The Board considered the point about increased productivity and
1
"Brief for the Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman and Enginemen," pp.
42-3. In: Transcript of Proceedings in Firemenes Diesel Case, pp.1961-.2114.
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the contention based upon possible technological unemployment
as subsidiary. Their validity depended upon the validity of
the preceding steps in the argument as the Board did not think
that the Brotherhood would ask for an additional fireman if there
was no useful job for him to perform.1
The Board was of the opinion that these questions had been
dealt with by the 1943 Board and was inclined to reject the or-
ganization contention that the case presented a new problem.
This contention was based upon the increase in dieselization over
the intervening years, particularly in freight service. On a
percentage basis the number of diesels used in yard switching ser-
vice had declined considerably with the "diesel problem" becoming
more one concerned with road operations. The Brotherhood had stated:
It is in freight service today that the
need for the protection proposed by the
Brotherhood is greatest and the impact
on the man is greatest. It is the wide-
spread and intensive use of multiple-unit
diesels in high-speed, heavy-tonnage, through-
freight movements that today spearheads the
diesel problem, distinguishes it from the
1943 problem, and that makes it one of the
most serious problems encountered by rail-
road enginemen since the inception of this
industry.2
Said the Board in reply:
A more extensive present use of diesel-
electrics than in 194 3 is, in itself, no
compelling reason for concluding that
operating rules, negotiated when a lesser
number of diesels was in use, are nec-
essarily inequitable to the firemen or
inevitably inadequate for safe and efficient
operation. To be sure, the assignment of
more firemen to diesels has doubtless re-
sulted in more widespread interest in the
way these locomotives are run and in more
intensive scrutiny of the rules. Adequacy
1 Report, p. 43.
2 Brief for the Brotherhood, pp. 3g-9.
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or inadequacy of the operating rules has to
be appraised, however, in terms of how they
work out in practice and not on the basis of
how widely applicable they are. 1
The Board admitted that the growth in dieselized freight
service did raise some problems as to whether the experience
with freight operation had been, in 1943, sufficient to enable
the parties to establish sound, workable rules for freight
operations on a fully informed basis. In its consideration of
freight operations, the Board took note of the fact that the
general practice was for the fireman to patrol the engine room,
answer alarms, and do whatever work was necessary in the engine
room while en route. The use of maintainers was the exception
rather than the rule and was of little or no importance for the
railroads as a whole.
The parties had been in substantial disagreement as to the
amount of time spent by the fireman in the engine room and, there-
fore out of the cab. The organization had claimed that the amount
of time varied according to the variety of factors, and averaged from
a third to one-half of the time en route.2 Time studies made by
the carriers on 12 of the largest users of diesels in such service
indicated that the fireman was absent from the cab while the train
was in motion only about 14 per cent of the time.
Another factor which the Board felt had to be considered in
the freight service aspects was the number and longer time of stops
1eport, pp. 44- 5.
2 Brief for the Brotherhood, pp. 48-51.
3Reort, p. 67.
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which may be and had to be made. The lack of pressure to
meet set schedules, in contrast to passenger service, provided
greater opportunity to patrol and do other work in the engine
room while the train was not in motion. There had been no
showing that under these practices the operation had not been
satisfactory or that, in addition to the time spent by the fire-
man, it would be necessary to assign an additional fireman to
the engine room.
The Firemen had advanced as an argument for breaking the
cab and engine room portions of the job in two that the existing
rules placed an undue burden upon the fireman in having to decide
which of two possibly conflicting duties he would perform. The
Board did not feel that this constituted an "undue burden":
It is quite true that some of the fireman's
job is to be performed in the cab and some
of it in the engine room and that he cannot do
both at the same time. But no rules demand such
an impossibility. The fireman, along with every
other employee, always has had a variety of duties
which could not all be performed simultaneously
and which require both a knowledge of operating
rules and some exercise of judgment in choosing 1
the one applicable to the situation at the time.
While no justifiable claim for an additional fireman could
be recognized by the Board under existing operating practice,
this practice had been made possible because there was no rule
requiring the fireman to remain in the cab at all times. The
Brotherhood request would extend the watching rule to all road
diesels used in freight service and would create there the same
problems as existed in high-speed passenger service. However,
Ibid., p. 68.
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noted the Board, the requested rule went well beyond the
watching rule in force on main-line passenger trains. The
rule there applied only to the time the train was in motion.
The requested rule would make it mandatory for the fireman to
stay in the cab at all times. Such a rule in freight service
where there are frequent and long stops, at which time there
was no need for his presence in the cab, regardless of whether
the brakeman was there, and was or was not qualified to observe
and call signals and do other lookout duties, would require that
the fireman remain in the cab. Such a rule would effectively
prevent the fireman from patrolling even at stops in freight
service. This would have a serious effect upon existing practice.
The fastest scheduled freight trains only seldom or in a few
instances exceeded an average speed for running time of 40 miles
per hour. The speeds of the trains powered by steam were about
the same as those of diesels with the two types of power often
used interchangeably on some runs and making the same schedules.
The Board considered such actual running speeds as well as the
authorized maximum speeds as far below those in passenger service.
The Board argued that even if speed were, per se, a factor
in safety, that factor would not be present in freight service to
any appreciable degree. Certainly it ould not exist to an extent
sufficient to compel the fireman to remain in the cab even while
the train was in motion. It would provide absolutely no reason for
his presence while the train was standing still. In the opinion of
the Board:
Ibid., pp. 70-1.
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The demand which would extend in freight
service the watching rule beyond its pre-
sent applicability to high-speed passenger
service is completely indefensible and
entirely unjustified on grounds of safety
or any other valid reason. 1
In addition, in the Board 3 opinion, the safety record of
diesel-electric locomotives used in freight service under the
JW L1 - -~zl 
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existiang operating rules ana practices disclosea no naee 1or
any change in them so far as manpower was concerned. In support
of its position, the tribunal cited the comparative accident
rates of the two types of power. In the three-year period from
1946 to 1949 in freight service on 23 representative railroads
there had been 73 trainmen on duty killed and 535 injured in steam
service by reason of train accidents as against 3 killed and 59
injured in diesel powered trains. In terms of casualty rate per
million locomotive-miles, there were 0.06 killed and 0.41 injured
in steam as against 0.02 killed and 0.32 injured in diesel operations.2
The Board noted further that only a small percentage of the acci-
dents that did occur had any relationship whatsoever to the presence
or absence of a fireman or head end brakeman in the cab.
Granting only for purposes of argument that some additional
person should be in the cab at least while the train was in motion,
the Board considered whether it was essential that this other derson
be a fireman. Would the need be satisfied if the head-end brakeman
were in the cab when the fireman was not? The Brotherhood had con-
tended that this would not satisfy the safety requirements. 3
lbid•,, p. 71.
2 Carriers' Exhibit 22, Tables 18, 20.
3Transcript, pp. 2169-2176.
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The union had urged that the duty of the head brakeman
to look backward to observe the condition of the train pre-
vented his being an effective lookout forward. This the Board
held to be not valid. If it were, it would similarly disqualify
both the fireman and the engineer, for the duty to look back was
common to all three. The fact that it was the primary duty of
the head brakeman did not constitute a sufficient difference upon
which to ground a distinction. In addition, the observation of
the train, which could be done only on curves, never presented
making sufficient observation forward on slow-moving freight
trains.
The Board considered the head brakeman as well qualified to
perform the watching duties as the fireman. He received the same
training and instructions and passed the same operating examina-
tions as firemen. The duty to observe and call signals and perform
the other functions of a lookout, regardless of the presence of the
fireman, had existed for decades. On hband-fired steam locomotives,
he had to do most of the watching as the fireman had to be on the
deck of the locomotive cab much of the time shoveling.
It was conceded that the brakeman was not so well qualified
as the fireman to take over the mechanical operation of the loco-
motive in the case of death or illness of the engineer, no such
ability seemed necessary to the Board. The only essential was that
he know how to stop the train and the simplicity of that operation
was such that it could be performed by any member of the crew. The
fireman, if' he were in the engine room, could be called to take charge
1 Report, p. 74.
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after the train had been halted.1
The Brotherhood had argued that on some railroads it
was standard for the head brakeman to ride in the cab of the
trailing unit and was not in the operating cab with the engineer.
The Board felt that this was the only argument that raised any
real question. It took into consideration, however, that on most
roads it was either the rule or practice that the brakeman be in
the operating cab whenever the fireman was absent, and that the
two roads which had no such rule or practice were willing to in-
stitute it if- it were held necessary or advisable. The Board
did not feel that the fact that some few railroads did not make
provision for the brakeman to be in the cab in the absence of the
fireman was sufficient to force all roads to require a fireman to
be in the cab at all times while the train was in motion, mach less
to adopt the more drastic rule that would require him to be there
at all times en route, even while the train was standing safely
for long periods of time.2
On these various grounds the Board concluded that no valid
reason existed as to either through-freight service or local-
freight service for adopting the B.L.F. and E. proposal that a
fireman be assigned to the cab of diesel-powered freight trains
at all times.
In its consideration of the Brotherhood's demand for the more
rigid watching rule (requiring a fireman in the cab at all times)
in multi-unit, high-speed, main-line passenger trains, the Board
IIbid., pp. 74-6.
2Ibid., p. 80.
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went over more familiar ground. In this service, existing
rules required the fireman in the cab while the train was in
motion. In consequence, in this service and only in this service,
any engine room work done en route was performed either by the
fireman at the regularly schedules but infrequent station stops,
at unscheduled stops made for the purpose of permitting the fire-
man to give necessary attention to the engine room, or by main-
tainers, spot checkers, or variously titled service or supervisory
personnel.
However, the Brotherhood contended that the watching rule was
being consistently violated because of the pressure of schedules,
and the danger involved in unscheduled stops. In addition, it was
claimed, the assignment of engine room work to others infringed upon
the work of firemen. Therefore, an additional fireman assigned to
the engine room was necessary.
The Board viewed itself as being required to answer three
questions:
(1) To further safe operations, should the
present watching rule be modified so as to
require the fireman to remain in the cab at
all times?
(2) If the present watching rule is either
so modified or continued as at oresent, does
compliance with the watching rule depend upon
the assignment of an additional fireman to per-
form engine room work en route?
(3) Do the firemen have an exclusive right to
perform engine room work en route which is vio-
lated by assigning such work to others?1
The Brotherhood had contended that violation of the rule was
inevitable and the Board conceded that violations had occurred.
Violations had been more prevalent on some roads than on others and
Ibid., p. 81.
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carriers in general had been acting in good faith to
secure compliance with the rule. Some had issued special
bulletins admonishing train crews to obey the rule; some had
posted bulletins to the same effect in the cabs of diesels.
The "on-time" tradition blamed by the B.L.F. and E. for
many of the violations was held by the Board to be countered
by another tradition that took precedence-safety. The rule
had been recommended by the 1943 Board with a view to contri-
buting to the safety of operations. The present Board felt that
although a duty rested upon the employees to conform to any opera-
ting rule, it seemed that an added desire might well be expected
of them in carrying out any safety measure adopted for their own
protection as well as for the protection of the train. Said the
Board: "This is especially so since they now urge safety of
operation as a principal cause to msupport present demands." 1
The carriers, while admitting violations, suggested that
these may not actually have resulted in unsafe conditions. In
their view, the rule was unnecessarily restrictive and inflexible.
However, they did their best to enforce it as it was part of a
labor agreement. The roads advanced different reasons for what-
ever violations occurred. In contrast to the Brotherhoods position
the carrier view of the matter was that the engine crews sometimes
decided on its own initiative that at slow speeds or under particularly
favorable road conditions, the fireman could safely leave the cab.
The men themselves decide, therefore, contended the roads, that the
1
Ibid., p. 82.
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watching rule is too inflexible to be practical and they
violate it. The carriers argued, and with reason, that it ill
became the Brotherhood to seek to use violations by firemen
I
of any agreement term under which the carriers were able and
willing to operate as a reason for adding an additional fireman.,
The Board took the position that if the rule were observed,
safety would be adequately provided for as a lookout, admitted by
the Brotherhood to be adequate, would always be in the cab when
the train was in motion. The Board said further:
We know of nothing, and no evidence on the
point was submitted to us, to show that the
fireman might contribute to the safety of
the train by being restrictel to the cab
while the train is standing.
If the firemen were to persist in going back to the engine
room while the train was in motion, and if the rule proved to
be no more enforceable in the future than it had in the past, the
Board considered it proper that it should examine the hazard of
such conduct in the light of past performance. Evidence submitted
by both parties had indicated that with the existing rule rigidly
enforced, or with it more or less casually disregarded, the matter
of safety of operation from the head of the train presented no
problem. Safety had been demonstrated.
Since the rule was apparently regarded as too inflexible and
impractical by both the employees and the carriers, the Board
suggested that negotiations between them on the subject might at
least be considered as one way of arriving at a possible answer to
1
"Brief on Behalf of the Carriers," p. 117. In: Transcript of Pro-
ceedings in Firemens' Diesel Case, pp. 1775-1959.
2 Report, p. 83.
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the problems of getting a safe, workable, and efficient
1
watching rule. With this gratuitous counsel, the Board
moved on to the safety problems involved in unscheduled stops.
The Brotherhood had asserted that unscheduled stops to
enable the fireman to quit the cab to attend an alarm in the
engine room were impractical as well as unsafe. Reasoning that
such stops were necessary in the enforcement of the existing
watching rule, the practice of stopping trains at unscheduled
points along the line of the road was dangerous in any case,
said the Firemen, and especially dangerous on the main trunk
lines with their density of traffic where the high-speed passenger
trains operated. Need for such stops could be eliminated, it was
claimed, only by hiring an additional fireman for engine room
duties. The safety insured thereby would justify the hiring, accor-
ding to the Brotherhood view. 2
In refutation of this point the carriers had cited delay st4-
tietics in both steam and diesel service. Diesel locomotives bad
lost 1.1 per cent in hours over a six months t period because of
road delays while steam power in the same time had lost 13.2 per
cent. The Board accepted the carrier contention that unscheduled
stops to permit the fireman to answer engine room alarms were not a
frequent necessity or occurrence. Nor could the Board admit that the
few stops which did occur should be classed as hazardous. An examina-
tion of the accident statistics had revealed the occurrence of no
lbid., p. Sk.
2
"Brief on Behalf of the Brotherhood," pp. 64-6.
3Transcript, pp. 3716-3722.
rear-end collisions as a result of the stopping rule. 1
The Board also denied the organization contention that
the unscheduled stop rule was impractical because stops fre-
quently could not be made in time to prevent engine room damage
or because grades or curves precluded stopping. It was felt
that these were indeed remote contingencies. Since unscheduled
stops with diesels were few compared to steam, the stop problem
could not be regarded as acute. In summary, the Board held:
The infrequency of unscheduled stops with
their accompanying lack of accidents or
damages, coupled with the reported rigid
enforcement by carriers of the rear-end
flagging rule, working in conjunction
with the automatic train stops which are
in use as required by the Safety Bureau
of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
all combine to render the hazard of the
unscheduled-stop rule entirely negligible.
The contention certainly does not in any
way indicate the need for an extra fire-
man either to diminish unscheduled stops
or to eliminate them in whole.2
Concerning the claim of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men and Enginemen to an exclusive right to engine-room work, the
Board declared that such work had traditionally been assigned to
others in addition to firemen. No strict line of demarcation had
ever been drawn between engine room work to be performed by the
firemen and work to be done by others.
The lack of any exclusive right of firemen to engine room
work had been tacit in the report of the 1943 diesel Board. The
1949 Board reviewed the 1943 findings and pointed out that its
predecessor had remarked upon the fact that employees other than
1 Report, p. 85.
21bid., pp. s5-6.
·I
firemen sometimes not only did maintenance and repair work
but also engaged in work of an operational character. The
Board had suggested that harmonious relationship between the
parties could best be maintained by such other employees not
performing operational duties. This suggestion had not been
accepted.
It was also noted that the use of maintainers in the engine
rooms of diesel locomotives had declined as the carriers had
learned from experience that such attention was not necessary.
If the Brotherhood felt that this now far from prevalent use of
other crafts in the engine rooms constituted a violation of labor
agreements with the carriers, it had access through defined channels
to the Railway Adjustment Board. The Board noted that no such
claims had been processed and very few had been filed with the
carriers.1 This indicated that violations were few.
Those other than firemen who were assigned to the engine room
were doing no more than they had always done and which the carriers
had every right to assign to them. Employees who were given only
intermittent, spot-checking assignments could not be performing
regular and periodic patrol. Said the Board:
There are no valid reasons to support the
demand of the B.L.F. and E for assignement
of an additional fireman to the engine rooms
of high-speed passenger trains on the ground
that firemen have an exclusive right to per-
form all or some of the work done in the en-
gine room en route.'
1Report, p. SS.
2Ibid., P. S9.
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The Board thus denied the Firemen an additional member
of their craft both in freight service and in high-speed passen-
ger service. It also considered several other classes of service.
The watching rule requiring the presence of the fireman in the
cab at all times while the train is in motion did not apply to
single-unit, sttreamlined trains. These were characterizied by
relatively high average speeds for short distances between fre-
quent station stops. Such schedules were made possible by the
acceleration characteristics of the diesel-electric locomotive,
but the use of only one unit dictated that such trains be short
and light.
In this class service it was permitted that the fireman make
patrol inspection trips, leaving the cab, while the train was in
motion. The need for patrolling en route was much reduced by the
frequent station stops, and the existence of only one engine room
reduced the time thus spent to a minimum. The quite limited duties
of the fireman in this service reduced the consideration of need for
an additional fireman to a question of safety. Again the Board in-
dicated that the safety and efficiency records of the diesel fore-
closed any possible need for an additional fireman in this class
of service.
tional passenger service" employed standard passenger cars powered
by diesel locomotives. The locomotive might be either single or a
mnltiunit plant, depending upon the requirements of the particular
train. Because of the relatively greater weight of the conventional
lbid., pp. 90-2.
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cars compared with the light-weight, streamlined cars, such
trains were more sluggish and operated normally on slower
schedules than did the high-speed, streamline trains. These
conventional trains marked the transitional period of changing
from the older type of trains, formerly powered by steam loco-
motives, to the newer type, made up of streamlined cars and diesel
locomotives. The Board felt, however, that this class of train
had contributed its proportionate part to the accomplishments of
diesels generally and was included in all statistical computations
affecting safety of operation, as well as dependability and relia-
bility. No justification could be seen for adding an additional
fireman in this class of service.
A comparatively new development in the diesel field, the so-
called "road switcher" which had no engine room but a hooded engine,.
but which could be and was used in multi-unit operation both in
freight and passenger service had been included in the organization's
demand. No additional fireman was requested on single unit hooded
engines.
Need for an additional fireman (helper) on this class of power
was claimed upon the ground that the fireman could not attend a
trailing unit should anything go wrong with its motor. Being
hooded, no repairs could be made while the locomotive was in motion,
and the sole function of a fireman in the event of trouble would be
to stop the motor. This would serve only the safety and protection
of the machinery.
The carriers had indicated that no more than a limited inspection
. p. 92.
Ibid.., p. 92.
as to the condition and supply of lubricating oil and the
battery-charging indicators was necessary and this was per-
formed only when the train was standing. Safety regulations
of the ICC required a catwalk between the units provided with
a hand-rail and a steel hand-rail guarded passageway along the
trailing unit. Carrier rules required that no employee move
from unit to unit while the train was in motion. Since in most
examples of multiunit, hooded locomotive operation, all of the
motors could be stopped from the operating cab, the Board could
see no need for an additional fireman in freight service employing
such motive power.1
The Brotherhood had indicated that if such power were used
in passenger service, the heating unit for the train might be lo-
cated on the trailing unit. This normally would require servicing
and periodic attention from the fireman. However, no evidence on
this score had been presented to the Board and it concluded:
Thus, it is clear that the very reason
relied upon for an additional fireman
is nonexistent in every case where the
facts were submitted to the Board. Fur-
thermore, no instance is shown of damage
to the trailing unit by lack of an addi-
tional fireman, nor is a case of a cold
passenger presented that the attention of
an additional fireman to a heating unit
in the second locomotive would have pre-
vented or alleviated. In any case, such
situations would properly address them-
selves to management as problems for solu-
tion rather than to the brotherhood for
organizational handling . . . . . The
demand has no merit. 2
The Board thus concluded that the Brotherhood claims arising
out of the request for a change in contracts to provide for the em-
lIbid., p. 95
21bid., p. 95.
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ployment of an additional fireman on road diesels should not
be recommended, but should be denied in all respects.
The B.L.F. and E. proposal to eliminate the 90,000 pound
exception to the definition of what constituted a "locomotive"
to which a fireman or helper had to be assigned was also examined
by the Board. The 90,000 pound figure had been fixed by agreement
between the Brotherhood and the carriers. The organization now
sought to have this line of demarcation removed. It repeated its
contentions from the earlier case: at the time of the agreement no
such light motive power was in use and it had not expected that any
would be introduced, operation--even within yard limits--with only
one man in the cab was not safe, the number of such units was small
and the assignment of a fireman to them would not represent a major
item of expense.
The Board found against the organization on all counts. It
held that the additional wages for such employees would total over
a million dollars annually. It was convinced that no good safety
reason existed for altering the existing practice and that no in-
creased efficiency sufficient to justify compelling the assignment
of a fireman to these small switchers had been shown.
On the score of safety, the Board had little concern. The
engineer on such switchers was required by rule to stop whenever
he could not see a member of the ground crew who could relay signals
to him. This rule was held sufficient to insure safe operation and
accident statistics indicated no necessity for a change.. The Boardts
SIrief on Behalf of the Carriers, p. 65.
2 Report, p. 99.
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conclusion from all the evidence was that there was no roeason
for eliminating the 90,000 exception which referred to the
1
assignment of firemen on locomotives operating in yard service.
The concern of both the engine service brotherhoods over
the impact of the diesel locomotive upon their crafts has thus
been manifest to the extent of three separate Emergency Board
proceedings. In the 1943 case the presentations of both organi-
zations had been joined before the Board. In that instance, only
the Firemen had received any relief from what they regarded as a
threat. The recommendations of the tribunal and subsequent agree-
ments with the carriers were to the effect that the fireman must
remain in the cab in high-speed, main-line passenger service. If
any additional employee were to be placed in the engine room to do
the work customarily assigned to the ,fireman, such an employee
should be taken from the seniority ranks of the firemen.
The Engineers had been denied completely in their demand for
the assignment of an additional engineer to the engine rooms in
multiunit diesel operation both in the 1943 and in the 1949 pro-
ceedings. The Firemen came out of their 1949 proceeding with no
more than they had the 1943 proceeding.
The contibuing interest of the organizations in the "diesel
question" serves as an indication of the importance they accord it.
It cannot be denied that the bulk of their concern springs from the
fear of displacement. It would seem that the arguments advanced
by the Brotherhoods and rejected by the several Emergency Boards
were rationalizations, attempts to win through reason an end dictated
1
Ibid., p. 102.
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by what they felt was necessity. The issue of technological
unemployment was not squarely faced by either the organizations
or the Boards in any of the cases.
The only statement really pertinent to the technological
displacement question was made by the Board in the 1949 Fire-
men proceeding. In a footnote to its ort the Board said:
It is not shown in the evidence before us
that any significant technological unem-
ployment has resulted from dieselization.
Elimination of some helper service, made
possible by substitttion of diesel for
steam, has also eliminated some helper
jobs in some districts. The capacity of
diesels to haul more cars and heavier
tonnage indicates that fewer firemen are
needed to handle a given volume of freight.
These two tendencies are emphasized by
the Brotherhood. On the other hand, the
total number of firemen needed depends
primarily upon the total volume of freight
to be handled and the total volume of
passenger travel. If diesels provide a
needed means of placing the railroads
in a competitive position, they may be
responsible for a greater volume of traffic
than would be forthcoming without diesel-
ization. Dieselization has unquestionably
improved the competitive position of the
railroads and may very well prove to be
a program providing for greater job sec-
urity instead of employee displacement.
It may bring about what might be termed
technological employment.1
This rather common view of innovation deserves to be examined
in more detail than that permitted the Board. The fear of the labor
organizations has not arisen in a vacuum. The writings and speeches
of their leaders testify to the fact that the fear is a real one
and one felt acutely by the membership. Isolated instances of
SIlbid., p. 43, n.
L:.
122
severe displacement have been cited by both organizations,
but it has not yet appeared definite whether such instances
are merely a continuation of the stream of increased productivity
arising from more powerful motive power or represent the result
of a true technological innovation in the railroad industry. 1
1 Almost any issue of the monthly magazines of either of the Brother-
hoods has a paragraph or two devoted to this subject. In general
the data is most obscure, consisting only of a report that "the
jobs of twenty men" have been •wiped out" by dieselization on some
unspecified division of some unspecified railroad.
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IV DISPLACEMENT TFFECTS ON THE DIESEL UPON
FIB~iEN AND ENGINErRS
The firemen and the engineers have expressed the most
concern with the introduction and spread of the diesel-electric
locomotive. These are the crafts most intimately connected with
railroad motive power and it is inescapeable that employees
have acquired, in the process of learning their craft, a vested
interest in the mechanism through which their trade was carried
on.
The fireman has felt himself most threatened by the innova-
tion. His functions have changed markedly. This is the culmina-
tion of an atrophy which began with the introduction of automatic
stokers on coal burning locomotives. Only the daties of the fire-
man concerned with the operation of the train have not changed.
Even in this area, however, the patrolling and inspection duties
in the engine room in all but high-speed passenger service, take
him out of the cab. The absence of the fireman from the operating
cab cannot help but detract to a degree from the operating content
&,%- )IP M a 4*%'h TT4 a a 4"a Tto%#m kn+4l.na W% +11 "%n4 'I 4 ,m,4 - A
and routine nature. The highly specialized skills involved in
maintaining an adequate fire and an adequate supply of steam for
the efficient operation of the steam locomotive are no longer re-
quired of him.
It is no exaggeration to say that the fireman has retained
a job of its present status, in all probability, only because of
the efforts of his Brotherhood on his behalf. The carriers recognized
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the compulsion induced by the threat of strike. Since firemen
were a necessity on steam locomotives, the gradual and incomplete
dieselization did not permit tne roads to join the issue. The
precedent offered by the retention of a fireman (helper) on elec-
tric locomotives also was a point in aid of the firemen. The roads
accepted the presence of a fireman on the diesel-electric locomotive
in road service.
Acceptance, however, does not necessarily constitute an effec-
tive demand for firemen. The effect of the new motive power upon
the demand for and the employment of firemen is difficult to measure.
As was noted above, a representative of the carriers stated categori-
cally in 1943, "It cannot be said the diesel has brought on any new
1
technological unemployment proolem."  This reouires, however, an
agreement as to the meaning of the word "new". The brotherhoods
2have concerned themselves greatly with the displacement aspects
and have cited them in the various Emergency Board proceedings. In
any event, the job content of the fireman's craft has been decreased
by the introduction of the diesel.
As was indicated in Chapter I, the diesel characteristics
coupled with electric traction enable tne diesel to pull longer
1 Testimony of F. G. Gurley, in: Transcrint, so-called "Diesel Case,"
Vol, 7, P. 1805.
2Numerous articles and editorials have appeared in the pages of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen's Marazine and in the
Brotnerhood of Locomotive Engineers Jornal. See particularly,
"Enginemen Bear Brunt of Attack as New Policies Develop with Diezeli-
zation," MaRazine, Vol. 129, No. 6, December 1950, and Vol. 130,
No. 1, January, 1951.
and heaver trains at a higher average speed. This ability
is less important in passenger service than in freight service
and, despite the wide-spread use of diesel power in passenger
service, the demand for both firemen and engineers is less
determined by the power of the locomotive than by a variety
of other factors.
In passenger service, the level of business depends in
part on how often people undertake journeys and in part upon
how far they go. Business conditions can affect the amount of
travel by influencing either the number or the length of trips.
For example, railroad travel has fluctuated in rough harmony
with the general distrubances in the rest of the economy and each
phase in passenger travel. A few months after the business con-
traction of 1920-21 began, travel started to decline. This con-
tinued for some time thereafter. During the long business expan-
sion from 1933 to 1937, passenger traffic rose to a peak in October,
1934, then declined somewhat, later rising to a final peak in March,
1
1937. During the war years passenger traffic in America soared to
new heights far above any registered in the past.
Not content with being acted upon by business conditions,
passenger traffic is also affected by movements in the general popu.
lation. The marked tendency toward suburban living whicn developed
during the 1920's was reflected in a larger number of commuters or
potential commuters. The populations of almost all commuting areas
increased greatly under this influence toward suburban living and the
percentage of all passenger traffic represented by commuter travel rose
Thor Hultgren, =. ,11.i, pp. 43-56.
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in turn. In the public works expansion which occurred after
1933, many highway improvements calculated to facilitate the
flow of motor traffic in metropolitan regions were undertaken.
These enhanced the relative attractiveness of driving to work
and made possible better bus service. The result was less
commutation traffic. The continuing improvement of highways
in the vicinity of the larger cities has reinforced this trend.
In addition to these factors, the level of passenger traffic
is also acted upon by the season of the year, the unseasonality of
the weather, an epidemic, or any number of random factors which
can affect the volume of passenger beyond the limits of price
elasticity. The railway, however, by its very nature as a common
carrier is recuired to offer adeauate service, regardless of the
effective demand for that service.
The demand for crews in passenger service is a function of
the number of trains run. This has no constant dependence upon the
numbers of passengers to be carried.
TABLE VIII
INDICES OF PASSENGER TRAIN-MILES AND PASSENGER MILES WITH
TOTAL TDIE PAID ROAD PASSENGER ENGINEERS ALD FIFYIEBN*
(1940=100)
Passenger Passenger T
Train-Miles Miles E
100.0 100.0
103.6 123.2
112.1 225.7
123.1 369.8
127.0 40 3. z
5 129.1 385.0
120.0 272.2
110.2 192.8
108.2 172.2
*SOURCE: Statistics of Railways, Tables 552,
ime Paid
naineers
100.0
103.8
114.8
125.8
133.2
136.9
126.5
117.2
115.0
44 and
Time Paid
Firemen
100.0
104.8
118.5
131.1
140.1
144.2
132.8
121.6
118.8
69. (Computed)
1940
19413
1942
1943
1944
1946
1947
1948
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Table VIII indicates the highly volatile nature of passenger
traffic, particularly during the years of World War II. It will
be noted that although passenger miles travelled had a range from
the low of 100.0 in 1940 to a high of 403.2 in index number terms,
the miles travelled by passenger trains varied only between 100.0
and 129.1. Comparison of this latter measure with the indices of
total time paid either engineers or firemen shows that employment
varies more closely with train miles than with passenger miles.
This, of course, reflects a more intensive loading of passenger
trains during war time, ea&h train in general carried more passen-
gers further than in more normal times.
It will be also noted from the Table that time paid engine
service employees varied more widely than did the milage of the
trains upon which they were employed. This reflects an increase
in overtime payments. The index of hours paid for the firemen ran
consistently higher than did the index for engineers over this
period. This reflects, in part, thepromotion of firemen to 1e
post of engineer, thereby reducing the amount of overtime paid
members of that craft, while creating a comparative shortage of ex-
perienced firemen necessitating the payment of more overtime to
that work.
In any event, the variation in time paid was considerably less
than the variation in passenger miles. Despite the growth of diezeli-
zation in passenger service over the period, the index of time paid
firemen in 1948 was 0.3 points higher than in 1942 although passenger
train miles were 3.9 points lower in the latter year. Evidence of
displacement cannot be deduced from this source.
I
Per Cent
Train-Miles Pass.
Diesel Train- Pass. Time Paid Time Paid
Year Month Powered Miles Miles Engineers Firemen
1949 Jan. 37.5 o100.0 100.0 100.o 100.0
Feb. 38.4 87.5 79.4 87.6 87.2
Mar. 39.6 95.9 79.4 94.4 93.8
Apr. 42.2 93.5 82.4 91.0 90.2
May 44.1 94.2 79.4 91.4 90.1
Jun, 44.7 92.4 91.2 91.4 90.2
Jul. 45.3 95.5 100.0 100.7 99.6
Aug. 45.4 94.5 97.0 99.6 99.5
Sep. 46.3 88.5 85.3 90.8 89.6
Oct. 48.1 87.8 73.5 87.8 86.6
Nov. 50.5 84.2 73.5 83.2 82.7
Dec. 46.9 95.0 85.3 93.4 93.4
1950 Jan. 51.2 87.5 79.4 87.8 85.9
Feb. 56.6 73.0 64.6 73.3 71.6
Mar. 54.4 85.5 67.6 84.7 83.8
Apr. 52.6 86.4 70.6 84.5 83.8
May 53.2 84.2 64.6 84.8 82.8
Jun. 52.6 87.2 83.2 90.4 89.3
Jul. 53.3 90.0 88.3 96.0 94.7
Aug. 53.8 93.0 91.2 97.9 96.8
Sep. 54.o 88.5 82.3 89.5 88.2
Oct. 55.0 89.8 76.5 89.1 88.0
Nov. 55.4 86.8 73.6 85.4 85.7
Dec. 53.2 95.2 91.2 94.5 95.9
1951 Jan. 54.6 93.4 88.3 92.3 91.6
Feb. 56.1 79.4 70.6 80.6 79.7
Mar. 56.5 90.7 79.4 86.5 83.8
Apr. 58.4 86.2 76.5 84.4 84.0
May 6011 87.5 76.5 87.5 86.2
Jun. 60.4 85.5 91.2 88.0 87.0
Jul. b0.6 87.8 94.0 95.3 94.3
Aug. 61.4 88.7 97.1 94.4 93.8
Sep. 63.2 84.2 85.3 85.0 84.3
Oct. 64.6 85.8 79.4 85.4 84.3
Nov. 64.3 83.9 79.4 82.3 82.3
Dec. 62.1 92.0 100.0 92.0 92.9
*SOURCE: "Wage Statistics of Class I Steam Railways." (Computed)
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TA3LJ IX
MONTHLY INDICES OF PASSE:E1R TRAIN-MILES, PASSE~GER MILES,
TOTAL TIME PAID ROAD PASSENGER ENGINEERS AND FIR~EEN, AND PER
CENT OF DIESELIZATION 1949-1951*
(January 1949-100)
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The wide variations characteristic of passenger traffic are also shown
in Table IX where the index of passenger miles varies from 100.0 to 64.6.
Passenger train miles, however, has a range only from 100.0 to 73.0 and
the variation in total time paid firemen and engineers more closely approx-
imates this latter figure, to 71.6 for firemen and to 73.3 for engineers.
Each of these low points was reached in February of 1950 and the low in
passenger miles was repeated in May of the same year.
No significant change in the relationship between the index for
passenger train miles and the indices of employment can be found over this
three year period, although the degree of dieselization increased greatly.
The index of total time paid firemen and helpers was above the index of
passenger train miles in 13 of the 36 months, three months in 1949, four
months in 1950, and six months in 1951. It is difficult to read into
this any displacement of firemen by the increase in diesel operation.
The index of time paid engineers exhibited a similar relationship
with the index of passenger train miles. Four months in 1949, seven in
1950, and five in 1951 saw the index of time paid higher than the index of
passenger train miles. A comparison of the two indices gives no indication
that the position of the engineers has declined as a result of the increase
in dieselization.
When the indices of time paid engine service employees and passenger
miles are compared, again it is difficult to see any weakening in the
position of the employees. The index of time paid firemen was above the
index of passenger miles in 29 of the 36 months, and that for engineers was
higher in 31 of the months. It is true that the 1951 movements of the
indices resulted in four months in which the index of passenger miles was
above that for time-paid firemen and for time paid engineers. These were
the months of June, August, September, and December. In each of these
months an increase in passenger travel failed to call forth an equivalent
rise in time paid engine crews. This reflected an increase in the intensity
of use of train facilities as no corresponding increase in passenger train
miles occurred. If this may be viewed as an increase in the productivity
of the engine crews, similarly it was an increase in the productivity of
the passenger train equipment.
The effect of the adoption of diesel locomotives, which in themselves
can do but little to vary the number of train miles operated in passenger
service, upon the payment of firemen and engineers has been slight indeed.
The diesel has exercised its greatest influence upon passenger train
operation in the form of speed increases, but the dual method of payment
in effect for train service employees has protected the workers from any
detrimental effects from this source. It would thus appear that a smaller
demand for firemen and engineers based merely on the speed characteristics
of the diesel is unlikely.
The diesel locomotive can and does operate over many divisions
in the course of a normal run and the same crew could operate it at present
speeds over several divisions before the time allowance would be consumed
and time and one half have to be paid. However, seniority lists are nor-
mally kept on a divisional basis and the consolidation of two or more
divisions for operating purposes poses problems in this connection which
inhibit such action on the part of the carriers. Payment on a mileage
Iil
but the complications offered by seniority rules effectively prevent
any severe reduction in the number of crews in order to take full advantage
of the distance characteristics of the diesel.
/A
basis is no greater to one crew than to three or four different crews,
The employment of firemen and engineers has, thus, been little af-
fected by the speed and the distance abilities of the new motive power.
However, the tractive effort characteristics which enable the diesel loco-
motive to draw more weight than steam locomotives present a slightly dif-
ferent.problem.
The ability of the diesel-electric locomotive to pull more weight has
eliminated the use of helper locomotives for some passenger and freight
service. So far as passenger service be concerned, this has not been a
significant development. The amount of helper territory for passenger
trains has not been great in the past. The elimination of helper service,
even in freight, because of the greater tractive power of the diesel has
progressed and may be expected to continue.
It is doubtful, however, that helper service will be completely
abandoned even if the diesel completely replaces the steam locomotive. It
would not be economic for a carrier to employ for all of a long distance
run a locomotive with sufficient power to take its train over a really
severe grade. What would be just enough power over that ruling grade
would be excess power over most of the run. It is true that some of the
excess could be crlverted into additional speed in flatter country, but
again practical operating considerations stand in the way of speed above a
certain limit. It appears that some helper territory will be retained for
operating reasons, although the greater power of the diesel permits a
reduction.
lb
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The displacement of helper service employees is an inevitable con-
comitant of the spreading use of the diesel. This displacement, however
severe in itself to the personnel concerned, is not particularly signifi-
cant for -the overall scene. In 1934, when the diesel was a comparatively
small factor in an overall consideration of motive power, helper locomo-
tive miles were 6.1 per cent of total locomotive miles in freight service
and 2.0 per cent in passenger 'service. In 1949, these percentages were
5.3 per cent in freight and 1.3 per cent in passenger service.1 Even the
complete abandonment of this service would not result in severe displace-
ment of engine service employees.
The impact of helper service displacement bears more heavily upon the
shop crafts. The elimination of round houses and servicing facilities
at helper locations is made possible as helper territory is eliminated.
However, maintenance installations for helper service were never extensive
and the relationship between the number of locomotives to be serviced and
the labor requirements for that servicing were not proportional, particu-
larly in the lower grades of labor.
It is in freight service that the principal effects of the tractive
effort characteristics of the diesel are felt by the onzeried
engine service employees. The carriers can, in the absence of the
compulsion to keep regular schedules present in passenger service, take
advantage of the superior ability of the diesel to draw heavy loads and
bring a heavy train up to operating speed in a short time. The practice
noted above that is followed by some carriers of running freight trains on
1Statistics of Railways (1934, 1949), Table 54.
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an extra basis and not dispatching a freight train until the weight is
up to the limitations of the locomotive has served to reduce the number
of trains necessary to transport a given quantity of freight. Heavier
trains mean fewer trains and fewer train crews. It is in this area that
the Brotherhoods now recognize the principle threat of the diesel to their
craft.
As was noted in Chapter III, the "diesel problem" had evolved over
the years from a concern only with yard and passenger service to become
primarily a problem in freight service. The use of diesel power in freight
service did not pass the experimental stage until 1941 but within ten years
over half of the freight train miles were run behind diesel power. The
advantages of the new power in freight service rapidly became manifest
to the railroads. During the war years, government regulations prevented
the introduction of diesels in passenger service, unless on mail trains,
and channeled the available new diesels into freight service. The volume
of freight traffic nearly doubled in the war years but no such rise in
freight train miles or in employment resulted. This, again, reflected the
more intensive utilization of available equipment.
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TABLE X
INDICES OF FREIGHT TRAIN-MILES AND REVENUE TON MILES WITH TOTAL TIME
PAID ROAD-FREIGHT FIRENEN IN THROUGH AND IN LOCAL AND WAY FREIGHT SERVICE,
1940-48*
(1940 = 100)
Freight Revenue Time Paid Firemen Total
Year Train-Miles Ton-Miles Through Local
1940 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1941 107.8 127.2 125.1 113.7 121.0
1942 138.1 171.0 162.2 125.6 148.9
1943 145.2 194.7 180.3 128.2 161.6
1944 144.5 197.5 183.4 133.1 164.8
1945 134.6 182.3 171.5 132.0 197.1
1946 122.1 158.6 146.2 128.9 140.0
1947 127.4 175.1 153.0 132.4 143.2
1948 .125.0 171.1 . 137. 132.1 135.8
wSOURCE: Statistics of Railways, Tables 55A, 44, and 69. (Computed)
It may be seen from Table X that the war years with their great
increase in traffic called forth a great increase in time paid to firemen
engaged in through freight service. Although this increase in hours paid
did not keep pace with the rise in the revenue ton-miles, it more than kept
pace with the rise in train miles. The nature of the freight movement is
also obvious from the table. Time paid through freight service firemen
rose far more than did the time paid firemen engaged in local and way
service. The return to a more normal pattern of freight movements in and
after 1946 is shown by the relative rise in the index of time paid local
and way freight firemen.
From Table X it can be seen that the employment of firemen in freight
service tends to vary more nearly directly with the volume of traffic than
is the case with passenger service. It will also be noted that the
"1
to reflecting the nature of the war time freight, also reflects the fact
that local and way freight service is commonly offered, within limits,
regardless of the volume of traffic. It also appears that the employment
of local and way firemen has not declined in proportion to the volume of
Lreight Lrafi±±c to the extent that the tnroughn reight firemen nave been
affected. This, again, may be a reflection more of the changing nature
of freight traffic than of motive power developments, but this conclusion
is a doubtful one.
The diesel locomotives, for the most part, have been introduced into
the longer and heavier through freight runs. The more modern locomotives
which they have replaced have been demoted to through runs of less critical
importance,1 the marginal steam power thus replaced, in many instances,
has been applied to local and way freight runs. It is still the older and
less powerful and efficient motive power that is used in local service and
the effects of the diesel have not yet reached local service to the same
extent that through runs have been affected. The introduction, since the
war, of the so-called "road-switcher" has permitted the dieselization of
many local services which would have had to wait for many years for a more
expensive diesel locomotive.
No evidence of displacement of freight firemen through the increase in
dieselization can be noted over the period 1940 to 1948. The employment of
freight engineers follows the same general pattern as that of firemen and the
same conditions may be noted in that occupation, as well.
LArmual ReDort of Erie Railroad Comrany, 1945, pp. 9-10.
firemen engaged in local and way freight service have had more stable
employment than have those in through freight service. This, in addition
TABLE XI
INDICES kF FREIGHT TRAIN-MILES, REVENUE TON-MILES, AND TOTAL TIME PAID
ROAD-FREIIIT FIREMEN AND ENGINEERS, WITH PER CENT OF TRAIN MILES WITH
DIESEL POUWER BY ,1ONTHS, 1J4/9-I151*
(January, 1949 = 100)
Freight Per Revenue All All
Train Cent Ton Freight Freight
Year Month Miles Diesel Miles Engineers Firemen
1949 Jan. 100.0 23.1 100.0 100.0 100.0
Feb. 91.3 23.9 92.5 89.3 90.4
Mar. 96.4 26.4 95.6 90.6 91.3
Apr. 94.5 26.7 102.0 90.3 90.6
May 96.7 27.6 104.1 93.6 94.0
June 91.8 29.0 97.6 91.2 91.3
July 90.0 30.9 88.6 92.2 92.1
Aug. 90.2 31.1 96.0 95.6 96.0
Sept. 86.6 32.1 90.7 35.6 86.0
Oct. 86.7 34.4 83.1 82.1 82.8
Nov. 90.2 34.2 94.2 85.3 86.2
Dec. 91.7 35.0 93.2 87.5 88.8
1950 Jan. 87.8 37.0 85.1 83.9 84.4
Feb. 75.8 41.4 74.4 71.6 72.6
Mar. 94.4 38.0 104.0 90.6 91.7
Apr. 93.2 38.2 101.5 88.1 88.8
May 94.8 38.2 109.0 92.3 92.5
June 94.8 38.5 106.2 96.5 96.1
July 95.4 39.5 106.2 98.8 87.5
Aug. 103.3 38.8 122.7 107.4 106.6
Sept. 101.0 39.1 119.0 101.2 100.8
Oct. 107.2 39.5 127.8 105.8 118.1
Nov. 99.8 41.2 113.3 97.7 98.0
Dec. 100.0 42.5 112.0 99.6 99.9
1951 Jan. 102.8 43.1 116.8 100.8 101.0
Feb. 87.6 43.5 99.6 86.8 87.3
Mar. 105.4 44.4 121.7 104.2 104.0
Apr. 99.9 46.4 117.2 93.6 94.0
May 100.8 48.7 121.7 96.8 96.6
June 118.3 40.7 116.8 96.1 95.9
July 93.5 51.3 110.0 96.6 95.3
Aug. 100.3 50.4 124.3 102.0 101.1
Sept. 96.3 52.0 120.0 93.7 93.0
Oct. 102.0 52.4 128.8 99.8 99.5
Nov. 97.6 54.1 117.8 92.9 92.9
Dec. 95.3 55.2 109.0 92.0 92.1
*SOURCE: "Freight Train Performance," M-211; "Revenue Traffic
Statistics," M-220; "Wage Statistics of Class I Steam
Railways," M-300, Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics,
ICC. (Computed).
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TABLE XII
INDICES OF FREIGHT TRAIN-MILES, REVENUE TON-MILES, AND TOTAL TIME PAID
THROUGH FREIGHT FIREMEN AND LOCAL AND WAY FREIGHT FIREMEN, WITH PER CENT
OF TRAIN-MILES BY DIESEL POWER BY MONTHS, 1949-1951*
(January, 1949 = 100)
Freight Per Revenue Through Local
Train Cent Ton Freight Freight
Year Month Miles Diesel Miles Firemen Firemen
ill(
1949 Jan. 100.0 23.1 100.0 100.0 100.0
Feb. 91.3 23.9 92.5 89.5 90.6
Mar. 96.4 26.4 95.6 88.7 95.6
Apr. 94.5 26.7 102.0 88.3 94.3
May 96.7 27.6 104.1 92.5 96.3
June 91.8 29.0 97.6 88.3 96.0
July 90.0 30.9 88.6 89.7 96.0
Aug. 90.2 31.1 96.0 92.5 101.5
Sept. 86.6 32.1 90.7 82.6 91.5
Oct. 86.7 34.4 83.1 77.7 90.2
Nov. 90.2 34.2 94.2 81.7 93.5
Dec. 91.7 35.0 93.2 85.6 92.4
1950 Jan. 87.8 37.0 85.1 81.7 89.0
Feb. 75.8 41.4 74.4 69.0 78.0
Mar. 94.4 38.0 104.0 88.7 96.5
Apr. 93.2 38.2 101.5 86.6 92.0
May 94.8 38.2 105.0 89.7 96.6
June 94.8 38.5 106.2 94.2 99.0
July 95.4 39.5 106.2 96.5 99.0
Aug. 103.3 38.8 122.7 105.2 108.9
Sept. 101.0 39.1 119.0 99.5 103.3
Oct. 107.2 39.5 127.8 123.1 109.0
Nov. 99.8 41.2 113.3 95.5 102.2
Dec. 100.0 42.5 112.0 99.5 100.8
1951 Jan. 102.8 43.1 116.8 99.4 103.9
Feb. 87.6 43.5 99.6 85.4 90.4
Mar. 105.4 44.4 121.7 102.8 108.7
Apr. 99.9 46.4 117.2 92.6 95.7
May 100.8 48.7 121.7 94.0 100.8
June 118.3 40.7 116.8 93.0 100.1
July 93.5 51.3 110.0 92.7 99.5
Aug. 100.3 50.4 124.3 97.5 106.9
Sept. 96.3 52.0 120.0 87.4 98.2
Oct. 102.0 52.4 128.8 94.0 108.8
Nov. 97.6 54.1 117.8 89.0 99.0
Dec. 95.3 55.2 109.0 90.2 95.1
*SOURCEs "Freight Train Performance," M-211; "Revenue Traffic
Statistics" M-220; "Wage Statistics of Class I Steam
Railways," M-300, Bureau of Transport Economics and
Statistics, ICC. (Computed).
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From Table XI it may be noted that the time paid freight engine
service employees varies, as in passenger service, more nearly as train-
miles, rather than with the ton-miles. This is, again, an indication of
greater utilization of the transportation facilities and a reflection
of the flexibility of the industry.
However, no indication can be noted over this three year period of
any decrease in engine service employment as a result of the increase in
dieselization. Over this period the per cent of train miles drawn by
diesel power more than doubled, but the relationships between the indices
did not change appreciably. It is true that at the end of the period the
indices of employment lagged behind the index of ton-miles to a greater
extent than earlier in the period, but this again is normal for the industry
and has been the usual relationship in the,past as traffic has increased.
Certainly, no conclusive evidence can be deduced from the relation-
ships between traffic and employment which would indicate any severe dis-
placement of engineers or firemen.
A comparison between employment in through freight and in local and
way freight is made in Table XII. Here, too, many of the same relation-
ships can be seen between the level of traffic, train miles, and employment.
Again, no indication of displacement can be noted which is severe enough
to lead to a conclusion that the dieselization of freight service has been
responsible. The historical relationships noted in Chapter II between
traffic and employment have not been breached over these years, despite the
fact that the per cent of dieselization rose from 23.1 per cent to 55.6 per
cent. The indices must be examined over the entire period, however, or it is
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possible to arrive at false conclusions. For example, in May of 1951, the
index of train miles stood at 100.8, while the index of hours paid all
freight firemen stood at 96.6. Upon first inspection this wacld appear to
represent a clear loss in employment of 4.2 points from the relationship
existing in January of 1949. However, when the indices for both through
freight firemen and local and way firemen are examined in this connection-
it is seen that the index for local freight firemen stood at 100.8 and the
entire deficit was in the through freight component of the total, as
that index was 94.0. Comparison of May with August, 1951, shows the index
of train miles at 100.3 and the index for all firemen at 101.1 - no loss.
Again, an examination of the figures for local firemen shows the August
index at 106.9, clearly no loss. However, the index for time paid through
firemen stood at 97.5, well above the May level, although below the train-
mile index and the total firemen index.
It thus appears that the relationships are not entirely constant
but vary with the nature of the traffic. It is obvious, however, that no
consistent trend to indicate an employment loss to the firemen exists.
On the basis of a very small difference, it could be argued that the
through freight engine service employees have lost ground to an extent not
felt by the local freight service employees. However, this cannot be
demonstrated as an examination of the indices for December, 1950, indicates
that with the train miles index standing at 100.0, the index for through
firemen was at 99.5 and the index for local firemen at 100.8. Any change
over 24 months, during which the per cent of dieselization rose from 23.1
per cent to 42.5 per cent, is insignificant. The index for ton-miles in
1in ecemiAber, 190 diLer libtle from Uthosej ie c in11 pUil, o Lr 1 .. L
the earlier month, the ton-miles index was 102.0, the index of time paid all
firemen was only 90.6, that for the through firemen only 88.3, and for
local firemen, 9h.3. The increase in dieselization from the 26.7 per cent
of April, 19h9, to the h2.5 per cent of December 19h9, did not result in
a significant loss in employment.
It is difficult on the basis of any statistical evidence to ascribe
to the diesel the responsibility for any severe displacement of engineers
or firemen. It is true that dieselization is not complete and is still in
the process of increasing. But, with well over half of the train miles
being operated with diesel power, any great effect would have begun to be
visible. This is not the case..
A comparison between railroads using the diesel extensively and those
using it not at all or less extensively yields no consistent picture which
can be taken as evidence of displacement. In a random sample of twenty of
the nation's Class I carriers there was no statistically significant rela-
tionship between the extent of dieselization and the employment of engine
service workers. The expected results in fuel costs, water costs, and
materials could be noted but no causal relationshin in the area of labor
costs exists.
For this portion of the study, twenty carriers were chosen using a
table of randar numbers applied to the numbering given the railroads in
Statistics of Railways, 19h9. The per cent of total train miles powered
by diesel on each road was plotted against an item of expense per traffic
unit computed from the expense'accounts of the railway as reported to the ICC.
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that month was 112.0. This could indicate a note worthy increase in pro-
ductivity, both of employees and of equipment. However, the relationships
4D A 1 0 ", T8
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The resulting scatter diagrams revealed no visible relation between
the degree of dieselization and maintenance costs per traffic unit,
total labor cost per traffic unit, or payment to the various engine
and train service crafts per traffic unit. In no area of labor cost
per traffic unit was the computed coefficient of correlation statis-
tically significant. The validity of the sample was demonstrated in
part by significant relationships between the degree of dieselization
and fuel and water costs per traffic unit. This portion of the study
constitutes only weak negative evidence and, hence, is not reported
in detail.
Examinations over time and between carriers have thus failed to
yield evidence of displacement through dieselization. This is not to
say that in certain instances there has not been displacement. In
helper service, on some branch lines, and in some crafts, the diesel
has eliminated jobs and employment. On the national scene, however,
this has not been the case and the classical tradition of the results
of technological innovation appears to have been maintained.
Other train service employees, such as conductors, trainmen, etc.,
vary in employment much as do the engineers and firemen. A train needs
a conductor and a number of brakemen just as certainly as it needs an
engineer and a fireman. The same forces operate with those employees
as with the engine service employees and the same inconclusive or nega-
tive results may be noted.
It is possible that further increases in dieselization may result
in some significant displacement. The nature of the traffic to be moved
and the hauls required by it will exercise a greater effect upon the
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employment called forth by that traffic than will the nature of the
•--.-I-·I .. . .. . ... - ~I , I, -- . '•.. .. J JJ t l ' . . . " A• " J • 1 -- I
motive power used tGo trransport it. The compleT~e elimination of helper
service wnould displace perhaps six per cent of the engine service
employees. The abandonment of now unprof~it~able branch lines maintained
only because ·of regulatory compulsion to maintain them would easily dis-
place a much larger fraction. The ·use of diesel powrer on branch lines
and in local and wFay freight service may sufficiently reduce operating
costs to an extent that the pressure for abandonment would be greatly
decreased. The diesel may yet save more jobs than it has cost.
IA. Train Service Employees.
The engine service labor organizations have not been alone in re-
garding the diesel-electric locomotive as a threat to the employment
opportunities and job content of their members. Almost every one of
the unions concerned with railway employees have expressed fear in some
degree. With some of the classes of employees this fear is doubtless
just a fear of the unknown, of the new.
None of the labor unions concerned has been able accurately to
assay the impact of dieselization upon its craft. Quantitatively the
measure of diesel engendered displacement has yet to be made. Circum-
stances existing even at this stage of the development of diesel opera-
tions do not permit a definitive finding concerning its displacement
effects.
Information as to this aspect of the "diesel problem" in the hands
of either the carriers or the organizations is, in part, in the nature
au hearsay evidence undiscounteLa y the forces acting upon railway
employment through changes in the quantity of traffic.
Mr. H. W. Fraser, head of the railway conductors, writing in the
union's magazine, could only generalize:
I have before me information that the supplanting
of steam power by diesel power washed out the
work of 24 enginemen in passenger service., and
18 enginemen in freight service on a single
railroad operating district in a single day's
operation--with no change in the number of trains
run. Other information is to the effect that
the number of crews reduced amounted to 50 per
cent of the crews needed prior to the replace-
ment of steam power by diesel power. These
S14 3
V. OTHER RAILWAPY LABOR AND THE DIESEL
telegraph department employees and others.1
Mr. Fraser said nothing about the problems created for his own
membership by the advent of the diesel. However, this amission was
not the result of any lack of concemn with the problem. Iia o h
factors and characteristics which enter into the employment picture
for firemen and engineers also act uqpon the conductors and other
members of the train crew. Any reduction in the number of trains
through dieselization would affect all train service employees and
all have expressed fear.
The president of the Order of Railwnay Conductors again gave
~an indication of his organization's concern with the diesel in his
report to the forty-ffoulrth conentrni on o7f that9 ~rou :
I have received a large number of complaints
from our members on various railroads in re-
gard to excessively long freight trains due
largely to the use of diesel-electric power.2
Sothn Tnhe conauctors ana . e trainmen nave long been concerned
with the matter of train length and their organizations have been
instrumental in securing the passage of maximum train length laws
and minimum crew laws in the various states. Such efforts to limit
train length have had a double purpose. The longer the train, the
more difficult is the job of the conductor and the brakemen. The
1president's Page, The Railway Conductor, June 1948, p. 160.
2President's Report, Report of Officers and Committees to the
Forty-Fourth Grand Division, Order of Railway Conductors of
-America, p. 353. An analysis of indices of time paid train
service employees compared with indices of train miles, ton-
miles, and passenger miles similar to that presented for engine
service employees in' Tabls XI and XII indicated no significant
.displa cement.
changes, in addition to wiping out employment
under double-header and helper district rules,
also displace mechanics in shops and round-
houses, water service employees, clerical and
I
longer the train, the fewer trains need be operated to move a given
volume of traffic. The train service employees thus act both in an
attempt to increase employement for their members and to reduce the
onerousness of their tasks.
The ability of'the diesel to pull longer trains and heavier
trains thus runs athwart the traditional interests of the la
bor groups
among the train service employees. 
As has been indicated, train
lengths most advantageous for the carriers fran an operating point
or view depend on many ractors in addition to the ability of the
locomotive assigned to move the load. The capacity of the yards at
either end of the run, the number of cars which can be accomodated
on sidings and passing tracks en route, the availability of traffic,
the optimum time requirements for the run, and a variety of other
factors enter into the operating decision as to the consist of the
train. However, the ability of the locomotive to move the load over
the territory between the terminals is one of the important factors.
It is possible that, as more roads adopt complete diesel opera-
tiom and alter their physical plants so as to attain maximum effi-
cient use of the new motive power, train lengths will increase
significantly throughldibselijlti on m 'assing trabkseha'e :-been. lengthened
by some of the carriers to permit the operation of longer trains,
centralized traffic control,which reduces the number of stops and
waits trains must make in order to clear other trains, and other
operating improvements have already made possible longer trains.
In the future, this tendency may increase. A substantial increase
in! train length may lead to a degree of displacement, depending upon
the nature and the volume of the traffic.
1
·:
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Historically, train length has increased over the years.
Table XIII shows the increase in the length of the average freight
train from 1925 through 1948.
TABLE XIII
AVERAGE NUMBER OF CARS PER FREIGHT TRAIN, 1925-1948*
Cars Per Cars Per Cars Per
Year Train Year Train Year Train
1925 43.8 1933 45.8 1941 51.3
1926 45.2 1934 46.2 1942 52.2
1927 46.5 1935 46.2 1943 52.4
1928 48.1 1936 46.8 1944 53.4
1929 48.6 1937 47.6 1945 52.5
1930 48.9 1938 48.1 1946 52.1
1931 47.9 1939 49.5 1947 53.2
1932 44.8 1940 50.7 1948 54.8
* SOURCE: Statistics of Railways, Table 60.
From Table XIII can be seen the gradual growth in train length
over the period. It should be noted that the diesel has been in use
in freight service only since 1941. Over the entire period, the in-
crease has approximated one per cent a year. This rate of growth has
also held true for the years since 1941. It appears that the advent
of the diesel has merely continued the trend of the past. It is
probable that the. trend has been the result of increases in motive
power strength, as well as other operating factors, and the diesel
has continued this power increase.
However, no severe increase in train length with resulting dis-
placement of train service employees can be seen in the data. Again,
in this connection it is possible that isolated instances of signifi-
cant changes in operating methods have been made by carriers which have
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displaced conductors and trainmen through increasing train lengths.
Blowever, when viewed on the total, national scene, these instances are
not visible and th total 
icture is not one of 
threat In addition
the speed characteristics of the diesel have permitted the roads to
recapture some of the less-than-carload-lot traffic between major
cities which formerly was carried by truck. This expansion of the
merchandise freight service, resulting directly from the adoption of
the diesel, with scheduled, fast-freight trains, may well create more
1t?'ni r t.hnrn 1~hE nnru~ ~hMrwt~'-A · tni ir.Q nv t~ha tli n I wpmiap
The dual basis of payment, noted above in connection with engine
service employees, is also in force for the other train service employees.
However, for conductors and trainmen, the mileage requirements are based
on 150 miles as a day's run, rather than the 100 miles of the engineers
and firemen. This dual basis serves as a protection for the train ser-
vice workers against speed increases exactly as it does for the engine
service workers.
In short, it is easy to read into the diesel a threat to the em-
ployment of train and engine service employees, but it is not possible,
on the basis of the evidence, to distinguish any real or significant
damage to them as a result of the threat.
B. Maintenance of Equipment Employees.
Perhaps the most sweeping changes to the face of the railroads
caused by the iStroduction of the diesel-electric locomotive has been
in the area of maintenance. The reciprocating steam locomotive,
although a precision piece of machinery, is essentially a metal monster.
Precision in.the fit of valves, bearings, pistons, tires, and certain
& I
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of the appurtenances to the locomotive is a necessity. However, the
device is a hardy one and can stand much abuse. The diesel, a combina-
tion of an internal combustion motor, delicate electrical control
devices, electric generators, and electric motors, is a vastly dif-
ferent piece of machinery. It requires different skills for its
maintenance than.does the steam locomotive and a higher level of
precision in more of its parts.
The diesel locomotive is an expensive machine and can justify
its e lra hm~ itr iC taNla i~r d~ d~n~r i r t~~r Tk t~
locomotive is a less expensive device and can be laid up for repairs
more often and for longer periods of time without representing a
really severe monetary loss.
The changeover from steam to diesel power has been far-reaching
and truly revolutionary in its effect upon maintenmece. The railroads
were fully equipped with steam locomotives and all necessary servicing
facilities for them, such as boiler shops, roundhouses, machine shops,
blacksmith shops, fuel stations, water stations, cinder pits, etc.
With the change in motive power, suddenly the greater portion of the
existing shop and wayside facilities became obsolete--not suited to
diesel operation. New shop facilities suited to diesel maintenance
and overhaul had to be built; new skills on the part of employees had
to be developed; new methods of maintenance and maintenance supervision
had to be developed.
Shop facilities optimally located for steam operation, taking into
consideration the most efficient length of runs, the nature of the coal
and water used, the flow of traffic, and many other factors, may not be
located correctly for diesel operation.
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It had been considered good practice under steam operations to
have the main shops of a system at one or more central points. Motive
power fanned out from these points. The diesel, however, is a system-
wide engine, capable of long runs requiring no coal and little water.
The requirement for central shops under diesel operation is often
entirely different than what it was for steam power. Careful studies
have had to be made to determine where shop facilities should be
located, and where to place servicing facilities. In this process,
many shops were discontinued completely.1
As the larger railroads approached complete dieselization it was
found that they had surplus shop space. Generally, the floor area
required for diesel maintenance was less than that required for steam.
Boiler shops, foundries, shops for the repair of tenders have no place
in diesel operations. Even the machine tools required for diesel main-
tenance are different than those needed in steam.
With complete dieselization, not only are the shops and engine
houses fewer, but those that are used are cleaner and offer better
working conditions. They must be designed for handling precision
motive power.
The job of overhauling a steam locomotive is one of tearing the
machine down, repairing old or manufacturing new parts, and then re-
assembling the machine. The job on a diesel is almost completely one
of replacing parts, using parts supplied by outside manufacturers. Of
necessity, facilities required for maintenance are vastly different.
I
1 J.B. Akers, "Effect of Diesels on Obsolescence," in: Railway Age,
Vol. 130, No. 14, April 9, 1951, pp. 45-49.
!expensive precision machinery designed and built primarily for inspec-
ting, cleaning, testing and checking the many mechanical and electrical
parts that function together in the diesel-electric locomotive.1
The demand for maximum availability of the diesel locomotives
has caused shop engineers to recognize the necessity for installing
every facility that will contribute to the elimination of man-hours
of maintenance labor and to shortening shopping periods. Iaterials
and parts handling equipment have been introduced to this end. These,
together with the lighter nature of the work have lightened the work
of the maintenance employees.
It should be noted, however, that most of the diesel power in use
is relatively new. The maintenance picture is still in flux. Diesel
shops thus far have been aimed at keeping the new power on the road.
The nature of the future shop, when the diesel units are greater in
number, older, and require more extensive and expensive rebuilding
work, may be such as to bring back into the railroad shop many of the
heavy production machines formerly used for steam locomotive repairs
and now peing used to build the new type of power.
Not only have the methods and requirements of maintenance changed,
but also the managerial and supervisory techniques involved. With steam
power, it was accepted that a road would have to own three locomotives
for each two on the road at any one time. The third would be in the
1 "The Changing Character of Shop Equipment," in: Railway Age,
Vol. 129, No. 25, December 16, 1950, p. 33.
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The steam locomotive machine shop contained heavy machinery,
boring mills, lathes, etc. The diesel shop has lighter and more
I
shop for servicing or repairs. With the more expensive diesels,
there is no longer any surplus of stored power which can be called
upon in emergencies to cover motive power failures or sudden and
unexpected peaks in traffic.
The servicing and maintenance practice in the case of diesel power
is predicated upon a completely new shopping concept--progressive main-
tenance of the diesels between runs with the use of exchange parts.
The carriers no longer wait for a failure or near failure to repair
the defective member. The aim ih diesel maintenance is to prevent any
breakdowns by scheduled repair or servicing of the various ccaponents.
Components are removed from the locomotive for repair and are replaced
by spare assemblies. The locomotive returns to the road using the new
assembly, the old component can then be repaired at leisure without
reduc)ng the availability of the locomotive itself beyond the time
required to remove one component and install another. The power is
not tied up while the repairs are being made.
This method requires a closely controlled system of inspecting
and servicing the locomotive. The unit exchange system with different
classes of inspection, servicing, and overhauling done on a mileage or
monthly basis as indicated by experience and manufacturer's recommenda-
tions. The diesels are maintained in this way, even to the extent of
scheduled painting.
Many of the roads which use power from different makers, have
distributed this power with all the locomotives from one manufacturer
used in one area and those from another maker in use in another area.
In this way, the spare parts inventory can be kept at a minimum and the
maintenance employees gain an expert familiarity with the one make.
The specialization has been carried a step further on some roads by
having the workers specialize in one or another of the basic parts of
the diesel.1 The all purpose maintenance man of the past does not fit
into the diesel maintenance picture.
The Erie Railroad serves as a leading example of the new main-
tenance practices. This road has developed a highly complete record
system for the entire road which has enabled advance scheduling of
work so that availability and mechanical efficiency of the locomotives
are kept at a high level. As a result, diesel engines in road service
averageiapproximately 11,000 miles a month. In contrast, steam loco-
motives on the Erie, while requiring more service at terminal points,
,are able to average only 6,000 miles per month in freight service.
This increase in mileage has been accompanied by a reduction in the
number of road failures as well as by a rise in the tonnage ratings of
the power.
The switching locomotives are maintained on a monthly, quarterly,
semi-annual and annual inspection basis based on the time in operation.
Checks are made on these engines in the yard once each 24 hours.
Mileage records for the road locomotives are kept in the diesel-
shop office. At 3,000 miles the road freight locomotive is held for
a mileage inspection taking approximately five hours. At this time
various items indicated for maintenance in 3,000 mile increments are
also taken care of. At the completion of 100,000 miles of service this
maintenance program begins again. At each 500,000 miles the diesel unit
1 "Re-Group and Centralize Shops," in: Modern Railroads, Vol. 6,
No. 5, May, 1951, pp. 103-8.
is taken out of service for a period of four days and the engine,
main generator and air compressor are removed. Previously overhauled
components are applied to the locomotive. The same cycle is observed
in maintaining the road passenger units except the mileage is doubled.1
Certain of the carriers have gone in extensively for reclaiming
diesel parts, rebuilding them by welding and machining. Many of the
reclamation techniques used have been the result of special study of
the application df welding processes to rebuild parts and components
subject to wear and requiring periodic replacement. The Atlantic Coast
Line, for example, has built in its own shops tools and fixtures de-
signed to aid in handling heavy or awkward sizes and shapes. Heat
treating facilities have been installed to control the temperature of
parts for most effective welding techniques and also to retain or re-
store the hardness and physical properties of the metal involved. The
A.C.L. shop uses the inert-gas-shielded tungsten arc welding method for
applying metal to worn portions of aluminum diesel pistons. With this
technique, reclamation can be accomplished for approximately 10 to 20
per cent of the original cost. 2
It can be seen that these new maintenance methods and requirements
have changed the railroad shop situation rather drastically, have
altered the labor requirements considerably, and have changed the job
content of many of the maintenance workers. The more intensive main-
tenance required by the diesel, maintenance as a function of time or of
mileage, the reclamation of parts, the increase in electrical component,
1 "Service Diesels for High Availability," in: Modern Railroads, Vol. 6,
No. 5, May, 1951, pp. 93-7.
2 "Diesel Parts Reclaimed by ACL," in: Modern Railroads, Vol. 6, No. 6,
June, 1951, pp. 49-54.
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the replacement of a boiler and cylinders by an internal combustion
engine, have all led to tasks once unknown in railroad maintenance.
Some of the smaller railroads which have converted to diesel
cannot afford and do not need the complete installation necessary for
effective diesel maintenance. Same of these send the entire diesel
locomotive back to the builder for general overhaul, or for heavy
repairs after accidents. This is a practice which may grow as builders
expand with more branch plants scattered around the country.1
The Railway Employes' Department of the American Federation of
Labor (which includes the machinists, boilermakers, blacksmiths, sheet
metal workers, electrical workers, carmen, and firemen and oilers) has
indicated a concern with the changing nature of the maintenance picture.
The Executive Council of the Department reported to its membership in
April of 1951, in comnenting upon the need for an employment stabiliza-
tion program: 2
Meanwhile, we have become increasingly concerned
over the situation which has developed, particu-
larly since the last war. While there was some
increase in employment during the war, over pre-
vious levels, the widespread introduction of the
diesel-electric locomotive, as well as the pur-
chase of a great deal of other new equipment by
the railroads, have made serious inroads on em-
ployment among the mechanical trades, and the
end is not in sight.
The Council went on to note that many carriers were contracting
out maintenance work on their diesels to the firms from which they had
1 J. B. Akers, op. cit., p. 49.
2 Official Proceedings, Tenth Convention, Railway Employes' Department,
American Federation of Labor, April 2 to April 4, 1951, Chicago,
Illinois, pp. 62.
1hauling of the diesel engines.
1 Ibid., p. 62.
No definite steps have been taken by any of the labor organizations
except the engineers and firemen. Many feel that a threat is presented
by the diesel but the engine service employees have been left to fight
the innovation alone. Supra Chapter III.
c eck a s own a carriers ha been reluctant to invest in the
special facilities and machinery necessary to service the new equip-
ment until their dieselization had progressed sufficiently so as to
result in enough diesel work to justify the investment. This had
necessitated a certain amount of contracting out of maintenance work.
However, for the most part, the work contracted out by such carriers
was confined to the rewindin of motors 
and enerators and the over-
purchased them. The Electro-Motive Division of General Motors was
singled out as having established maintenance facilities at various
points throughout the country, where maintenance work for the carriers
was performed. The report said that they also maintained a stock of
parts, "all of which reduces the amount of work done in railroad shops."
They also indicated that technological developments had had a
greater impact on the employees represented by the Department than,
perhaps, on any other group. It was their view that a sound program
to stabilize and increase shop employment should be developed and pro-
gressed as soon as possible, "while the situation is still fluid and
before maintenance policies on the various railroads become crystallized."
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The Executive Council urren~ on to indicate that a preliminary
~~L~hAI~ t·l~~ ~tr- ~~~+ t·~~ 'L~~~~ ~~~~.~L~UL L, ~~Ull
~~lt;~K rrau Jnunrr wla~ ~ar-nara ilau u~c~rl r~ruu~arr~r trv Irrvrsa~ m wre
special Yvice ar i
ment until their dieselization had progressed sufficiently so as to
result in enou~h diesel work to justify the investment, This had
necessitated a certain amount of contracting out of maintenance work.
~a~9-e~7er, for the most part, the work contracted out by such carriers
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hauling of the diesel engines,
1 Ibid., p. 62.
No definj.te steps have been taken by any of the labor o~ganiaatictls
e~rcept the engineers and rEiremen, Bdan3; feel that a threat is presented
by the diesel but the engine service emDloyees have been Lef+J to fight
the innovation alone. Supra Chapter III
i
1I
lt;~K 
was confined.to t;fie re·oo·inding of motors and generators and the over-
hauling of the diesel engines.
i rganiaations
firemen, banSr 
1 by the diesel ut the engine -pl  
the innovation alone, Supra Chapter III.
In contrast, the Council had found, many carriers had built the
necessary facilities to service the equipment at considerable savings
to themselves. Said the group: "We are confident that with a sound
program, vigorously prosecuted, we can persuade other carriers to do
likewise." 1
The Council indicated that it was giving continuous study to the
problem and hoped in the near future to develop a complete program
under which they would seek, among other things, to have all the main-
tenance work done by railroad employees. They would seek to end the
contracting out of maintenance work and seek to stabilize employment
by agreements with the carriers. In another area, the Department would
attempt to encourage the construction of new equipment, such as freight
cars, in the railroad shops.
The problem of construction of equipment has represented on many
roads a source of employment for the mechanical crafts. Many of the
major carriers would build some of their own steam locomotives in their
own shops with their own shop forces. This practice is still followed
by the Norfolk and Western Railroad, as indeed it must be by any carrier
wanting steam power in any quantity as all of the major steam builders
have changed over to the manufacture of diesels and have abandoned
steam construction. The building, rebuilding, alteration, and modifica-
tion of steam power in the carriers' own shops provided a major source
of employment in the past.
Such individual construction has not been possible with the diesel.
Most of the parts are much too specialized and the units too complex
1 Ibid., p. 63.
to permit manufacture in the average shop. The mass production methods
more characteristic of the automotive industry and of suppliers to it
which have been employed by the builders of diesel power, are not
possible in a railroad shop. It is possible that as dieselization
increases and carrier after carrier becomes completely dieselized,
more and more of the heavy repair work will be done in carrier shops
but it is extremely doubtful that any carrier will ever attempt to
build its own diesel locnootives. Not only the problems of construc-
tion but the more complicated design of the new power renders such
construction difficult in the extreme. The diesel is more amenable
to assembly line techniques and the cost reductions possible under the
mass production methods possible to the regular builders would not be
available to the individual carrier. Economy of acquisition alone would
appear to dictate purchase, rather than construction.
It is possible that the freeing of carrier construction facilities
from locomotive building may result in the use of such equipment and
space for the building of freight and passenger cars. Many of the
carriers have built a portion of their rolling stock needs in their
own shops in the past and this practice may well increase as more and
more facilities are freed throuah b Ai eselizai Ho^ veWir. +thV
may also prove to be the case. In the absence of locomotive construc-
tion and rebuilding, the facilities may be too extensive to be fully
employed by car construction. In that event they may well be scrapped
and car construction abandoned by the carriers and relegated completely
to the commercial car builders. In this event, the diesel will have
reduced the employment opportunities for the mechanical crafts indirectly
as well as directly.
i
One of the concerns shown by the Railway Employes' Department
was with the new shop equipment being installed by the carriers in an
effort to speed the maintenance of the expensive diesels and to reduce
the labor costs involved in such work. The changing nature of this
equipment has been discussed above and it can be appreciated that a
labor organization might properly be concerned.
The importance of the problem recognized by the Department has
also been appreciated by other labor organizations, some of them
members of the Railway Employes' Department. Most of these, however,
have been a bit more definite in their fears or demands. Several of
the unions concerned with maintenance have discussed their own sectors
of "the diesel problem" and have appeared to be aware of the changes
that the diesel has wrought without being aware of their exact nature
or extent.
An example of this is found in Resolution Number 16 of the 1948
convention of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Worlers.
This read in part.:1
Electric and diesel-electric power and equipment
will in a very short time replace steam and we
feel that the Electrical Workers today lose much
of their work due to rules being very much out
of date and we feel rules should be brought up
to this more electrical date.
This resolution had been introduced by a railroad local and was
adopted by the convention. It was not made clear in either the resolu-
tion itself or in any discussion of it just what work the Brotherhood
1 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Convention of the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, September 13-17, 1948, Atlantic
City, New Jersey, p. 376.
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possible hint was given, however, in Resolution Number 17 of the
same convention: 1
Be it resolved, that our International chiefs
members felt was being lost to them through inadequate rules. A
be requested t secure for the Electrical
Workers on railroads in America and Canada
the positions of diesel electric maintainer
while enroute and to further secure this
through national movements and to revise
our present rules covering this equipment
while enroute as well as in terminals or
shop points on railroad properties.
It appears that the engineers have not been the only labor
organization to dispute the claims of the firemen to the engine room
work. It will be recalled that the use of maintainers in the engine
rooms of the diesels was more prevalent in the earlier days of their
use than today, but the practice was being discontinued or decreased
by many of the carriers even before 1948. Most of the carriers re-
cognized that the electrical was the proper shop craft for employment
as maintainers, but all hesitated to concede the use of maintainers
to the union. Most of the difficulties experienced en route are of
an electrical ýature and if maintainers are to be used, the claim of
the Electrical Workers deserves recognition.
For the year 1950, total repairs to passenger diesels on 33
representative roads cost 2.95 cents per passenger train car mile
or 15.37 cents per locomotive unit mile. Of this 2.95 cents, the
total labor component was 1.58 cents. The 1.58 cents was divided
between engine repairs, electrical repairs, and other repairs.
Engine repairs took 0.54 cents, electrical repairs took 0.36 cents,
1 Loc. cit.
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and other repairs, 0.68 cents. 1
A proper comparison between freight and passenger diesels
cannot be made, but total repairs to freight diesels on the same
roads cost 11.9 cents per locomotive unit mile, or 10.91 cents per
one thousand gross ton miles (MGTM). Of the 10.91, repair labor
accounted for 6.19 cents. The average labor cost for engine repairs
on the 33 roads was 2.82 cents per MGTM, that for electrical repairs
was 1.61 cents per MGTM, and other repairs averaged 2.20 cents per
The importance of maintenance in the cost picture for the
carriers is indicated by the fact that, in passenger service, fuel
costs were 13.59 cents per locomotive unit mile, compared to the 15.37
cents per mile for repairs. In freight service fuel cost 16.68 cents
and repairs ll.9 cents. 3
Members of the machinist craft are, for the most part, charged
with the repairs to the engine. Many of these are represented by the
International Association of Machinists. This organization has not
neglected the problems raised by the diesel for its members although
its approach has been a bit less phrenetic than that of other organiza-
tions. It, too, has the matter under study, but has devised variations
in its apprenticeship rules which recognize some of the implications
raised by the diesel.
"ISpecial Statistics Evaluate Diesels," in: Modern Railroads, Vol. 6,
No. 7, July,l19l, p. L1.
2 Ibid., p. 40o
3 Ibid., p. l1-2.
L
a
i3
i
F!  161
At the 1948 convention of the I.A.M. a resolution was submitted
by Lodge 214 the subject of which was "Jurisdiction over machinist
work on Diesel locomotives." The suggested resolution read:1
Resolved that the General Chairmen Railroad
Committee make a complete study and list all
machinist work on diesel locomotives.
That the Railroad Department of the A. F. of
L. do everything possible to expedite any
items of a jurisdictional nature.
That this itemized list shall become a part
of all Railroad Agreements.
The resolution was defeated on the recommendation of the com-
mittee to which it was referred. This is not to say that the Associa-
tion did not approve of taking some steps in the area of the "diesel
problem" but that this particular method was not thought advisable
at the time.
Another of the crafts involved in the problem is the Boilermakers.
These workers had had much of the work involved in the construction
and repair of steam locomotive boilers and tenders. The work available
to them on the diesel is limited, and, in part, challenged by the Sheet
Metal Workers. 3etween these crafts the traditional and contractual'
dividing line has long been the gauge or thickness of the steel in-
volved in the particular job. Thinner metal has gone to the sheet
metal workers and thicker to the boilermakes. On the diesel there is
relatively little thick metal as the use of alloy steels has permitted
a reduction in gauge and weight in the few appropriate installations.
1 Proceedings 22nd Convention Grand Lodge International Association
of Machinists, September 13-25, 1948, Grand Rapids, Michigan,
Resolution Number 100, p. 256.
Both the Boilermakes and the Sheet Metal Workers unions have
considered the problems raised for their crafts by the introduction
of the diesel. Each has sought to expand its jurisdiction in an
effort to maintain or to improve the position of its members. In the
19h4 convention of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers,
Iron Ship Builders and Helpers of America an attempt was made to add
to the constitution of the organization specific reference to the
diesel:1
Include in article defining Boilermakers' work,
diesel locomotives and such work as is classified
as boilermakers' work on steam locomotives.
Many other instances could be cited of the concern shown by the
labor organizations for the job security and employment opportunities
of their members so far as the diesel is concerned. Suffice it to
say that all have approached the innovation with respect and with fear.
The "diesel problem" is by no means solved either in the locomotive
cabs, in the engine rooms, or in the maintenance shops.
The carriers and their maintenance employees have met the problems
raised in a variety of ways. The new skills and demands of diesel
maintenance have raised problems for both the employers and the emp-
loyees. Critical problems of training have been created by the diesel.
These have been met, for the most part, by the carriers with little
assistance from the labor organizations. In the early days of the
diesel, the carriers had to turn to the only source competent to advise
1 Proceedings of the Seventeenth Consolidated Convention, Inter-
national Brotherhood of 3oilermakers, Iron Ship Builders and
Helpers of America, January 31-February 9, 1944, Kansas City,
Missouri, Resolution Number 17h.
and train maintenance workers--the builders. The shop forces and
supervisors of the carriers themselves were not equipped for the
training job.
The training problem is still a severe one. There were appro-
ximately 2,500 diesel units added to the rosters of the railroads in
1951. To maintain and operate this amount of new power (since vir-
tually none of it went to replace diesel power) approximately 5,000,000
square feet of new shop space for diesel servicing and repairs was
required. About 7,000 additional enginemen and firemen had to be
trained to operate diesels, some 3,500 shop and service men and at
least 350. supervisors had to be instructed in the special requirements
of the diesel locomotive. Thus, about 1l,000 railroad men worked on
diesels for the first time in 1951. This presented a training problem
of great magnitude.1
In the past, manufacturers' schools carried the major load of
diesel training. That of the Electro-Motive Division of General
Motors has given basic instruction to over 10,000 railroad men. In
addition, two of the company's instruction cars have been used for
classroom work by about 65,000 men on individual roads throughout the
country.
Some of the carriers have equipped air-brake and other cars for
diesel instruction and encouraged the establishment of diesel clubs
at local shops. Correspondence school courses have been developed
by the railroads in conjunction with the builders and existing
1 "Teaching Teachers at Electro-Motive," in: Railway Age, Vol. 130,
No. 1L, April 9, 1951, pp. 41-hh.
'1 Ibid., p. 43.
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institutions. The need, however, is a critical one and again the
roads have called upon the manufacturers for assistance. A new,
specialized course has been developed by the Electro-14otive Division
school for the purpose of preparing railroad instructors to teach
classes on individual lines. This course, a "Sixty-day Personalized
Instructor-Training Program" was developed with classes limited to a
maximum of four men. Most of the time is spent in the shop with an
instructor to point out approved methods of reconditioning, building,
and maintaining diesels. 1
In view of this obvious displacement of the old, painfully
acquired skills, the concern of the labor groups for the job content
and security of their members is understandable. The situation of
their members in relation to the diesel is a delicate one and not
calculated to breed security. In addition to the psychic factors
involved in this insecurity and uncertainty of craft and ability, the
displacement of men as well as of skills is in the minds of workers
and their organizations.
It is fully as difficult to measure displacement in the area of
maintenance employees as in the other areas. As was indicated in
Chapter II, the variations in maintenance work with rises and falls
in traffic are severe. Roads which are partially dieselized use their
steam power on a stand-by basis but keep their diesels fully employed.
In the event of an increase in traffic beyond the ability of the normal
complement of the diesels to handle, steam locomotives are taken out
I-
employment picture.
Table XIV compares the index numbers for traffic units and the
mid-month count of employees in the various shop crafts. The re-
lationships are much the same as might be expected, given the
mechanical and electrical characteristics of the diesel, which
increased greatly in importance over this period (from 23.1 per
cent of the freight train miles in January,. 1949, to 55.2 per
cent in December, 1951).
!.
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of storage and put into service. These are not properly maintained--
certainly not to the extent they would be if they were in regular
service--and carriers planning to add diesels are not likely properly
to maintain steam power which is about to be replaced.
On the other hand, some of the carriers, looking forward to
dieselization, have not purchased new steam power for a number of
years. As a result they are operating with out-moded power which
requires excessive maintenance if it is to be kept on the road at
all. All of these factors serve to cloud the maintenance employee
1P6
TABLE XIV
INDICES OF TRAFFIC UiTNIITS WIrITH EMPLOYMLENT OF BLACKSMITHIS,
BOILERMIEAS, ETLECTRICIANS, MACNISTS, AND SHEET
ETAL W~0RIERS, BY MONTHS
1949-1951*
(January, 1949@100)
Year Sheet
and Traffic Black- Boiler- Electri- Machin- Metal
Month units smitbhs mnakers cians ists Workers
1949
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Act.
May
Jun.
Jul.
Aug.
Sep.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
1950
Jan.
Feb.
Mar .
M•ay
Jun.
Jul.
Aug.
Sep.
Oct.
Dec.
1951
Jan.
Feb.
:-ar.
Apr.
May
Jun.
Jul.
Aug.
Sep.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
100.0
89.4
94.1
99.6
101.2
97.o2
90.1
96.2
90.5
82.0
91.6
92.3
84.8
73.4
99.4
97.4
100.0
103.6
104.5
118.9
114.8
121.4
113.5
109.2
113.3
96.2
116.2
102,2
116.2
113.6
107.8
121.0
118.0
122.9
113.2
107.7
100.0
97.4
90.2
91.2
91.7
89.1
85.0
83*.1
8103
65.2
69.4
79 .5
83.0
79.5
81.5
86.5
77.
90.21
89.6
92.0
93.3
93.7
93.9
95.6
94.6
95.0
96.0
96.5
96.61
94.7
94.8
91.30
91.0
90.4
100.0
95.5
89,4
86.7
86.3
83.2
76.5
76.1
7803
65.8
70.7
79.5
82.7
79.0
80.3
83.3
76.1
83.7
84.1
84i9
87.3
88.0
8.5
88.9
38.8
39.6
90.1
86o3
83.9
81.6
80.8
78.8
78.3
?r?,
100.0
99.0
91.2
98.2
99*.0
97.6
102.5
97.1
99.6
94.6
96.9
101.8
106.1
105.1
106.1
109.8
99.1
111.6
112.2
11309
115.1
116.2
117.1
118.0
119.2
120.8
121 2
123.5
123.5
123.7
123.8
124.1
124.9
125.7
125.2
100.0
97.2
111.2
91.7
91.8
88.2
83.3
83.3
84.1
75,0
79 .1
86.8
90.1
87.7
89.4
92,0
81.8
93.2
93.6
94.5
96.1
97.1
98.1
99.1
99.8
100.0
100.6
101. 0
99.2
96.7
96.0
95.8
96.1
95.1
95.0
95.1
100.0
96.6
93.7
90.7
91.7
88. 5
83.8
85.1
85.5
76.2
80.6
89.0
93.7
89.6
91.5
94.6
85.6
95.8
96.6
98.1
99.5
102.1
103 .8
104.9
105.76 3
107.*4
108.
106.5
103.9
103.8
104.0
103.3
103.5
104.4
105.1
*SOTCE: 7lage Statistics of Class I
Statement M-300, Bureau of
ordics and Statistics, ICC.
Steam Railways,
Transport Econ-
(Computed).
--
The importance of theelectrical components of the new loco-
motives and the necessity for extensive maintenance of them may be
read from the steady growth in the employment of electricians.
This growth becomes even more apparent when the index of traffic
units is examined in conjunction with it. Through the early portion
of 1950 traffic continued near the levels of 1949. Through most of
this period, the indices for the other shop crafts were depressed,
but the growth of the employment of electricians continued in spite
of somewhat lower traffic levels.
The boilermakers, again as might be expected from the maintenance
requirements of the diesel, lost ground almost consistently and even
the higher traffic levels of 1951 could not compensate for the loss
of boilermaker work with the growing abandonment of steam.
Blacksmiths, needed for heavy repairs on steam power, also lost
ground, but to a lesser extent than the boilermakers. It is possible
that as the diesels age and heavier repairs upon them are necessary
the blacksmiths will again be in demand. Here, however, the changing
nature of the equipment used in maintenance work on the railroads
will take its toll. Automatic devices for regulating the heat-
treating of the metal being worked upon will remove much of the
necessity for the skill of the blacksmith in this area. The reclama-
tion of parts through welding noted earlier in this chapter may take
up some of the slack, but in this area the boilermakers and the black-
smiths heve yet to arrive at an agreement as to complete jurisdiction
over welders.
The role of the machinists in the maintenance picture is a 'con-
fused one. Their loss has been less than the boilermakers and the
blacksmiths. There is still a place for the machinist in the repair
of the engine, but at this stage of the use of the diesel, most of
the repairs-quantitywise if not cost wise--are to the electrical
components. It is probable that as the motive power ages and more
and more mechanical repairs become necessary, the importance of the
machinist in the maintenance routine will increase.
As was indicated in the discussion concerning the boilermakers
and the sheet metal workers the lighter gauge-material used in the
diesel has led to little decline in the employment of the sheet
metal workers. Although their number has not increased to the extent
that traffic has increased, they have lost little ground absolutely
and certainly none in comparison to the other crafts with the excep-
tion of the electricians. There is no reason to suspect that the
future situation will vary greatly from that of the immediate past.
Only in the event that the boilermakers expand their jurisdiction
over the work involved will the sheet metal workers find themselves
the victims of any great displacement by and through dieselization.
It appears that the advent of the diesel has exercised a
greater effect upon the maintenance employees than upon the operating
employees. Much of the work involved in the railroad industry has
continued relatively unchanged by the introduction of the new motive
power. Cars of freight and passengers must be moved over the road.
They must be switched, serviced, billed, accounted for, etc., regard-
less of the type of motive power used to move them. The engine service
employees have retained their operating duties as have members of the
signal and communications departments. The' maintenance of way and
structures continues to be concerned with track, roadbed and
structures. These have not been altered to any appreciable extent
through dieselization. It is possible, although not probable, that
complete dieselization after a number of years would begin to
exercise some effect upon the track and roadbed. However, this
time has not arrived and it is by no means certain that any great
effect will be felt.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Any exazrnation of the problems posed by the introduction of
the diesel-electric locomotive on the railways of the United States
is inevitably impressed by the rapidity of the spread of this new
variety of motive power. From its early introduction in 1924
to the present time, the diesel has made almost constant strides in
the direction of its present importance. Introduced first in switch-
ing ser-'ce, it did not expand its field of employment for some nine
years when i+ first entered into passenger service. Seven more years
were to elapse -ntil it began operating in freitght se-r'ice to any
extent worthy of the name. Since its introduction into freight in
1 941, it has spread until it is now the rdominant form of motive
Dower in that field.
To make such strides in such a comparatively short time the
diesel has had to possess outstanding advantages. The steam loco-
motive, after over a century of devblorment, was not to be idly re-
placed by any motive power less than as efficient or without a dom-
inating superiority. The railways of the country had tried the steam
locomotive ancd foT1hii it not want.ing. Only the marked superiority of
the diesel-electr c as a form of railroad moti-e rower enabled the
new form of -ower to survive.
The d~esel proved itself superior in several important char-
acteristics. These included the ability to lull heavy loads at low
speeds, thereby rendering it well suited for use in switching and in
freight service; the ability to accelerate to operating speed quite
ra•.dly, which made its use in all varieties of passenger service a
move both toward economy and toward more efficient service; the ability
to travel long distances without the necessity for adding fuel or
water or req uiring other servicing, this made its use in through pas-
sengor and through freight service not only possible but desirable;
the ability to utilize efficiently a ccmparatlsvly cheap fuel, this
enabled its application to be made in all kinds of railway service.
In additi•on to its operating advantages, the diesel had a com-
oarative freedom from repair and maintenance requirements which enabled
it to ring up records of availability. and low maintenance costs. This
-n turn enabled the locomotives to snend more time on the road at
work. The higher first cost of the diesel could thus be amortized
and its operating advantages taken full advantage of.
Another of the factors which recommended the diesel to the car-
riers was its comparative cleanliness in operation. This was part-
icularly important in switching service in cities and towns. It was
in this class of service that the diesel first rose to dominance.
All of these advantages were responsible for the rapid and wide-
spread adoption of the diesel. Recognized as an innovation by the
carriers, it was also recognized as an innovation by the railroad
emplcye~e. The labor orgsnizatiowsrepresenting the worker~ who came
into contact with the new form rf 3ower were not slow to suspect the
new motive power of representing a threat to the crafts and the job
security of their members. The unions reacted in the same manner tha+t
cther iunions in the past, presented by a technological development,
had chosen.
S·,e of the railway unions attempted to combat the new device
through the medium of restrictive rules and practices. The two engine
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se--ice brotherhoods, the Brotlerhood of Lccomotire Enrineers and the
Bro+herhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen both attempted to
forr! the carriers to employ a second member of their craft on the
diesel for duties ir. the engine rooms. The carriers had recognized
the operating necessity for having both an operating engineer and a
fireman (helper) on each locomotive, Aespite the fact that the gener-
ation of power no longer denended uron the fireman. However, apparently
feeling that the diesel, with its ability to pnull hea'-rer loads, rep-
resented a def rite threat to the employment of engine ser=ice emo-
lovees, both of the organizations demanded the emnloyment of a seoond
member of their seniority list for the purpose of perferming routine
inspection and maintenance tasks en route. When the carriers ref'used.
these senarate demards, +he unions 'breatened to strike. Ooerating
unde" the terms of the Railway Labor Act, the Prsi&dent in three in-
stances appointed an Energencv Board, t- bear the claims. Tn each of
the cases, a joint procee.ing in 1943, the Engineers' case in 1941,
and the F4remen's case in the same year.. the Boards rejected, almost
in entirety, the demands. In the first case the Board did concede
and recommended that the fi-reman (helper) remain in the cab at all
timbra in higFh-qpeed, min-line passenger service. In the event that
another man were to be added to nerform the work customarily done by
the fireman, he sho-!ld be taken from the ranks of the firemen. In
both of the other cases the union failed to win a ooint.
The nresent situation is just as it was after the 104 case.
Two men are employe- on each locomo+ice in road service and in yard
serice on locomot-ver wpight o-er 00.000 pounds on dri-,ers. One of
these men is taken from the ranks of the engineers and the other is a
fireman. From an operating point of view, from a safety point of view,
this two man crew is necessary. None of the Boards was able to find
in the evidence and testimony of the labor organizations any justification
for the employment of an additional man on the diesel locomotive. The
present investigation has not brought to light any additional facts
which would lead to disagreement with th+e Boards.
It also appears that the feav of the Brotherhoods that diesel-
ization would lead to the displacement of their members has, as yet,
no justification in fact. It is admitted that complete dieselization
may well alter the present picture. However, this event is not likely
to take place in the near future, if at all. It is certain that the
ups and downs in the volume of traffic have been, in the past, the
cause of much more unemployment and under-employment than the diesel
could ever account for. To the extent that the cost advantages of
the new power enable rate reductions or inhibit rate increases an
thereby stabilize to some extent the traffic load of the carriers, the
diesel will have contributed to stability of employment, rather than
to the reverse.
The dispute between the various crafts as to the jiirissdiction
over running repairs en route has involved the engineers. the fniremen,
the electricians and, to a limited degree, the -machinists. At the
present time this work is done either by firemen, maintainers who are
members of the shop crafts--us-ally electricians--or by so-called
sunervisory employees. This d~soute is by no means at an end and the
probabilities are that l.t, will continue as an active issue in negotiat-
ions between the -unions and the carriers as well as the subject of
,ontroversv between the labor orcatnizations.
17 4
So far as can be seen from t+he available evidence, it is only
in the case of the maintenance craf+s that dieselization has led to
any significant changes in employment opportunities. The very natuore
of the diesel is such that the maintenance re uirements are vastly
different from those of the steam locomotie., In many respects. a
higher degree of skill is required from the shop crafts. Many of the
tolerences to which they must work are more severe. Many more of the
machirnery and controls are electrical in nature, many of the parts are
lighter, most of the machinery operates at higher rotational speeds
than is the case.with the steam locomotive.
These maintenance characteristics are reflected in the emnlov-
ment relationships over the past three years, when the diesel has had
a rapid growth. The electriciars have increased their employment, the
sheet metal workers have gained slightly in relatinn to the other metal
working crafts, the machinists have lost ground as have the black-
smiths. The boilermakers appear to have borne the brunt, of the change
in maintenance requiremcnt,. The work on the boilers and tenders of
steam locomotives formerly provided the bulk of their iuties. The
absence of wor•h of thi 9 nature on the diesel has spelled rather
severe displacement for this craft. There aopears to be lIttle chance
That their craft can regain it* former imnortance in the railroad
mainltenance ?icture, so far as locomotivres be concerned, ?r-cent at
the expense of other of the maintenance crafts.
So far as the rest of the railway emploswees be concerned, the
rlesel resreser 4l i:rely an extens1.,'r -f a trend of long standeig
toward more and more oowerf~-. motive -ower. To the extent that hi s
trend in the past has represented any threat to the employment of
any of the callings, the diesel has continued that threat and has
possibly increased the tempo of potential displacement. For such
emnlovees, howerer, the diesel 'oe•s not represent anything completely
new or different. In any event, even with traffic slightly over half
dieselizsd at the moment, the degree of dieselization is not yet
great enough to permit any generalization on this score.
It is altogether possible that the economies of the diesel are
such that almost complete dieselization will permit the recapture
of traffic lost to the rails and result in increased, rather than in
decreased employment for almost all of the occupations. Certainly
the rail transportation net work of the country is important enough
to it economically,as well as from a military point of view, so that
an increase in efficiency of the magnitude -ermitted by the adoption
of the diesel-electric locomotive cannot but help to benefit the
commtry and the economy in the long rmn. The price for this benefit
in terms of technological displacement of workers promises to be so
low that the country cannot afford not to pay it.
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